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ABSTRACT
The Depoliticization of Public Policy
(September 1984)
Dwight Conrad Kiel, B.A. , Cornell University
M.A., University of Texas/Austin
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jeffrey L. Sedgwick
Much of the recent work in the public policy field
in Political Science has heralded a welfare
economics/public choice approach as the new "paradigm"
of the field. A welfare economics/public choice
approach does have political appeal because it redefines
politics, the public good and citizenship in ways that
seem to resolve many of the problems facing the modern
administrative state. However, the thoughts and
practices necessary to make these redefinitions and
resolutions hold are even more dangerous than the
problems now facing the administrative state.
The public policy field has opened itself up to
much of the fare of a welfare economics/public choice
approach because the field lacks a history guided by
more than just a case-study approach. This work
attempts to develop a history of public policy in the
v
United States that is guided by an understanding of the
relations between the public sphere and the private
sphere. Such an examination provides insights into the
nature of guiding approaches developed in the United
States to deal with the problems of a federal government
with immense responsibilities for, yet, relatively weak
powers in, the private sphere. Each of the approaches
taken by representatives and administrators at the
federal level from 1883 to 1969 had its flaws. Yet,
compared with a welfare economics/public choice
approach, each previous approach maintained a commitment
to good politics, to the public good and to citizenship.
The historical examination of past policy
approaches helps reveal both the appeal and the danger
of a welfare economics/public choice approach to public
policy.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Public Good and Public Policy
In the last fifteen years scholars and
practicioners of public policy in the United States have
been lured by the sirens of a welfare economics/public
choice approach to public policy. In the public
administration literature, the policy literature and the
policy analysis literature the sirens have warned that
past policy approaches taken by the federal government
to solve social ills and promote social equity failed,
and failed dangerously. [ 1] The previous forms of
intervention into the private sphere by government have
been accused of wrecking the economy, fostering civil
disturbances and weakening the social fabric of the
United States. Indeed, the sirens claim that the
legitimation crisis of the 1960s and the 1970s was not
so much the product of institutionalized racism, nor of
the Viet Nam War, nor of the Nixon presidency nor of a
rejection of American mores, but was, instead, the
product of the techniques of public policy. The sirens,
of course, do more than warn of danger, they offer a new
approach and a new set of techniques which will, they
1
promise, secure a strong economy, restore faith in
government action and protect citizens from the
deliterious effects of the private economy.
I have little doubt that many of the techniques and
models advocated by those who support a welfare
economics/public choice approach will be adopted by
policy makers in the United States. I have, though,
grave doubts about the effects a welfare
economics/public choice approach will produce on the
political life in the United States. The assumptions
made by this approach about human nature, the public
good and good politics portend the depolit icizat ion of
government and society in the United States. I do not
make such a claim lightly. The methods of intervention
in the private sphere by government establish practices
and create concepts which influence the thoughts and
actions of citizens. As the Founders understood, good
government is predicated upon good citizens, but good
government also has a responsibility to nuture good
citizens. A public policy approach which ignores the
connection between good government and good citizens is
dangerous. A public policy approach which isolates
citizens in the policy process, encourages unreflective
behavior by citizens and endorses "homo economus" as the
ideal citizen is dangerous. A public policy approach
which denigrates the ability of citizens to come
together in public forums and to rise above self-
interest in the pursuit of the common good is dangerous.
Methods
I want to expose these dangers, which are the
dangers of the depol i t icizat ion of public policy at the
hands of a welfare economics/public choice approach, but
I also want to explore why past policy approaches have
encouraged this depoliticization of public policy. In
reviewing the history of public policy in the United
States, I found (and/or constructed) four federal
approaches to public policy since the 1880s. By an
"approach" to public policy I mean a set of techniques,
structures and concepts which guide government officials
as they are forced to make interventions in the private
sphere. Each approach that I have discerned makes
assumptions about human nature, good politics and the
public good which guide and justify the actions taken by
the government under that approach. [2]
As we shall see, each approach taken since the
1880s has been a response to the failure of previous
approaches to respond successfully to new political,
economic and/or social developments. Each approach also
4generated problems which could only be handled by moving
outside the boundaries which determined that approach's
selection of techniques for intervention in the private
sphere. Rarely does an approach die outright. Rather
it survives in some areas, but is supplanted in most
areas of government intervention by a new dominant
approach.
From the 1880s to the 1970s, the history of public
policy in the United States has been marked by four
approaches to government intervention in the private
sphere. First, beginning in the 1880s the federal
government adopted a regulatory approach to intervention
in the private sphere. Second, without abandoning the
regulatory approach, the federal government, in response
to the Great Depression, accepted responsibility for
steering the economy and for guaranteeing decent living
standards for all citizens. The myriad of approaches to
these new responsibilities during the New Deal makes the
New Deal approach hard to label, but the emphasis on
social responsibility by the federal government
separates this era from the regulatory movement and I
have chosen to call it the social responsibility
approach. Third, following the Second World War, the
federal government attempted to fulfill the promises of
the New Deal with the scientific-planning approach.
Fourth, in the 1960s a participation approach was
slapped on top of the increasingly deficient scientific-
planning approach.
It is my argument in this work that each of these
previous approaches, although containing serious flaws,
maintained a commitment to good politics, the public
good and good citizenship. We need to rethink these
past approaches so that we can find the moments of truth
and of insight that each approach offers. We need to be
aware of the deficiencies of each approach so that
better policies can be made in the future. We need to
beware those approaches which sacrifice politics, the
public good and good citizenship to the single banner of
efficiency.
Organizat ion
The depolit icizat ion of public policy at the hands
of a welfare economics/public choice approach is the
thread which binds this work together. I use the term
"depoliticization" to signify the de-moral izat ion of
both citizen and citizens: the political being and the
political body. Political life is a way of being in the
world which has been celebrated periodically in the
history of humans and squashed quite easily, though not
completely, for much longer periods. In the literature
of public policy there is far too little discussion of
the connection between policy and good politics and
between policy and good citizenship. These connections
need to be explored if the study of public policy is to
make lasting and fruitful contributions to the human
condition.
In Chapter I, "The Anti-Political Character of a
Welfare Economics Approach to Public Policy," I critique
the assumptions about human nature that welfare
economics/public choice advocates hold. In the next
four chapters I began the examination of the four
approaches to public policy practiced from the 1880s to
the 1970s. In Chapter VI, "The Why of a Welfare
Economics/Public Choice Approach to Public Policy," I
present the case for the welfare economics/public choice
approach by examining the flaws of the previous
approaches. In Chapter VII, "The Depolit icizat ion of
Public Policy," I illustrate the conceptual weaknesses
and practical dangers of a welfare economics/public
choice approach to public policy.
ENDNOTES
1. My criticisms of a welfare economics/public
choice approach to public policy are aimed most
specifically at works by Vincent Ostrom and Charles L.
Schultze: Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in
American Public Administration (University. Alabama:
Alabama University Press, 1974); Charles L. Schultze,
The Public Use of Private Interest (Washington D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1977); Allen V. Kneese and
Charles L. Schultze, Pollution, Prices and Public Policy
(Washington D.C. : The Brookings Institution, 1975). I
am more leary of holding other advocates of a welfare
economics/public choice approach knowingly responsible
for the depolit icization of public policy which such an
approach encourages. Ostrom and Schultze, though, are
both politically astute scholars and cannot claim
ignorance of the political benefits and costs of the
model they endorse.
2. I make no claim that this is the only possible
construction of previous policy approaches. Other
scholars may discern more complicated and sophisticated
patterns in the ways which the public/private split has
influenced public policy in the United States. My
schema is helpful for understanding the dilemmas of the
modern administrative state in the United States and, I
hope, that it is provocative enough to encourage further
historical analysis of public/private relations and the
way in which these relations determine the possibilities
for government action.
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CHAPTER II
THE ANTI-POLITICAL CHARACTER OF A WELFARE ECONOMICS
APPROACH TO PUBLIC POLICY
The Tragedy of the Commons
In 1968 Garrett Hardin published his now famous
parable, "The Tragedy of the Commons. "[1] This parable
— a paraphrasing of an account made by an English
political-economist in 1883 -- has become the standard
introduction to works that argue for a welfare economics
approach to public policy. [2] Hardin's parable is
useful to welfare economists because it illustrates
their conception of the individual and the dangerous
consequences of this individual in action. Furthermore,
the parable is an alleged explication of an historical
event: the enclosure movements in England. This is not
a fable with talking fauna, but an, allegedly,
exempl icat ive and "true" story of humans acting in the
world. The claims of such a story deserve exploration.
The parable reads:
The tragedy of the commons
develops in this way. Picture a
pasture open to all. It is to be
expected that each herdsman will try
to keep as many cattle as possible on
the commons. Such an arrangement may
work reasonably satisfactorily for
centuries because tribal wars,
8
poaching, and disease keep the
numbers of both man and beast well
below the carrying capacity of the
land. Finally, however, comes the
day of reckoning, that is, the day
when the long-desired goal of social
stability becomes a reality. At this
point, the inherent logic of the
commons remorselessly generates
tragedy.
As a rational being, each
herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.
Explicitly or implicitly, more or
less consciously, he asks, "What is
the utility to me of adding one more
animal to my herd?" This utility has
one negative and one positive
component
.
1. The positive component is a
function of the increment of one
animal. Since the herdsman receives
all the proceeds from the sale of the
additional animal, the positive
utility is nearly +1.
2. The negative component is a
function of the additonal overgrazing
created by one more animal. Since,
however, the effects of overgrazing
are shared by all the herdsmen, the
negative utility for any particular
decision-making herdsman is only a
fraction of -1.
Adding together the component
of partial utilities, the rational
herdsman concludes that the only
sensible course for him to pursue is
to add another animal to his herd.
And another.... But this is the
conclusion reached by each and every
rational herdsman sharing a commons.
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is
locked into a system that compels him
to increase his herd without limit —
in a world that is limited. Ruin is
the destination toward which all men
rush, each pursuing his own best
interest in a society that believes
in the freedom of the commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to
10
all. [3] (original emphasis)
The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons
Within the parable is a clear description of the
individual according to welfare economists.
Individuals, including herdsmen, are "rational" beings
who seek to maximize their individual economic gains.
Individuals, as economic self-maximizers , lack the
ability to perceive correctly interests greater or other
than their own individual and specific economic
interests. Being incapable of, or at least retarded in,
determining interests other than their own economic
interests, individuals are denied the political ability
of communicating and discussing political issues in a
forum where the pubic good (as opposed to the summation
of private interests) might be determined. Individuals
are cast as economic and atomistic creatures, not as
political and social beings.
If this is indeed a true picture of human nature
then one is prompted to ask why the commons originated
and how they were maintained before the enclosure
movement. No precise explanation of the origin of
commons is offered in the parable, but one is suggested
by the parable's direct answer to how commons were
11
maintained. The parable states, "Such an arrangement
may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because
tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of
both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of
the land." [4] Simply, each individual was earnestly
pursuing economic self-maximization in the commons, but
the ill effects were constrained by warring neighbors,
roaming villains and natural disasters. Maintenance of
commons, then, was the result of the whims of human
nature and the caprice of nature. The origin of the
commons also must, then, be the result of whim, caprice
and chance. Surely, economic and atomized self-
maximizers — with narrow and short-term world views who
are devoid of political and social skills — must have
simply lucked into the commons arrangement.
The parable, having presented such a sparse view of
human nature, must ignore evidence that the users of
commons were also responsible for the maintenance of
commons. A vast array of anthropological studies have
shown how even the most primitive tribes have
sophisticated social, religious and political practices
which maintain their commons. [5] These practices may
not be acceptable to modern citizens, but the practices
do illustrate that members of these tribes, as well as
English herdsmen, were not merely economic creatures who
12
were constrained from destroying their commons by the
whims of other humans and the caprice of nature.
Indeed, the English commons were not enclosed
because they were an agricultural failure or because
pasture land was overgrazed. From the thirteenth
century to the sixteenth century enclosures were carried
out by the heads of baronies for the creation of parks
and to secure land surrounding their homes. [6] This
estate-building by the aristocracy was usually
accomplished without remuneration to the yeomanry. The
aristocracy may have displayed prestige and security
motives in these enclosures, but economic motives were,
at best, unimportant. After 1600 an economic motive for
the enclosure of commons did appear. Commons were
enclosed to provide the vast acreage necessary to make
the raising of sheep for wool production profitable.
Enclosure was possible because the aristocracy was able
to enlist the most affluent yeomanry to the movement.
As commons were enclosed, large villages disappeared and
were replaced by five or six large estates: affluent
yeoman had become landed gentry. These enclosures
forced the yeomanry off the land and created yet another
new class in England: the poor. [7] Prior to these
enclosures some of the yeomanry were impoverished, but
they maintained access to their own sustenance. After
13
these enclosures, dispossessed yeomen either found a
market for their labor or found themselves in a building
without an exit: the poor house.
The enclosure movement was fueled, at times, by
economic motives, but the explanation of the demise of
the commons (as a result of each herdsman pursuing his
rational self-interest and thus destroying the commons
through overgrazing) was an incorrect and posthumous
apology for the aberrational economic motives displayed
by the aristocracy and the landed gentry. This
prevaricated apology by England's blooming political
economists was necessary to explain the most dangerous
consequence of the enclosure movement, the new class of
the permanent poor. Evicted yeomen who sought no
employment and escaped the poor house were able to
sustain themselves by relocating to areas where commons
still were maintained. By gleaning and by using waste
land held in common in these areas, these yeomen were
able to avoid selling their labor without ending up in
the poor house. These "idle poor" never constituted a
threat to commons, but they were seen by English
political-economists as deviants who refused to live by
the new model of economic self-maximization and who were
thus poor role models and future threats to social
stability. [8]
14
The enclosure movement did provide economic
benefits. Wool production was profitable for those few
who owned large sections of land. The rents charged for
enclosed land were higher than those charged for land on
agricultural commons and this also created profits for
large land owners. New and more productive agricultural
techniques were employed more often on enclosed lands
than those on commons and these innovations surely
produced some long-range economic benefits in
England. [9] However, the claim that the enclosure
movement after 1600 produced economic benefits for some
and the claim that these enclosures were the product of
some individuals' attempting to maximize their prestige,
security and, in some cases, profits do not prove that
the economic explanations of enclosure and the economic
arguments for enclosure expounded by political-
economists in the nineteenth century are correct. On
the one hand, the explanation of the enclosure movement
propounded by the political-economists (the one which
Hardin accepts) assumes that the tragedy is the logical
outcome of the transcendental self-maximizing character
of all humans. This explanation was inaccurate, but
necessary for the political-economists who wanted to
illustrate that the economic self-maximizing individual
glorified by Mandeville and elevated to the rank of
15
citizen by Adam Smith was not simply a vision of or a
model for the modern subject, but was instead an
historically verifiable (and transcendental) description
of human nature. On the other hand, the economic
argument for continued enclosures advocated by the
political-economists was a result of their desire to dry
up the resources of the "idle poor" and force these poor
to conform to the political-economists* vision of the
safe and depol i t ic ized modern subject. The political-
economists' explanation could carry no weight until the
many deviants who undermined their interpretation were
forced to accept their proper economic attitude toward
life.
The attempt to argue that the economic self-
maximizing individual is a transcendental construct is
central to Hardin's parable, but this construct is
simply not self-evident. Hardin's parable assumes such
a transcendental claim about human nature — gaining
persuasiveness by the very simplicity and brevity of the
story -- by ignoring both anthropological and historical
evidence.
16
Consequences of Endorsing the Myth of the Tragedy of the
Commons "
Despite these serious flaws, it is still possible
that the parable may be an accurate description of
particular actors in particular commons situations.
Welfare economists use the parable to explain why air
and water pollution occur in the United States: the
polluter is plagued by only a small proportion of the
environmental damage his pollution creates, but the
benefit of the free use of the environment to dispose of
the pollution accrues completely to the polluter. The
welfare economists have provided a compelling
explanation of modern air and water pollution by
retrieving Adam Smith's vision of the individual as an
economic self-maximizer with accurate knowledge only of
his own passions and by applying this vision to both the
modern corporation and the modern individual. It is not
the modern corporation that is demeaned in this view,
but rather the quality and character of humans. Given
this view of the modern individual, how is it possible
to solve public problems created by individuals (and
corporations) pursuing and knowing only their own
private interests? How is it possible to determine and
to pursue the common or public good?
Hardin and the welfare economists part company in
17
answering these questions. Hardin, exhibiting Hobessian
colors, suggests the necessity of a scientific-
administrative elite to determine and enforce the public
good. The individual pursuit of economic interests
would be blunted by administrative laws and
constructively rechanneled by a paternalistic
technocratic elite. How this elite would be selected
and how it would maintain its allegiance to an
acceptable interpretation of the public good are
questions Hardin does not answer. How would individuals
in society (previously known as citizens) rise above
their channeled pursuit of self-interest and select
technocratic guardians who have everyone's best
interests in mind? How would expertise in scientific
issues provide a moral framework within which allocation
decisions could be made? Why would individuals who are
in essence self-maximizers accept the decisions of
individuals whose only claim to legitimacy is a
scientific background and a claim to moral superiority?
Such questions cannot be answered when one's conception
of the individual estranges the individual from
knowledge of interests greater or other than his own.
The advocates of a welfare economics approach to
public policy avoid the inconsistencies of Hardin's
solution. Individuals will not determine the public
18
good, because the concept of the public good is a myth
and the public good is, therefore, not accessible. What
is accessible is the summation of all individual
interests in society, and this summation of interests
will replace the false ideal of the public good with the
empirical reality of the "public interest." The
calculation of the "public interest" does not depend
upon the ability of humans to act ethically or morally.
Nor does it depend upon the ability of humans to
communicate their interests to each other and upon
reflection posit a "good" greater than individual
interests. The calculation of the "public interest,"
then, does not rely on either democratic or republican
forms of government. For both forms ultimately must
rest upon the virtue of citizens and upon the greater
insights of intersubject ive communication in democratic
forums. [10] Indeed, individuals who act ethically
and/or who try to understand and represent interests
other or greater than their own interests "artificially"
skew the results in the calculation of the "public
interest." Proper calculation depends upon proper
behavior: economic maximization (at all costs!). [11]
According to welfare economists, the dangers posed
to common resources by self-maximizing behavior, as well
as the deleterious effects of ethical and political
19
action on the calculation of the "public interest can
be managed by creating the proper incentive structures
in society. To control pollution of common resources,
all that is required is a system of effluent fees that
force manufacturers to "cost in" their use of common
resources. [12] Adam Smith's vision of the individual
was not incorrect; what was misunderstood by Smith was
the role that public policy must play in ensuring that
the individual pays the full cost of his economic
activities and in ensuring that the individual will
"live up" to Smith's meager vision.
Once one has accepted Smith's model of the
individual, the solutions proferred by the advocates of
a welfare economics approach to public policy seem
internally consistent. The welfare economics model
needs no bureaucratic elite with the abilty to determine
the public good. If the summed preferences of
individuals illustrate a preference for industrial
production over clean rivers or a preference for plastic
trees over natural trees, then so be it. [13] It is not
the role of the bureaucrat to determine the final
outcome of public policies, only to determine the proper
incentives which will produce the outcome which the
aggregation of individual preferences has indicated.
The problem facing welfare econom)cs advocates is the
20
acceptance of this model of the individual and of the
"public interest" by policy makers and by the public.
The problem, then, is to convince the populace of the
"social" benefits of giving up on political thought and
action and replacing political life in the United States
with pure economic behavior. The allure of Hardin's
parable for welfare economists now becomes clearer. For
the parable posits this model of the individual in all
times and in all places. An accurate understanding of
the political nature of human nature can become
unnecessary if only the proper (read welfare economic)
vision of the individual can be produced.
The transcendental implications of the parable's
description of humans are important for a welfare
economics approach because so much must be sacrificed to
produce and maintain this vision of the individual. As
we have seen, the welfare economics model of humans must
reject: (a) the ability of humans to know interests
greater or other than their specific individual
interests and, thus, their ability to act ethically and
morally, and (b) the ability of humans to communicate
intersubject ively to determine the public good and thus
their abiltiy to participate in either democratic or
republican forms of government. The concept of the
public good must be abandoned because the demoralization
21
and depoliticization of humans make the public good
unattainable. Inividuals must be emptied of all the
virtues and abilities that form the bond between
politics and the public good.
Why such a mortal sacrifice of the political nature
of humans is acceptable to proponents of a welfare
economics approach to public policy will become clearer
in the following chapters. For each of the four
predominant approaches to public policy which preceded
the welfare economics approach failed to make such a
sacrifice and, also, failed to achieve the political and
economic promises that each had offered. Each previous
approach had relied on politics, the concept of the
public good and enlightened political citizens to
achieve their policy goals. In order to avoid the
failures of past approaches the welfare economics
approach is willing to sacrifice politics, the concept
of the public good and the political citizen in favor of
economics, the "public interest" and the economical
consumer. Why such a model of society and of the hollow
individual is now offered up for public consumption can
best be answered by first examining the four previous
policy approaches and why each one failed to deliver its
political and economic promises.
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Enclosure Movements (London: Victor Gollancz, 1967), pp.
60-61. ^
7. Tate, The English Community
, p. 77.
8. Tate, The English Community
, pp. 70-73.
9. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the
Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966)
,
p. 23.
10. Even republican government presupposes the
ability of citizens to come together in forums where the
individuals will rise above their own interests and work
at positing policies in the common or public good. The
faith in this ability by citizens is obvious both in the
construction of the federal legislative bodies and in
the maintenance in the United States of jury systems
which depend upon the ability of "ordinary" citizens to
rise above their own view and reach agreement among 11
of their peers.
11. It is possible for welfare economists and
public choice advocates to claim that it does not matter
what factors (e.g., regard for others, regard for future
generations, insanity, etc.) influence the responses of
individuals making their preferences known to policy
makers. However, there is a drive for normalization in
this policy approach which guided by the approach's
demand for efficiency. If, for example, many citizens
decide that all other members of their community will
undervalue health care then these citizens' strategic
responses which overvalue their own willingness to pay
may provide an inaccurate picture of the communty's
commitment to health care. If all the citizens in a
community value, for example, their local forest as
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priceless (or worth $5 billion if they are forced to
give an answer in dollar terms), then assessment becomes
difficult. Normal responses by consumers who honestly
reveal their isolated and specific preferences is needed
for the model to be truly efficient.
12. For a brief and clear discussion of this
approach to water and air pollution see Charles L.
Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest (Washington
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 80-82.
Schultze' s discussion here reveals a serious technical
problem in the conceptual framework of a welfare
economics approach: this approach assumes that
environmental decay proceeds along the same smooth
curves as those hypothesized by economists for consumer
preferences. The problem, of course, is that once an
ecological entity decays past a certain point it is no
longer a live system. Just like humans, ecological
"units" die and death is not smooth cornered.
13. The egocentric dangers of a welfare economics
approach can be mitigated by political strucutures which
encourage the political development of citizens and
which foster democratic and republican forums where
citizens can rise above self-interest and attempt to
pursue the public good. The citizen viewed only as and
simply as a consumer will be denied the opportunity to
develop as a political being. However, there are no
sure guarantees that as political beings we will not
destroy nature and replace it with nature surrogates.
Political activity does not guarantee that good politics
will result or that we will be able to appreciate the
world in non-egocentric terms. Political activity only
guarantees that citizens will have available the
opportunity to learn and practice reflective thought and
action as the social beings that we are. For an
excellent discussion of the problems policy analysts and
policy makers face in thinking about environemntal
issues, and for a convincing plea for more careful
thought about our relationship to the natural
environment see Laurence H. Tribe, "Ways Not To Think
About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental
Law," The Yale Law Journal 83 (June 1974 ): 1315-1348
.
CHAPTER III
THE REGULATORY APPROACH: 1883-1933
The Beginnings of Modern Public Policy
Two legislative enactments of the 1880s marked the
beginning of modern public policy. The first, the
Pendleton Act of 1883, provided the rudiment of a
professional and rationalized federal civil service.
The second, the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887,
created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) which
established a precedent for future government
intervention in the private economy and served as model
for the administrative structure of subsequent
independent regulatory agencies. Neither Act produced
the results sought by their respective advocates until
the first decade of the twentieth century, but both Acts
proved crucial in setting boundaries for the development
of modern public policy in the United States.
The Pendleton Act and the Moral Character of Public
Employees
The Pendleton Act was not a piece of legislation
that was swiftly and haphazardly patched together in
response to President Garfield's assassination by a
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frustrated office-seeker denied Republican spoils.
Garfield's assasination did prove instrumental in
provoking a public outcry against the spoils system and
in prodding a reluctant Congress to take some sort of
action, but careful research and sophisticated
legislative proposals preceded the Pendleton Act by more
than a decade. In 1868, Congressman Thomas A. Jenckes
sponsored a report on the civil service procedures of
China, Prussia, France and England. [1] In 1871,
President Grant appointed George William Curtis, a
proponent of civil service reform and an admirer of the
Northcote-Trevelyan civil service reform in England, as
chairman of a Civil Service Commission. [ 2 ] Grant's
Commission was refused appropriations by the Congress in
1873 and slowly and quietly died, but not before it had
produced detailed procedures and laws for a civil
service based on competitive examinations, security of
tenure and political neutrality .[ 3 ] By 1881, the
National Civil Service Reform League, with George
William Curtis as President, was formed after meetings
of numerous state and city reform associations. [4]
The target of these reformers was the spoils
system. While they were interested in producing economy
in government by securing more competent public
employees, their distaste for the spoils system centered
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upon the lack of honesty and morality exhibited by
public employees selected on the basis of their
connections with the political party in power. Dismayed
by the avarice and illegalities of individuals who
sought public employment for purely economic gain, the
reformers proffered a view of political men in public
office — moral economic men — who could counter the
ill effects of amoral economic men in the private
sphere. [5] Economic considerations were not
unimportant: corruption and incompetence were costly and
businessmen were dissatisfied with the waste and
inconsistency of performance and judgement diplayed by
patronage appointees .[ 6 ] Leonard D. White has also
suggested that another motivation for reform was "...
the concern of thoughtful men over the prostitution of
the party and the weakness of the executive power. "[7]
Such concerns may have motivated a few reformers,
Woodrow Wilson included, but it is clear that these
conserns were far from primary for most reformers . [ 8
]
Nor was the demand for a businesslike approach to
government a source of reform zeal, for business methods
of recruiting, selecting and promoting were also
underdeveloped and lagged behind the federal government
for decades after the Pendleton Act.
The primary objective of the civil service
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reformers was the creation of mechanisms which would
select moral and competent public employees and would
allow these employees to remain free from partisan
intrusions that would threaten moral and competent
performances. The Pendleton Act of 1883, drawn up by
the New York Civil Service Reform Association in 1881,
contained such mechanisms. Certain positions in the
federal government were designated as classified
positions and were to be free from political influence.
Entrance into classified positions was based upon
success in competitive examinations. Performance in
public office was to be the only basis for removal from
office, providing classified employees with a relatively
secure tenure in their positions. Merit would determine
placement and advancement in classified positions and
party loyalty or affiliation was to be disregarded in
the selection and evaluation of classified personnel. A
Civil Service Commission was created by the Act and
empowered to control the testing of applicants for
classified positions and to investigate departments to
ensure conformity to the Act. The Civil Service
Commission, to ensure its ability to maintain this
politically neutral sphere of public employment, was
composed of three members, one of whom was to represent
the political party out of (executive) power. The
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President, in recognition of the executive power over
federal administration, was granted the power to dismiss
commissioners without explanation, but appointments were
to be confirmed by the Senate. The Congress also
granted the President the power to increase the number
of classfied positions by executive order. [9]
By the use of executive orders the number of
federal civilian employees covered by the Pendleton Act
was slowly and erratically extended from 1883 to 1900.
In 1883, 14,000 of the 100,000 federal positions were
classified and by 1900 the merit systen covered 106,000
of some 275,000 federal civilian posit ions .[ 10 ] Of
course, these figures on federal employment also reveal
that between 1883 and 1900 the number of patronage
positions grew from 86,000 to 169,000. The patronage
system was far from collpse by 1900, but it had given up
ground to the merit system in key technical positions
within the executive departments. The Departments of
Agriculture and Interior, especially within those
offices which gathered and analyzed data, experienced a
rapid extension of the merit system. [11] Positions
within the Treasury Department that required technical
and scientific expertise were also quickly covered by
the Pendleton Act, and continuity within these offices
was matched by consistency in external relations with
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the private economy with the passage of the Customs
Administration Act of 1890. This Act further
rationalized the Treasury Department, much to the
pleasure of businessmen, by creating a board to ensure
uniform custom rates at the various ports in the United
States[12] The number of patronage positions in the
federal government still far exceeded the number of
merit positions in 1900, but the percentage of merit
positions had doubled in the first twenty-seven years of
the Pendleton Act, and the positions covered by the
Pendleton Act were concentrated in executive departments
where knowledge and consistency were the keys to power.
By 1900 the extension of the Pendleton Act had
created a sphere in the federal government that was
separated from both partisan politics and the private
economy. Politics and administration can never be
entirely divorced, but in 1900 it was possible to argue
reasonably that there was politics and then there was
civil service administration. Such a claim was possible
because the Pendleton Act provided for moral and neutral
administrators, and Congress passed laws which were
extremely detailed and which denied administrators
discretion in implementing legislation. For example,
Congress passed very rigid and very detailed legislation
for the provision of Civil War pensions. Administrators
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were given little discretion in applying Congress'
standards for these pensions and from 1886 into the
1890s Congress passed hundreds, even thousands, of
personal bills each year exempting individuals from the
standards set by Congress. The denial of discretion by
Congress from 1886 to 1900 on the awarding of pensions
and the subsequent flood of personal bills to right this
lack of discretion illustrates the difficulty of
accepting Theodore J. Lowi's argument in The End of
Liberalism that one of the solutions to "liberalism" is
Congressional enactments which limit administrative
discretion by providing detailed and specific
instructions for administrative action. [13] If Congress
could not develop equitable standards for pensions, it
is far from likely that Congress could establish
equitable and non-dicret ionary standards for more
complicated legislation.
At the turn of the century, neither Congress nor
civil servants encouraged administrative discretion.
Congressman saw administrative discretion as a
delegation of power to the executive branch and they
were leary of their loss of power under the Pendleton
Act. Indeed, Senator George F. Howe wrote in his
autobiography that: "The reform of the civil service has
doubtless shorn the office of Senator of a good deal of
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power. B [14] Civil servants, by being denied discretion,
were safe from assaults on their integrity. If there
were complaints about the effects of policy these
complaints should be directed at Congress, not at the
neutral civil service created by the Pendleton Act. The
Pendleton Act had created a civil service that could be
recognized in Max Weber's ideal-type presentation of
bureaucracy. Of course, the civil service in the United
States has never reached a state where it corresponded
exactly with Weber's ideal type bureaucracy — it was
not Weber's intention to suggest that any bureaucracy
would correspond exactly with his ideal-type
presentation — but, the United States' civil service
under the Pendleton Act was able to operate behind a
facade of bureaucratic neutrality. [ 15] Because there
was a real distance between Congress' politics and the
civil servants' administration of politics at this time
there was substance to the facade.
The Pendleton Act was important in the development
of public policy in the United States because it
created a civil service that was professional and a
structure of administration that was rational. These
features were absolutely essential if the federal
government was to be effective in promoting the success
of private enterprise in domestic and foreign markets.
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The emphasis by civil service reformers on moral
economic men who would be neutral administrators was not
hypocritical, but it was crucial in developing a federal
administration that could serve the interests of
business in the United States, usually big business,
without appearing to be a handmaiden to those interests.
In time, the moral foundation of the Pendleton Act would
reappear to haunt those individuals and those interests
who demanded a purely business-like approach, rather
than an ethical approach, from government for business.
The Act to Regulate Commerce and the Commitment of
Public Employees to the Public Good
The direct regulation of private enterprise by the
federal government began with the establishment of the
ICC in 1887. Support for government regulation of the
railroads came from farmers, shippers, paying passengers
and, even, from some of the railroad owners. Farmers
and shippers objected to long haul/short haul price
differences that sometimes made it more expensive to
ship goods two hundred miles than it was to ship goods
eight hundred miles. The lack of standard track gauges
and coupling devices for railroad cars produced
increased loading and unloading costs for those who
shipped goods long distances over the tracks of several
34
railroad companies. Farmers and shippers were also
outraged at the price concessions and rebates given
large corporations. Paying passengers were dissatisfied
with the practice of giving free railroad tickets to
favored shipping customers. Some railroad owners were
wary of the increasing "cut-throat" competition among
railroads and desired government determination of
minimum charges for railroad services — a goal that
these railroad owners had been unable to secure through
informal pooling associations of railroads.
Furthermore, the cut-throat competition among railroads
was producing a crazy quilt of unnecessary and redundant
railroad tracks across the country.
Despite all this support for government regulation
of the railroads, the ICC was, until 1904, rather
ineffective in addressing the complaints of its various
supporters. The most powerful restraint on ICC action
came not from the private sector, but from the Supreme
Court. Determined to protect the self-regulating
economy (the market) from direct intervention by
government, the Supreme Court in 1893 and 1897 denied
the ICC the power to establish standard rates for the
railroads. [ 16] The first major reform of the Act to
Regulate Commerce of 1887 was the Elkins Ant i-Rebat ing
Act of 1903. This Act was written by employees of the
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Pennsylvania Railroad and was supported by most of the
large rai lroads
.
[ 17 ] The most important provision of
the Elkins Act legalized the setting of joint rates by
railroad companies. In effect, by allowing joint rate
setting to be legalized, the large railroads had finally
achieved the goal they had sought with informal (and
ineffective) pooling: standardized rates that would not
be threatened by cut-throat competition from small
and/or new railroad companies. Indeed, the Elkins Act
fulfilled the request that Albert Fink, Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the Trunk Lines Association, had
made before the United States Senate Committee on Inter-
State Commerce on May 6, 1889 when Mr. Fink claimed that
the ICC would be truly effective only if pooling were
legalized. [ 18
]
The Elkins Act though, did not solve the basic
problem confronting the ICC in establishing maximum
rates for railroad services. It was impossible for the
Congress to pass legislation that would provide rigid
standards for maximum rate setting by the ICC. This is
not to suggest that the ICC welcomed discretion in rate
setting. Martin A. Knapp, the Chairman of the ICC,
wrote in 1905 that the ICC should not have its authority
over the railroads extended until there were clear
administrative guidelines established by Congress:
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We must begin by prescribing in the
statute law, with as much precision
and certainty as the case admits, the
rules of conduct which it is the
province of administration to apply
and enforce. The substantive law
must first be made ample and
explicit, clear and comprehensive in
its definition of legal duty and as
exact as may be in its restraints and
requi rements
.
[ 19
]
Knapp's call for more ample and explicit administrative
guidelines went unheeded by Congress. In 1906, the
Congress instead passed the Hepburn Act which gave the
ICC rate-making power. [20] Nowhere in the legislation
were there specific guidelines for the determination of
just and reasonable rates.
The delegation of rate-making authority to the ICC
completed the birth of the first regulatory agency in
the United States. Even at that time it is possible to
discern the criticisms that would later be launched at
the ICC, other regulatory agencies and the regulatory
approach to public policy. First, government regulation
of private sector enterprises entails a government
guarantee of the continued success of those enterprises
regulated. If regulated enterprises fail, it is not the
fault of the enterprises, but of the regulator, the
government. Thus, regulated enterprises must be
protected from new competition and must be guaranteed a
profit in their operations. Second, if the government
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is to guarantee the success of regulated enterprises,
the government agency which regulates must be staffed,
especially at the top of the agency, with personnel
familiar with the regulated enterprises. Although only
three of the five ICC Commissioners can be of the same
political party, usually all five have been extremely
familiar with the railroad companies and almost all have
been extremely sympathetic to the interests of the
railroad companies. Because familiarity with the
workings and problems of regulated enterprises is
essential for government regulation, it is not
surprising that regulatory agencies are so frequently
co-opted by those whom they are supposed to regulate.
Third, given the need to guarantee the success of
regulated enterprises and the need for intimate
knowledge of the regulated enterprises to provide the
guarantee of success, it is necessary for Congress to
delegate authority to regulatory agencies. The more
complicated the regulation of enterprises becomes the
more impetus there is for Congress to delegate the
setting of standards and the making of rules to
regulatory agencies. Increased and increasing
administrative discretion by regulatory agencies is not,
as Theodore J. Lowi suggests, simply one of the ills of
interest group liberalism, but is the logical result of
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government intervention into the private sphere. [21]
Fourth, government regulation of private enterprises
ensures the status of those enterprises which are in
dominant positions at the time government regulation
begins. Large railroad companies encouraged government
regulation and secured their continuing dominance in
railroad transportation under the post-Elkins Act ICC.
This same pattern can be seen in the regulation of
meatpacking companies. Large meatpacking companies
supported the Pure Food Act of 1906 because the new
standards would reduce competition from small domestic
meatpackers and would open the European market to meat
exports from the United States. [22] European countries
had controlled meat exports from the United States by
setting health and quality standards that most United
States meatpackers did not meet. The new standards for
meat quality that the Pure Food Act set were a boon for
consumers, but the standards also assured the success of
the large meatpackers who could most readily adopt them.
Government regulation of the banking industry with
the Federal Reserve Act of 1914 followed much the same
scenario as the ICC and the Pure Food Act. In response
to the bank panic of 1907 a National Monetary Commission
was appointed in 1911 to study the value of a national
reserve system for banks. In 1912 the Commission
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produced the Aldrich Plan which was written by Paul M.
Warburg of the powerful banking and investment giant
Kuhn, Loeb and Company. [23] The Aldrich Plan, which
clearly expressed the desires and interests of the large
banks in big cities, was reworked under the direction of
Senator Carter Glass of Virginia and President Woodrow
Wilson. The result, the Glass Plan, reduced the
centralization of private control envisioned by the
Aldrich Plan, but still managed to address the major
interests of the large banks and of high finance. As
was the case with the ICC and the Pure Food Act, the
Federal Reserve Act secured the interests of the largest
enterprises, but it also paid more than lip service to
the idea of government regulation serving the public
good. As Arthur S. Link has stated in his analysis of
the Federal Reserve Act:
What began as a bill designed to
serve only the business community and
reinforce private control over
banking and currency had
metamorphosed, under progressive
pressure, into a measure that offered
substantial benefits to farmers as
well as bussinessmen and allowed at
least a modicum of public
regulat ion. [ 24
]
Government regulation of the private sector, in the
Progressive Era, cannot be viewed simply as the success
of public control over the excesses and abuses of
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private enterprises. The regulatory approach ensured
the success of large enterprises that were regulated and
allowed such agencies as the ICC to interpret, at times,
the public good as the railroad companies' good. The
determination of the general approach to regulation and
the infiltration of regulatory agencies by those
enterprises which were regulated denies a simplistic
interpretation of the Progressive Era's regulatory
approach as a triumph of the public over the interests
of the private sector.
Yet, the arguments of recent historians, such as
James Weinstein and Gabriel Kolko, which claim that the
regulatory movement in the Progressive Era was actually
the triumph of conservatism and of corporate elites over
the public and the public good are also simplistic
misinterpretations. [25] Corporate interests were served
by government regulation of private enterprises, but
corporate interests were forced to acknowledge the
existence of a public good in the establishment of
regulatory agencies. Simply because government
regulatory agencies have not always served the public
good does not mean that the public good has lost its
value as a criterion for judging the effectiveness of
regulatory agencies. Rather, the symbolic value
accorded to the public good in the regulatory movement
41
by the populace, by the government and by those
enterprises that were and are regulated has forced all
discussions and evaluations of the regulatory approach
to include service to the public good as the primary
criterion of the effectiveness of government regulation.
This emphasis on the public good is not just a product
of flowery after-the-fact assessments of the progressive
era which ignore the benefits regulatory agencies
produced, and still do produce, for regulated agencies.
To suggest, as Kolko and Weinstein do, that during the
Progressive Era the symbol of the public good
camoulflaged the protections and benefits provided
regulated enterprises by regulatory agencies is to
miscalculate the insights of even the mainstream
commentators of the day. In 1910, commenting on the
administrative consolidation of the Hepburn Act under
the Manns-Elkins Act of 1910, [26] Gustav Stickley,
editor of the home improvement journal, Craftsman , made
the following remarks about the ICC and the railroads:
Now the government steps in and
interposes the strong shield of the
law. The whole railroad system is
lifted into the realm of a recognized
public service, and the powers of the
railroad officials are clearly
defined. They are in a manner
regarded as trustees of property that
in the last analysis belongs to the
whole people, and the very laws that
restrict their freedom of action in
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administering it and disposing of it,
also relieve them of embarrassment
and hedge them about with vastly
improved economic conditions that can
only result in a stronger
organization. In effect, the law
that regulates rates puts money into
the pockets of the railroad companies
to an extent that has never been
obtained before, for it practically
insists that they shall charge full
price for services which they have
been in the habit of rendering free
to anybody strong enough to demand a
place on the free list. Moreover,
the law protects the railroad
companies from one another, for it
has practically established the whole
system as a monopoly to be carried on
under government protection as well
as supervision. [27]
The paradox of the regulated self -regulat ing
capitalist economy — government regulation for the
public good includes government insurance for vested
private interests — was evidently understood during the
Progressive Era.
The failure to grasp this paradox of the regulated
self -regulat ing capitalist economy is most evident in
the seemingly contradictory interpretations offered by
historians on the final progressive reform of the ICC:
the Transportation Act of 1920. I. L. Sharfman, the
prominent historian on the ICC, concludes that the
Transportation Act "... marks the beginning of a new
approach in railroad legislation. " [28] Sharfman
emphasizes that by granting the ICC the power to set
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minimum, as well as maximum, rates and by authorizing
the ICC to establish a rational and integrated national
system of railroads the Congress passed a n . . . radically
constructive measure
.
n
[ 29 ] The measure was radically
constructive because the ICC was to take positive action
in promoting the public good rather than simply
protecting the public good through restrictive measures.
By focusing on the Transportation Act's positive
promotion of public responsibi lty by the ICC Sharfman
stresses the break between the pre-Transportat ion Act
and the post-Transportation Act ICC.
Gabriel Kolko, in his Railroads and Regulation
1876-1916
,
concentrates his analysis on the government's
insurance of vested private interests and concludes that
the Transportation Act was not a major shift in ICC
policy, but was instead the logical culmination of the
federal government's guarantee of success for
established railroads:
The Transportation Act represents the
final victory of the railroads under
the Wilson Administration, and was
the logical culmination of their more
than forty years of agitation and
education for comprehensive federal
railroad regulation designed to
provide rationalization and stability
to the industry .[ 30
]
Theodore J. Lowi's analysis of the Transportation
Act in The End of Liberalism does not suffer from the
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myopia that both Sharfman and Kolko share. Lowi
perceives the paradox inherent in a regulated self-
regulating capitalist economy and underscores the
conflicting directives embodied in the Transportation
Act of 1920 when it calls on the ICC to provide (a)
integration of the national transportation system and
(b) securement of a "fair share" for transporters .[ 31
]
Furthermore, Lowi correctly claims that the directives
were ambiguous, especially when implementation of the
directives was to rest on the ICC's perception of "just
and reasonable" rate setting. Lowi rues this ambiguity
because it forced the ICC to make decisions on a case-
by-case basis rather than determining all cases by
reference to clear and specified rules. However, as has
been suggested, this ambiguity is a fundamental
characteristic of federal regulation of private
enterprises in the United States. The guarantee of
commercial success for regulated enterprises entailed
the sacrifice of justice (clear and specific rules that
apply impersonally to all) in the search for equity
(decisions determined by reference to the specific
circumstances of each).
Equity-based regulation does, as Lowi argues,
weaken the government's claim to authority by delegating
power to make decisions to non-elected officials who
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appear inconsistent in the application of privileges and
who are disadvantaged in promulgating decisions where
information needed to make decisions is supplied and
controlled by the private enterprises. Decisions
derived from singular cases also erode government
authority because government must depend on the candid
cooperation of private firms — a dependence that is
seldom rewarded. The control, by private enterprises,
of the information necessary for case-by-case decisions
provides private enterprises with a lever for the
manipulation of regulatory agencies.
Kolko's calim that the Transportation Act was a
victory of the railroads over the public good is not
unfounded. The problem with the claim is that it
ignores the concept of the public good, a concept which
was and is essential to sustain an equity-based
regulatory approach. By charging federal regulatory
agencies with a responsibility for the public good,
Congress could legitimate government decisions and
actions that worked to the benefit of each established
and regulated private firm. Private firms, while
reaping the benefits of government regulation, could, at
the same time, deplore the costs of subservience to the
public good. The concept of the public good served the
regulated firms by creating the appearance that there
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was a contest between the interests of private
enterprises and the concept of the public good. Without
this appearance of continuing contest it would not have
been possible to legitimate government regulatory
agencies which, in many cases, so obviously pandered to
the private interests of private firms. [32]
Sharfman's applause for the positive promotion of
the public good inaugurated in the Transportation Act is
applause for the very concept that legitimized the
rather constant manipulation of regulatory agencies by
regulated enterprises. The concept of the public good
is a difficult concept to constrain, but constraint of
the concept was (and is) possible .[ 33 ] First, federal
regulatory agencies were charged with the finacial
success of regulated firms (the paradox). Second, the
concept of the pubic good was used to create the
appearance of opposition between the concept and private
interests while the public good was actually being
subsumed to private interests (the appearance of
continuing contest). Third, a case-by-case approach to
regulation restricts the information easily available to
regulators and to the public. The lack of information
by regulators discourages a coherent view of the public
good. Case-by-case decisions also make it more
difficult for the public to ascertain the general
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effects of regulatory policy. Lack of information and a
plethora of speicific decisions retard the
politicization, the self-reflective awareness and
discussion, of regulatory policy.
Nevertheless, the concept of the public good was
and is not permanently constrained by a regulatory
approach. We have noted earlier the development of the
public good as the primary criterion for evaluating
regulatory agencies. By reaping the benefits of
regulatory policy and offering up "sacrifices" to the
symbol of the public good, regulated firms maintained a
context in which the concept of the public good could be
enlarged to provide a legitimate critique of regulatory
agencies for their extreme subservience to regulated
interests. Indeed, in the 1960s and the 1970s consumer
advocates enlarged the concept of the public good in
regulatory policy and provided the information necessary
to politicized regulatory policy. [34] The response, by
conservative politicians, by the Reagan Administration
and by proponents of a welfare economics approach to
public policy, has been to de-regulate enterprises and
thus (a) to depoliticize the actions of those
enterprises and of regulatory agencies and (b) to
denigrate government's role in, and the possibility of,
the public good. [35]
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Equity-based regulation can retard politicizat ion
of regulatory policy, but once politicizat ion has
occurred equity-based regulation provides easy targets
for consumer investigators. This is especially the case
when, as in the United States, equity-based regulation
has been so sympathetic to the interests and
circumstances of each firm regulated. Furthermore,
equity-based regulation depends upon the administrative
discretion of the regulators, regulators who may also
become politicized and acknowledge a broader concept of
the pulbic good. [36]
Lowi's rejection of an equity-based regulatory
policy is not founded on the "dangers" of potential
politicizat ion of regulatory policy, but instead on its
lack of justice (in distinction to equity) and the
subsequent loss of authority that a lack of justice
implies for government .[ 37 ] Lowi's alternative to equity-
based regulation, a justice-based regulation with clear
and specific laws developed by Congress for strict
application to all enterprises regulated, though, is not
convincing. First, as we have observed, the complexity
of regulatory policy is usually great. Congress has
illustrated neither the inclination nor the ability to
handle the specifics of regulatory policy. Second,
without the insurance of success of established private
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firms by the government, it was unlikely that any
measure of federal regulation would have been adopted.
Cooperation from the railroad industry was necessary for
federal regulation to begin and to be "effective."
Third, it is doubtful if the federal government could
have been successful in establishing effective justice-
based regulatory policy. Government planning mechanisms
were sparse, particularly in Congress, and the
government-induced failure of some established railroad
companies, a result almost guaranteed by a justice-based
regulatory approach, would have been perceived as a
failure of the federal government. Even if the federal
government had possessed the authority to create a
justice-based regulatory approach in the regulation of
railroads, such authority would have been undermined by
the consequences.
The early history of the federal regulation of
railroads reveals that the regulatory approach in the
United States has two aspects that are joined in, what
we have termed, equity-based regulatory policy.
Commentators exploring the traits of only one face of
this regulatory approach, have assessed federal
regulation of private enterprise as a creature spawned
by private enterprise for the service of private
enterprise. Examination solely of the other face
results in an undeserved adulation of the federal
government's role in the positive promotion of the
public good. Only by the recognition of the moments of
truth contained in each of these unidimensional
interpretations is it possible to grasp how the concept
of the pulbic good is enmeshed in the conception of
regulatory policy in the United States. Federal
regulation of private enterprises in the Progressive Era
was dependent upon the concept of the public good. The
concept was often perverted, abused and constrained
under the regulatory approach to public policy, but the
concept was not destroyed. Indeed, the development of
the concept of the public good during the Progressive
Era was crucial in laying a foundation of the claims of
public responsibility that would be made in the 1930s
after the regulated self-regulating capitalist economy
had crashed.
The Legacy of the Pendleton Act and the Act to Regulate
Commerce
Both the Pendleton Act and the Act to Regulate
Commerce were legislative enactments which served
private sector interests. Yet, both Acts established
the concept of the public good within federal government
institutions and both Acts charged the federal
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government with public responsibi lty . The Pendleton Act
sought to place moral men in a sphere removed from
partisan intrusion and private sector avarice. Such men
were helpful in disguising policies that were not in the
public good, but federal administrators to this day are
aware and self-reflective about the moral position and
public responsibility that they hold. The ICC was
created to protect the pubic good and to protect the
private interests of the railroad companies. The
submergence of the former does not destroy its impact on
the development of regulatory policy and the later
enlargement of public responsibility by the federal
government. Both Acts established a moral foundation
for future federal government intervention in the
private sector. The Acts set both the structure of
future intervention and the moral claims for future
intervention. It should come as no surprise that the
modern welfare economics/public choice critique of
public policy wishes to destroy the structure of
regulatory policy in the United States in order to
uproot the moral claims and demolish the concept of the
public good.
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CHAPTER IV
GOVERNMENT ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY: 1932-1940
The First Period of the New Deal: 1933-1935
The inability of the United States economy to
rebound after three years of severe depression following
the collapse of the regulated self-regulating economy in
1929 paved the way for a new set of relations between
the federal government and the private economy. The
policies adopted by Franklin D. Roosevelt's
Administration, however, were not guided by any one
coherent view of public policy or by any one specific
conceptualization of the relations between the public
sector and the private sector. Indeed, one of the
greatest difficulties in understanding and evaluating
the policies of the New Deal is that there were three
distinguishable periods in the New Deal; and, in each
period, several policy views vied for dominance. No
single view comnpletely dominated any period of the New
Deal, much less the entire New Deal era. Despite this
lack of coherence in policy conceptualization, there did
emerge in and from the New Deal a major change in the
relationship between the public sector and the private
sector. The federal government assumed direct
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responsibility for maintaining and guiding industrial
capitalism and for easing the economic burdens
individuals had to bear under modern industrial
capitalism. By assuming the role of "steering
mechanism" for industrial capitalism and the role of the
legitimator of the social order — a role previously
filled by the private economy under the "Horatio Alger"
myth — the federal government vastly enlarged the size
and functions of the public sphere. [1] Put most simply,
the New Deal politicized society.
The first period of the New Deal -- March 1933 to
June 1935 — did not indicate a course toward the
politicization of society that would later develop. In
this period the Roosevelt Administration pursued three
distinct approaches to federal policy. Each approach
aimed at producing economic recovery but each was guided
by different basic assumptions. One of these approaches
was founded on the assumption that the federal
government's expenditures were responsible for the
Depression and this approach called for a reduction of
such expenditures. Another approach blamed "cut-throat"
competition for the Depression and focused on the need
for government to act as a mediator and a conduit for
cooperation among industries. The third approach found
fault with big business and high finance in their lack
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of public concern and in their inability to plan
production to fit pattterns of consumption and demanded
that the federal government become an active partner in
the planning of a new industrial society.
The "budget-cutting" approach to the economic
crisis of the 1930s was not abandoned when FDR took
office on 5 March 1933. FDR fulfilled, at least
initially, the campaign promises that he made in the
fall of 1932.
He [FDR] would increase aid to the
unemployed, but he would slash
federal spending. On this one point
he was specific: he would cut
government spending 25 per cent. At
Sioux City, Iowa, in September,
Governor Roosevelt stated: "I accuse
the present Administration of being
the greatest spending Administration
in peace times in all our history.
It is an Administration that has
piled bureau on bureau, commission on
commission, and has failed to
anticipate the dire needs and reduced
earning power of the people." In
Pittsburgh the next month, he
declared: "I would regard reduction
in Federal spending as one of the
most important issues in this
campaign. In my opinion, it is the
most direct and effective
contribution that Government can make
to business. " [2]
In order to placate business, to appease the "arch-
conservative du Pont wing of the Democratic Party," to
make good his campaign promises and to effect his own
beliefs that government could be run just as efficiently
59
with greater economy, FDR submitted a bill to Congress
on 10 March 1933 that granted the President the
authority "... to slice $400 million from payments to
veterans and to slash the pay of federal employees
another $100 million. "[ 3 ] Congress quickly granted FDR
this authority over the budget and FDR took the task
seriously. Throughout the spring of 1933 , FDR was
confident that the twenty-five percent cut could be
made; and all of the major federal departments were
required to come in with budget proposals substantially
lower than the allocations made under Hoover's
budget. [4]
The budget-cutting approach did not survive for
long in the New Deal, but its devotees did not disappear
altogether. After Lewis Douglas resigned as Director of
the Budget in September 1934, Henry J. Morgenthau, the
Secretary of the Treasury, became the advocate for
budget-cutting and budget balancing. While Morgenthau
was rarely successful in his attempts to cut the budget,
he maintained influence with FDR who used Morgenthau to
hatchet unsuccessful programs, to be the voice of
orthodox finance and to reassure the business community
of FDR's sanity.
A second approach to healing the ills of the
economy was launched on 17 May 1933 when FDR presented
the Congress a proposal for the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA)
.
The NIRA itself contained enough
different parts to avoid a single label. The National
Recovery Administration (NRA)
, a component of NIRA,
began the Blue Eagle Campaign and exempted from anti-
trust laws businesses that were willing to draft code
agreements for their industries. Labor was guaranteed
the right to collective bargaining, and standards were
set for minimum wages and for maximum hours. The
planning advocates in the Administration were appeased
by the government's new role in the licensing of
businesses and the opportunity to spend $3.3 billion for
public works. [5] Even though the NIRA was many things
to many people and almost everyone could find some
aspect of NIRA to applaud, there was a coherence to the
policies of the NRA as they were carried out under the
leadership of General Johnson. The policies of the NRA
cohered around a vision of the federal government as the
arbitrator among big businesses and between big business
and big labor unions. Indeed, William Appleman
Williams, emphasizing this particular approach in the
New Deal, has interpreted the New Deal as a
restructuring of the political-economy of the United
States into a functionalist-syndicalist framework. [ 6
]
While Williams overemphasizes the completeness of the
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framework under the New Deal, the NRA represented, in a
very unsubtle way, the syndicalist approach to public
policy that did exist in the New Deal.
The NRA represented a syndicalist approach, as
opposed to a planning approach, because the government
was not to be a planner but rather a vehicle through
which big businesses could plan their futures. Under
the NRA, businesses were allowed to form trade
associations and draft their own code agreements over
production and pricing. [7] The NRA codes were never
standardized and each trade association became a private
economic government .[ 8 ] Rather than increasing the
federal government's authority over the private sphere,
the NRA set up a series of economic feifdoms. What the
NRA shared with the planning approach in the New Deal
was an explicit rejection of the "individualistic
organization of economic activity. n [9] As commentators
in 1934 noted:
The NRA is not intended as the
beginning of a steady encroachment by
governmental authority over the field
of production and distribution. It
is intended mainly to eliminate those
competitive practices to which the
business community generally has
strenuously objected for many years,
and which, in its jargon is
designated as "cut-throat,
destructive, uneconomic
compe t i t i on . " [ 10
]
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The NRA was similar to the regulatory approach we
examined in the last chapter in two ways. First the NRA
was used to protect those businesses that were already
large and established enterprises. Second, the trade
associations provided a system for maintaining prices
that had not been achievable through voluntary
agreements between businesses. In fact, the trade
associations legalized and institutionalized price-
fixing agreements that hampered the entry of new
businesses and insured the success of established firms.
The NRA even provided a better guide to long-term
planning by big business than did the regulatory
approach by creating an institutionalized arrangement
for dealing with labor through legalized collective
bargaining. However, the NRA departed from the legacy
of the regulatory approach to public policy in a much
more fundamental way. While the regulatory approach
charged the independent commissions with responsibility
to the public good, the NRA left this responsibility to
the private enterprises that framed the "codes of fair
competition" and controlled the trade associations. One
might assume that, given such control and given an
economic crisis that called into question the capitalist
economic system, private enterprises would rise above
pure and narrow self-interest if only to perpetuate a
system conducive to their long-term stability and
profitability. This did not occur, while each code of
fair competition contained the obligatory denouncement
of monopoly, each code erected controls that insured
monopolistic practices and that enlarged those
enterprises astute enough to take part in the
formulation of the codes. [11]
The NRA was a syndicalist approach to public policy
because the government provided a legalized and
institutionalized framework within which the competitive
practices of individualistic capitalism could be
deterred and the confrontational and violent tactics
that big businesses and labor unions practiced on each
other could be abated. Furthermore, the NRA was a
syndicalist approach because the federal government
maintained little or no control over the actors in the
framework which the government established. The trade
associations, and, to a small degree, the legally
recognized agents of the labor movement, became
important actors in establishing the definition of the
public welfare. [12] The NRA, then, was not a vehicle
for enlarging the pulbic sphere, but was rather an
approach that institutionalized the privatization of
public issues and political questions.
The syndicalist elements that emerged from the NRA
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from May 1933 into the spring of 1934 did not avoid
resistance despite the anti-monopoly rhetoric in the
codes of fair competition. Price-setting control by the
trade associations became price-raising power, and the
control over production became a means to restrict
production. Rather than speed economic recovery, the
NRA's policies retarded recovery. Consumers blamed the
NRA for high prices; small businesses accused the NRA of
creating monopolies; workers found the labor provisions
of the NRA to be anemic, and private enterprises,
sensing an end to economic and social crisis, deplored
the NRA framework that held them accountable for the
unselfless actions they had taken. By 1934, FDR showed
growing concern over the leeway businesses had been
allowed in drawing up the codes of fair competition. [13]
After 1934, the NRA was restructured into an
organization that renounced the use of price and
production controls and that promoted the competitive
ideal. [14] Not that this change was successful, for
. . . most of the major codes had been
written, and the market restorers
were never able to apply their policy
to codes already approved. The chief
effect of their efforts to do so was
to antagonize businessmen and to
complicate the difficulties of
enforcing the code provisions that
were out of line with announced
pol icy
.
[ 15]
The rather quick demise of the NRA after 1934 marked the
end of a full-fledged functional-syndicalist approach in
the New Deal.
The third approach to public policy in the first
period of the New Deal was a planning approach. The
planning approach differed from the syndicalist vision
most profoundly in the role the federal government would
assume in relation to the private sector. The planning
advocates, most notably Harold Ickes, Rexford G. Tugwell
and Charles E. Merriam, agreed with the syndicalist
assumption that individualistic competitive capitalism
was an outdated form. The planners also shared with the
syndicalists the belief that the private economy must be
maintained. However, the planners envisioned the
federal government as something more than a simple
expeditor for corporate-controlled planning of
production and distribution. Planning assumed that
government would (a) take an active role in the
establishment of standards for business activity, (b)
serve to ensure that big business served public goals,
(c) protect the natural resources (the public domain) of
the country and (d) produce those necessary goods and
services that the private economy could not or would not
produce in sufficient quantity or with sufficient
equity. The planning advocates espoused such a role for
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the federal government not on the basis of economy or
efficiency, but rather on the basis of ethical and moral
ends. [16] Government would become the guarantor of
justice and fairness and only secondarily the generator
of economic prosperity. It was the planners who laid a
foundation within the New Deal for the assumption of
social and economic responsibilities by the federal
government
.
In considering the role of the planning advocates
in the first period of the New Deal it is imperative to
heed the distinction William E. Leuchtenburg has made
between the shadow of planning and the substance of
planning. [17] It is certainly true that a fully
developed planned economy directed by the federal
government was never a likely possibility during the New
Deal. FDR never took the idea seriously, nor did the
planners presume that such an idea could be realized to
such a full extent. Even Tugwell, the most avid
advocate of national economic planning by the federal
government, did not wish to challenge the private
ownership of established corporations, but rather he
wished to control abuses made possible by the increased
size and power of corporations:
Collectivization was here to stay;
the only question was whether it
could be made to work in the public
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interest without actually being
publicly owned. We contended that it
could. Most of the abuses charged to
it could be eliminated by mutual
agreement, all conforming to
established standards: but these
standards must be set, or at least
approved, by representatives of the
public, and restraint must be applied
to those who might seek profit from
others' compl iance
.
[ 18
]
Other advocates of the planning approach to public
policy, including Ickes and Charles Merriam, did not
even share Tugwell's rather optimistic opinion that a
mechanism of planning through the control of prices and
distribution could be installed in the United
States. [19] The planning approach in the first period
of the New Deal did not envision a society mapped out
and controlled by levers of power accessible to the
federal government (or some combination of government,
business, labor and consumers). Neither did it envision
the submergence of political questions by empirical data
and macro-economic tools that would assure an ever
growing-economic pie. [20] Dreams of a technological
Shangri-la did not flirt before the eyes of the New Deal
planners
.
The planners, though, did lay a rudimentary
foundation for later planning in the New Deal and
beyond. Within specific agencies, planning mechanisms
were established. In the Public Works Administration
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(PWA), ickes put together a staff that could plan
construction, cost out the price of construction,
estimate labor costs, procure equipment and materials,
and supervise completion of projects. The PWA also
created a tough internal procedure for assuring honesty
and legality during the course of the construction of
projects. [21] Similar planning mechanisms were also
established for the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) in
the first period of the New Deal as the National Park
Service acquired more than twice the area of land
previously purchased by the federal government for
national protection. Indeed, Leuchtenburg has written
that, "Of all the forest planning, public and private,
in the history of the nation, more than half was done by
the C.C.C."[22] With the enactment of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 the Department of Agriculture
became a planner of prime importance. Not only was a
national perspective necessary to plan acreage
reductions in planted farmlands, but the county agents
had to become experts in gathering and presenting data
for effective national planning. In the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration, the focus of activity and the
center of information was the Program Planning
Division. [ 23 ] Within specific agencies, then, planning
imperatives led to changes in what administrators did
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and to changes in the lines of communication among
administrators. These changes did not represent the
substance of complete national planning by the federal
government, but they had more substance than shadow.
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
,
signed into
law on 18 May 1933, was also an artifact of the planning
approach in the New Deal. The TVA, a public
corporation, was designed to produce hydroelectric
power, control floods, manufacture fertilizer and aid in
soil conservation and reforestation. The TVA was also
to engage in social experiments with state and local
governments. [24] Planning in the TVA was not national
or comprehensive planning, for it had a geographically-
defined jurisdiction as well as functionally specific
planning responsibilities, but it was planning that had
a direct and substantial effect. Furthermore, the TVA
was not a syndicalist solution, but was a purely public
corporation that was "... to serve as a 'yardstick' to
measure what would be reasonable rates for a power
company to charge." [25] The TVA was not a shadow, but
it did cast a shadow across private utility companies in
the country. By assuming new standards for public
responsibility and public accountability, the TVA
satisfied the demands of the planning advocates.
Another component of the planning approach in the
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New Deal was the National Planning Board (NPB)
established in 1933. The NPB enlarged the concept of
planning during the New Deal because, as Barry Dean Karl
has argued, the NPB "... provided the possibility for
important utilization of a kind of planning which was
not specifically oriented toward either the budget or
toward such specific interests as transportation,
conservation and natural resources, or industry. "[ 26
]
The focus of the NPB was not on the administration of
planning or the management of planning, but on research
and education. The NPB's research arm, the National
Resources Planning Board (NRPB)
,
produced large volumes
of social science research on a wide variety of topics
to present a picture from which the priorities for
national planning could be selected. The research was
also intended to educate the public about the necessity
of federal government activity in the private
sphere. [27] The NPB was not an effective management
agency, and its recommendations for policy changes were
not accompanied by "... detailed programs of
administrative act ion . " [ 28 ] The NPB was not a
centralized planning agency nor was it a mechanism for
the operationalizat ion of planning in the New Deal.
Nevertheless, the NPB extended the concept of planning,
improved the process of data gathering for social
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phenomena and educated the public about the social ills
that were a consequence of the regulated self
-regulat ing
economy of the United States. The NPB made these
contributions not from academic enclaves, but from
within the federal government with the sanction of the
Chief Executive.
With the establishment of the NPB , a scientific
method of planning had been inaugurated in the New Deal.
This scientific method had not yet penetrated the
administrative structure of the federal government
(although it had made certain thrusts in specific
agencies) nor had it yet reached a level of self-
deception where science governed politics. Karl
emphasizes this latter point in his discussion of
Charles Merriam:
This idea -- that in the relation
between science and politics it was
politics which governed and science
which served -- was, from the
beginning of Merriam's interest in a
science of politics and throughout
his life, the key to his fundamental
position. He supported the supremacy
of politics, the view that the
information recieved from research
was only information, only material
for use in the making of political
decisions, the "commands ."[ 29
]
The planning approach to public policy in the first
period of the New Deal was more than a shadow of
planning. A comprehensive national system of planning
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for the production and distribution of goods based on a
rational, planning-directed administration did not
emerge at this time, but the planning advocates did
create some substance of planning and they did much to
enlarge and legitimate the role of the federal
government as a national planner.
The existence of three distinct and contradictory
approaches to public policy in the first period of the
New Deal was a result of the administrative style FDR
practiced as Chief Executive. FDR's administrative
style is important because it illustrates how disparate
policy approaches could co-exist in the White House and
how major shifts in the configuration of disparate
policy approaches were possible. FDR's administrative
style has been characterized accurately by Richard
Tanner Johnson as "competitive."
Several themes underlay FDR's
competitive methods. The first was
his appetite for diverse ideas. The
second was his choice of advisers of
clashing temperaments and values to
supply the diversity of outlooks he
sought. Roosevelt sharpened these
clashes by virtue of a third
attribute of his management style: he
granted overlapping delegations of
authority. [ 30
]
FDR did not seek policy coherence, and his
Administration did not produce it. FDR would often
assign two men, with different policy philosophies and
with independent power bases, to the same task. Both
men would be assured by FDR of their primacy in this
policy area; and, during the ensuing months (or years),
FDR would provide both men with sufficient political and
administrative rope to hang themselves
.[ 31 ] FDR's
administrative style did provide for a diversity of
policy ideas, an invigorating rivalry between
administrative agencies and a centralized authority
where diverse analyses of problems and projects could be
surveyed and evaluated: FDR.
But, FDR's administrative style also had its
drawbacks. The administration of the federal government
was far from a rationalized structure under the
hierarchical control of the Chief Executive. The Chief
Executive could not be the sole focus of decision-making
and planning because he could not control the entire
federal administration as it was structured, and he
could not possibly handle the pressure or absorb the
information necessary to control the administration
single-handedly even if the administration were
restructured. These problems were to be addressed later
in the New Deal with the Brownlow Report (The
President's Committee on Administrative Management);
and, as we shall see, the Brownlow Report underscores
the connection fused during the New Deal between policy,
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planning and administration. No restructuring of the
federal admninistrat ion, though, could have addressed
another disadvantage of FDR's administrative style, the
loss of experienced and intelligent advisers who could
not stand the strain of institutional "competition" in
the White House or who could not abide the ruthlessness
of FDR when he would finally dump the less successful of
his two primary policy activists.
Roosevelt's administrative tactics did, of course,
have political advantages. By keeping a few
philosophies and a few agencies in each policy fire, FDR
could keep a variety of critics satisfied that their
interests were being heeded and served. By delaying
decisions until plans had been put into effect, FDR
could test and evaluate not only the administrative
efficacy of alternatives, but also the political
reactions from prominent persons and from the pulbic.
As Paul K. Conkin has argued, one should refrain from
dubbing FDR's style as pragmatic for it is not the
pragmatism proffered by the two American philosophers of
pragmatism, Dewey and Pierce. [32] Rather, FDR's style
reflects a politically practical approach that guards
political power at the expense of administrative economy
(as opposed to efficiency) and of a coherent
conceptualization of policy.
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FDR's administrative style, with its encouragement
of diverse opinions and tactics and with its sudden
shifts in policy approaches, is partly responsible for
the variety of interpretations that have been made of
the policy precepts and policy effects during the New
Deal. Simply put, the diversity of approaches and the
shifts in approaches make it possible to find some
evidence to support diverse, even contradictory, views
of the New Deal. If one emphasizes the orthodox
financial push in the first period of the New Deal, one
can certainly make the claim that the early New Deal was
a continuation of the conservative politics of FDR's
predecessors and that FDR's attack on big business from
1935 to 1940 was a move toward the radical left. [33]
If, as William Appleman Williams does, one focuses on
the NRA and the New Deal attempt to bring labor into a
permanent bargaining arrangement with business, then it
is possible to assert that the New Deal, in general, was
the completion of a functional-syndicalist framework
that was initiated during the Progressive Era. [34]
Williams' interpretation minimizes the shift of 1935 by
discounting FDR's attack on big business as the rhetoric
of a campaigning politician. Rexford G. Tugwell
emphasizes the planning possibilites available in the
AAA, the PWA and the CCC, and Tugwell views FDR's
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assault on big business in 1935 as a sideshow which
diverted attention from a major shift in public policy,
a shift that rejected planning approaches and embraced a
conservative economic phi losophy
.
[ 35
]
While I do not dispute that elements of orthodox
finance and syndicalism were important during the early
New Deal and that elements of both of these approaches
were maintained throughout the New Deal, the shift in
1935 can neither be dismissed as a purely rhetorical
shift nor can it be interpreted as a move to the radical
left. Tugwell's interpretation overemphasizes the
rejection of planning from 1935 to 1940, but his
analysis that the 1935 shift by FDR concealed a
conservative economic philosophy is, in general,
correct
.
The Second Period of the New Deal; 1935-38
The second period of the New Deal — June 1935 to
the spring of 1938 — was a time of ascendance for the
Brandeis-Frankfurter group. After the abuse showered on
FDR's Administration at the annual meeting of the United
States Chamber of Commerce in May 1935, FDR found the
policy approach of the Brandeis-Frankfurter group to be
personally and politically sat isfying . [ 36 ] Louis D.
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Brandeis and Felix A. Frankfurter did not view the large
corporation as an essential feature of the modern age.
Large corporations, with their vast economic, social and
political power, undermined the classical model of the
market and endangered the democracy which Brandeis and
Frankfurter viewed as dependent upon that model. The
role of government was to maintain competitive
capitalism by dismantling economic enterprises which
dominated markets and thus prevented the efficient,
honest, but unplanned, distribution of goods in society.
Government intervention in the private sphere was
necessary, but only to prevent the aberrations of
monopoly or oligopoly. The policy approach of the
Brandeis-Frankfurter group offered FDR the chance to (a)
reduce the management demands imposed by planning, (b)
reduce government involvement in the private economy,
especially the NRA, and (c) develop a campaign theme for
the 1936 elect ion. [ 37 ] Furthermore, the Brandeis-
Frankfurter approach tapped a traditional base of the
reformist movement in the United States -- the
opposition to large economic units and a fundamental
belief in the benefits of open competition — which FDR
could embrace without flinching.
The idea that individual freedom, political rights
and social justice were accessible only in a competitive
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capitalist economy was, of course, not new. Nor was the
belief that government regulation was necessary to
prevent monopolies and to maintain standards of honesty
in business a fresh idea. During the Progressive Era
there had been a split between progressives over the
role of large corporations in society. This split was
most obvious in the 1911 Presidential campaign in the
rhetoric of Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt
.[ 38
]
Wilson's "New Freedom" campaign was an appeal to the
progressives who distrusted the large corporations.
Theodore Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" campaign accepted
the large corporations as a given and promised a closer
relation between the federal government and big
business. The conflict between the Brandeisians and the
planners during the second period of the New Deal was a
rematch of this earlier row.
To the planners, the Brandeis-Frankfurter approach
to the private sphere diminished the role of planning
and reduced the government's reponsibility for social
justice. By concentrating on an anti-trust method of
regulating the economy, the Brandeisians were ignoring
three points that the planners deemed crucial. First,
economic prosperity was possible only if, in certain
industries, large corporations prospered. Second, the
failure of the market system to distribute goods
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effectively and efficiently when large corporations
dominated markets made government control and planning
essential for a prosperous economy. Third, government
control and planning could allow the government to
insure economic security for individuals and to
redistribute wealth to provide for equality of
opportunity -- the planners' ideal of social
justice. [39] The planners saw the Brandeisians as
advocates of a conservative economic philosophy because
the Brandeisians would limit government to limiting the
development of large corporations. The public sphere
would not be expanded and social justice would be left
to the machinations of the private economy.
The Brandeisians were not opposed to government
employment and government relief during economic
emergencies. They were opposed to the permanent
establishment of such government agencies, though, and
they encouraged reliance on private enterprise as the
solution to the economic crisis even as they railed
against the dangers of large corporations. The
legislative enactments of 1935 did create government
respons ibl i ty for the economic conditions of citizens,
but the responsibility was diluted in the case of Social
Security legislation and it was qualified in the case of
federal employment of the unemployed, the Works Progress
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Administrat ion.
The Social Security Act of 1935 established a
permanent role for the federal government in protecting
individuals from one of the "side-effects" of
competitive capitalism: the poverty of the elderly who
had worked during most of their lives. The Act expanded
the concept of federal government responsibility for the
welfare of individuals and expanded the federal
government's intervention in the private economy at the
expense of private insurance and retirement plans. The
Social Security Act, though, was far from a
comprehensive package of protection for the individual
or family that was suffering from the systemic crises
encountered in the economy. Indeed, the Committee on
Economic Security, the drafters of the Social Security
Act, worked independently of the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration (FERA) which was engaged during
1934 in planning for a works program. Although there
were contacts between the Committee on Economic Security
and the planners in FERA, attempts at coordination
between the two were not successful. Institutional
rivalries between the two planning agencies were fueled
by FDR's competitive management style, and the rift
between the two agencies was deepened by the distinct
policy views held in each agency. [40] The Committee on
Economic Security, chaired by Francis Perkins (a member
of the Brandeis group), did not wish to become
affiliated with an organization advocating a permanent
structure of federally supported work relief. [41] The
planners at FERA accepted the importance of social
security legislation, but they did not believe that it
addressed the more pressing issue of the unemployed
employable. [42] Thus, it was not only political
considerations that produced the piecemeal approach to
social welfare initiated by the Social Security Act.
The piecemeal approach was due to a difference between
policy approaches and grand visions of the good society
within FDR's Administration. The Social Security Act
was a victory for the Brandeisians because it expanded
the concept of social responsiblity without offering a
comprehensive package of protection for citizens that
would demand a vast expansion of the federal
government
. [43
]
The failure of the Social Security Act to secure
more comprehensive protection for the economic fortunes
of citizens was not the only factor which served to
dilute the expanded concept of social welfare. The
funding for Social Security was drawn from payments by
workers with matching payments by employers .[ 44 ] This
taxation on the workers was highly regressive because
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all wages were taxed proportionally under a low ceiling
figure. Furthermore, the Act was not even comprehensive
in its coverage of workers.
The law denied coverage to numerous
classes of workers, including those
who needed security most: notably
farm laborers and domestics.
Sickness, in normal times the major
cause of joblessness, was
disregarded. The act not only failed
to set up a national system of
unemployment compensation but it did
not even provide adequate national
standards. [45]
The Social Security Act was conservative social
legislation. It fit comfortably within the designs of
the Brandeisian view of the good society. Government
would regulate and maintain competitive capitalism while
treating the side-effects of competitive capitalism with
programs that would minimize (a) the cost of the
treatment, (b) government intervention in the private
sector, (c) expansion of federal administration and (d)
the discretionary powers of federal administrators.
The Works Progress Administration (WPA) , the
product of FERA planning in 1934, was also a setback for
the planning advocates in the New Deal. The WPA was
offered as a means to get the federal government out of
direct relief for the unemployed. Previous attempts at
government employment of the unemployed had been subject
to several types of criticism. The PWA was accused of
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moving too slowly in the planning of projects and also
was accused of competing with private contractors when
plans were accepted. The Civil Works Administration
(CWA) had developed a reputation for providing useless
"leaf-raking" work. [46] Both the PWA and the CWA were
criticized for paying salaries to workers based on the
local prevailing wage. Businessmen objected to this
practice because it did not encourage workers to seek
private employment. The WPA was designed to address
these criticisms by spending funds rapidly, building
projects that did not deprive private contractors of
work and developing pay scales that were below the local
prevailing wage. [47] The WPA, to assure private
enterprise that this was an emergency program, was
funded in two year increments. The WPA was a
recognition by the federal government that it did have
some responsibility for the economic fortunes of
citizens, but this reponsibility was extremely limited.
The WPA employed 2.9 million workers in 1936, 1.5
million workers in 1937 and 3 million workers in
1938. [48] However, there were still over 7 million
unemployed in each of these years. The WPA turned out
to be an important gesture and a godsend for many
millions of workers, but it was not a comprehensive
program effective in solving the unemployment situation
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in the United States. Instead, the WPA was a short-term
cure for what was viewed as a temporary illness of the
economy. The federal government was in the business of
production and construction, but it was conducting this
business at the fringes of the private economy. Unlike
the TVA, the WPA projects could not become actors in the
economy. Rather, WPA projects would be designed to
stimulate heavy industry and, thus, the entire private
economy. [49] The emphasis on the success of private
enterprises was further illustrated in the wage-scale
adopted by the WPA. The WPA's low wages were to serve
as an inducement for workers actively to seek jobs
within the private sector. [50] The WPA was not a
project in which the planning advocates could take
delight. The WPA served the interests of private
enterprises by improving transportation, by diminishing
labor violence and by creating a labor pool that kept
workers healthy in preparation for their return to the
private economy. [51] The federal government would
assume some responsibility for social welfare during
economic emergencies, but the federal government would
not be an active planner, or senior partner, in the
production and distribution of goods in society. The
WPA left the Brandeis vision of the good society intact.
Despite the success the Brandeis group enjoyed from
1935 to 1937, the planning advocates had not been
completely ousted from the federal government. The
planners did not design any of the large scale public
programs during the second period of the New Deal, but
they were successful in specific areas in promoting the
centralization and rationalization of administration.
In November 1934, Marriner Eccles was appointed as
Governor of the Federal Reserve Board; and by February
1935, he had drafted and had introduced to Congress
banking legislation. [ 52 ] The Banking Act of 1935, based
largely on Eccles's draft, provided the federal
government with the powers to control currency and
credit and, thus, established the mechanisms necessary
for the employment of the fiscal techniques being
advocated by John Maynard Keynes. [53] Senator Carter
Glass, the self-proclaimed founder of the Federal
Reserve System, claimed that he had reduced
substantially the amount of government control over
private finance that was envisioned in Eccles's draft,
but the deletions by Glass were not as important as he
suggested.
What Congress conspicuously deleted
was a statement of policy Eccles had
attached to the bill. In it he
argued that the Federal Reserve Board
should adopt policies to maintain
business stability and to mitigate
unstabilizing influences on
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production, trade, prices and
employment by monetary action and
credit administration. This looked
toward the Employment Act of 1946 and
toward avowed policy of today. In
actual practice the Board, by open
market operations, shifts in the
rediscount rate and rare changes in
the reserve requirements, did just
this, finally bringing the supply of
money and the cost of credit almost
completely into the area of public
policy. [54
]
The Banking Act did not provide the government with
complete control over the banking system or over
monetary policy, but the act did provide sufficient
control for the enactment of Keynesian techniques by the
federal government. The policies advocated by Keynes
were suitable for FDR's administration because the
policies did not require extensive planning or expansive
administration. The federal government could guide the
general direction of the economy without threatening the
system of private enterprise and without entering into
an explicit partnership with private finance. The
policies of Keynes would require planning and they would
necessitate occasional government action in the private
sector to prime the economic pump during recessions, but
these policies did not require the extent of planning
and the continuous activity of government in the private
sector envisioned by the planning advocates during the
first period of the New Deal. The federal government
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could steer the economy without having to man the
engines of the economy.
The Third Period of the New Deal; 1937-1940
The Banking Act created the mechanisms of control
necessary for Keynesian policies to be put into
practice, but the mechanisms of control remained idle
until the 1937-1938 recession. Planning advocates,
though, did not remain idle. They attempted to
resurrect the planning approach through the
restructuring of the entire Executive branch. The
planners had grasped the influence of administration on
policy and their proposals for the reorganization of the
federal administration were to influence the course of
future policy approaches for the next thirty-five years.
The distinction between politics and administration
could never again be made with the clarity that had been
possible at the turn of the century.
On 20 March 1936 FDR created the President's
Committee on Administrative Management (PCAM) to propose
a reorganization of the federal administration that
would give the President greater control over the
federal bureaucracy. The three men appointed to the
Committee by FDR were Louis Brownlow, Charles E. Merriam
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and Luther Gulick.[56] The final report of the PCAM,
submitted to the President in January 1937 and submitted
to Congress the same month, became a center of
controversy between the Executive and a Congress that
was beginning to assert its independence. [ 57 ] The
PCAM's report called for a restructuring of the federal
administration that sought clear lines of hierarchy
under the President, presidential control over the
plethora of independent commissions, a permanent
national planning board and an expanded White House
staff. The report was designed to increase Executive
control over a bureaucracy that had expanded in a
piecemeal fashion and at a rapid rate since 1932. [58]
However, by the spring of 1938, when FDR presented the
PCAM report in a legislative package to the Congress,
many members of the Congress believed that the
"rationalization of administration" was simply a
rationalization for an increase in Executive power at
the expense of Congress .[ 59 ] The proposals of the PCAM
did envision an increase in the power of the Executive,
but the Committee viewed this increase in power as
essential if there was to be responsibility and
accountability for the actions of the federal
administration. The explicit battle over the PCAM's
report was waged as a constitutional struggle between
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the Executive branch and Congress, but the implicit
battle was between two views of the role of the federal
government in society. Those who drafted the PCAM's
report were committed to government action in the
private sector to control the economy and to effect
social justice. Opponents of the report placed their
faith in a private economy free from the interference
and direction of government.
The PCAM's report did not advocate a system of
planning that would control the production and
distribution of goods in society nor did it enter the
fray between the Brandeisians and the planners over the
issues of big business and monopoly. What the report
did advocate was a centralized administration that would
take responsibility for economic stability and for the
enrichment of the lives of c i t izens
.
[ 60 ] This social
responsibility by government would be possible only if
planning and scientific study became fused with an
administrative structure that was accountable to the
people by being under the supervision of a single
elected representative, the President. The PCAM's
report is filled with a compassion for the social and
economic rights of individuals and with a recognition of
the government's role in pursuing the public good.
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Your Committee fully appreciates that
there is no magic in management
alone. Management is a servant, not
a master -- a means, not an end, a
tool in the hands and for the
purposes of the Nation. Public
service is service of the common good
in peace or war and will be judged by
this standard. Not merely lower unit
costs but higher human happiness and
values are the supreme ends of our
national life, and by these terms
this and every other system must
finally be tested. Good management
will promote in the fullest measure
the conservation and utilization of
our national resources, and spell
this out plainly in social justice,
security, order, liberty, prosperity,
in material benefits, and in higher
values of life. The adjustments and
arrangements we suggest have no other
purpose or justification than better
public service for our people through
better administrative management .[ 61
]
The PCAM's report represents a transition from the
second to the third period of the New Deal. The PCAM's
report espoused planning by the federal government for
economic stability and the economic and social fortunes
of individuals. The federal government's role in
planning was not to entail the penetration of the
private sphere advocated by the planners in the first
period of the New Deal, but the government's role would
be greater than that advocated by the Brandeisians . The
PCAM's report also broke from the Brandeisian vision
because the report called for the centralization of
administration that guaranteed a large federal
government. The federal government would not be as
large as would be necessary if the government assumed
responsibility for the production and distribution of
goods in society, but it would still be large enough to
arouse the fears of those opposed to bigness in
government and business.
The ascendance of the Brandeisians in the second
period of the New Deal did not prevent planning
mechanisms from being established, nor did it prevent a
greater expansion of the concept of social
responsibility. The Brandeisians were able, though, to
prevent planning advocates from entrenching the
government deeply within the private economy. The
Brandeisians did not allow the planners to become the
controllers of private enterprise or to become partners
with private enterprise. Just as regulation could be
carried out at a distance from the private sphere
(within a neutral sphere charged with the public good),
so too could planning be carried out a distance. The
Brandeisian influence helped create a relationship
between the public sphere and the private sphere that
made the federal government responsible for economic
stability and for the social welfare of citizens and,
yet, left the federal government at such a distance from
the machinations of the private economy that the
92
government had neither the information nor the control
commensurate with the responsibility.
Indeed, in 1938 the conservative coalition in
Congress rejected legislation drawn from the PCAM's
report and, thus, denied the Executive effective control
over the distanced federal administration. FDR, not to
be denied, put into place in September 1939 most of the
recommendations of the PCAM's report with Executive
Order 8248. This Executive Order created the Executive
Office of the President which was to be staffed with six
administrative assistants and moved the Bureau of the
Budget to the Executive Office from the Department of
the Treasury. [62] The creation of the Executive Office
secured the President's position as the head of the
federal administration and made the Executive the center
of the federal government as the government assumed
responsibility for economic stability and social
welfare.
The transition to the third period of the New Deal
was completed in April 1938 when Roosevelt finally
accepted a Keynesian response to the 1937-38 recession.
During 1937 Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau
had convinced FDR that the cure for the recession could
be found in the principles of orthodox finance.
Government spending was reduced and the rolls of the WPA
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were slashed. Finally, in April 1938 FDR decided to
accept the advice of Eccles and to use federal spending
as a means to economic recovery. Eccles 's approach was
straightforward.
The government must be the
compensatory agent in this economy;
it must unbalance its budget during
deflation and create surpluses in
periods of great business
activity. [63]
The appeal of the Keynesian approach to the economic
fluctuations of capitalism, as we have noted, is that it
allows the government some control over the direction of
the economy while still allowing the federal government
distance from the operations of the private market. The
Keynesian approach fits within the policy model that
emerged in the conflict between the Brandeisians and the
planners. Planning would be essential and
centralization of administration would be necessary, but
planning would be done from a safe distance and the
centralization of administration would not demand the
consolidation or the control of private markets.
The Keynesian approach was in accord with the
vision of the good society proffered by members of the
PCAM. The problems of information gathering and of
control of private sector aberrations could be solved by
the fusion of planning mechanisms and administrative
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management. A profound faith in scientific study and
administrative techniques was exhibited by members of
the PCAM.
It is important, however, to see to
it that our arrangements for making
use of the finest and soundest
American experience and judgement in
planning for the American future are
the best that can be set up, and
further that they are meshed with the
machinery, first of administrative
management and finally of policy
determination. We confidently
believe that the universal aspiration
for economic security and the
increasing enrichment of human lives
may be forwarded by substituting the
results of careful scientific study
for uninformed judgement and
political expediency as the basis for
the formulation of governmental
plans. [ 64 ]
This profound faith was also evidenced in the writings
of Keynesians.
The relationship between the
Roosevelt administration and
Keynesian doctrine, then, was at best
one of tepid affection. On the
longer run what counted more than the
1937-38 fiscal episode was the growth
to academic power, even to academic
dominance of an indigenous Keynesian
school. The conversion of Keynesian
public policy into administrative
routine which has been the
achievement of the Kennedy-Johnson
years was based upon the training of
a generation of economists and
students in a new set of techniques
and a new set of practical
consequences
.
[ 65
]
Science and the scientific tools available to
administration would overcome the distance between the
public sphere and the private sphere and ensure an
enlarged concept of social responsiblity.
The third period of the New Deal was a profession
of faith in science and scientific techniques.
Scientific administration and scientific techniques
could be harnessed for the benefit of both private
enterprise and the public. The political liberties
derived from an open, competitive economy could be
maintained because the government was to exercise
control only from the perimeter of the private sphere.
The threat of bureaucratic tyranny from a large central
government was abated because (a) the federal
administration would be guided by the neutral principles
of science and (b) the selection of appropriate
techniques by administrators would be guided by elected
representatives and would be limited by scientific
certainty.
The confidence in a scientific approach to public
policy in the third period of the New Deal was certianly
not shared by many in the federal government. Nor was
the establishment of scientific administration and the
perfection of scientific techniques completed during
FDR's tenure as President. A structure for scientific
administration had been proffered, though, and the
acceptance of Keynesian techniques in both government
and higher education spread the faith in scientific
tools. World War II would provide the situation in
which scientific approaches and scientific
administration would flourish. The federal government,
during World War II, would engage actively in the
planning of the production and distribution of goods,
increasing the opportunities for scientific experiments
in planning, but the federal government after World War
II would quickly return to the perimeter of the private
sphere. [66]
The accommodation reached during the third period
of the New Deal between the Brandeisian vision of the
good society and the planners' vision of the good
society determined the relationship between the public
sphere and the private sphere for the next thirty-five
years. Even the issues omitted in the accommodation
between the two policy approaches would remain issues of
contention far into the future. The issue of bigness in
private enterprises was not resolved in the
accommodation, and this resulted in an anti-trust
program that can be characterized, at best, as
schizophrenic
.
The accord reached in the third period of the New
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Deal — the scientifc approach to public policy — was
crucial in establishing a federal government that could
assume responsiblity for the machinations of the private
economy even as the government kept its distance from
the private sphere. The federal government accepted the
responsibility for maintaining the private economy and,
at the same time, for protecting citizens from the worst
side-effects of the private economy. The federal
government became the steering mechanism for the economy
and the legitimator of the social order. Success in
either one of these roles would be difficult enough from
the perimeter of the private sphere. Success in both
roles at once, even with science, would be, at best, a
tightrope act. The scramble for scientific solutions
was on.
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CHAPTER V
THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO PLANNING: 1946-1969
The Dilemma Posed by the Employment Act of 1946
The Employment Act of 1946 was both a cogent
articulation of the public policy model that emerged in
the last two years of the New Deal and of the
institutionalization of a scientific-planning approach
destined to undermine its own integrity. The Employment
Act embraced the late New Deal vision of government
planning on the periphery of the private sphere. The
federal government would be both the steering mechanism
for the private sector and the guarantor of basic needs
for the citizenry while maintaining its distance from
the basic economic decisions which private enterprise
made. Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies would make
planned economic growth a science that need not
penetrate into the core of the private sphere. The
science of economic planning offered the promise of a
federal government able to foster and promote free
competitive enterprise and the general welfare.
The Employment Act institutionalized this science
of economic planning by creating the Council of Economic
Advisers (CEA).[1] The CEA was to be composed of three
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members appointed by the President and approved by the
Senate. The CEA was placed in the Executive Office,
further acknowledging the role of the President in
national (economic) planning. The function of the CEA
was to provide (a) long term forecasts of economic
developments, (b) policy choices and (c) evaluations of
current policies to the President. Furthermore, the CEA
was to furnish the President with the information
necessary to present Economic Reports to the
Congress. [2]
The dual, but far from compatible, mandate
established for all CEA activities — the promotion of
free competitive enterprise and of maximum employment,
production and purchasing power — was apparent even
during the legislative battle over the Employment Act.
The House bill emphasized the promotion of free
enterprise while the Senate Bill stressed maximum
employment, production and purchasing power. [3] The
result, not surprisingly, was an Act that promoted both
goals equally and never addressed the question whether
both goals were compatible with economic planning. The
CEA was to hurdle the issue of how much intervention by
the federal government is necessary to achieve maximum
employment, production and purchasing power without
allowing that intervention to undermine the promotion of
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free competitive enterprise with the use of four
strategies.
First, each member of the CEA was "... to be a
person who, as a result of his training, experience,
and attainments, is exceptionally qualified to analyze
and interpret economic developments, to appraise
programs and activities of the Government in the light
of the policy declared in section 2, and to formulate
and recommend national economic policy to promote
employment, production, and purchasing power under free
competitive enterpr ise . " [ 4 ] Economic expertise would
allow the CEA to remain above the dilemma posed by the
Employment Act. Furthermore, this science of economics
could avoid the obvious political and partisan
explosions sure to follow government plans calling for
increased intervention into the private sphere and the
private economy. Edward S. Flash Jr., in his Economic
Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of
Economic Advisers
,
has described well the distance from
politics which scientific expertise was to purchase for
the CEA:
From its Olympian perch the Council
could dispense expert advice with
objectivity, perspective and
independence. The implication of the
qualification for holding office was
essentially that of non-political
expertise. The Council would not
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become enmeshed in the passion of
advocacy and operation. Moreover
expertise would reveal the answerslead to the setting of correct goals,
and provide economic standards forjudging specific policies. Truth
would harness, perhaps even overcome
but never succumb to partisanship.
True to the public administration
views of the day, economics, like
administration would be separated
from politics. [5] (original emphasis)
Expertise, of course, was to be expertise in the
economics of planning at the periphery of the private
sphere: Keynesian economics.
Second, the CEA would overcome the dilemma posed by
the Employment Act by advocating the pan-partisan
economic philosophy of fast and vast growth. Economic
growth would (or, at least might) create a private
economy that, although still regulated in some areas,
provided a free space for competitive capitalism.
Economic growth would also relieve the government of the
responsibility for procuring the basic economic needs of
those who suffered during depressions and recessions. A
thriving economy could produce a low tax rate combined
with increasing expenditures for domestic policies
designed to aid those who remained unemployed in times
of plenty. Most importantly though, a booming economy
could allow the CEA and the government to avoid the
nastiest and most precocious issues which confront
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society in the United States: redistribution of income
and wealth. [6] Sustained economic growth could sate the
citizenry and mute the issues of redistribution of
income and wealth. Indeed, Leon H. Keyserling,
appointed as Chairman of the CEA in May 1950, summed up
this perspective in a 1948 article which preached the
merits of planned, sustained economic growth: "There can
be so much for all that the removal of unmerited poverty
will remove the threat to merited wealth. "[7]
Third, the CEA could enact the social programs and
produce the social benefits most Keynesian economists in
the United States supported. This could be done without
an explicit redistribution program or a government
planning system intervening directly in the choices of
private enterprises because the periodic expansion of
social programs and services was one of the accepted
scientific techniques in the Keynesian counter-cyclical
arsenal. Social programs that lived up to the promises
of the federal government during the New Deal — "low-
cost housing, social insurance, education, resource
development" [8] — could be funded by economic growth
and could be expanded as a technical response to periods
of economic stagnation. Scientific neutrality in the
pursuit of planning for the good society was to exist
within the CEA, as it had in the National Resources
Planning Board during the New Deal, as a protective
armor for "scientific integrity.
" [9] "Scientific
integrity," of course, was synonymous with a view of
society that can be best described as "moderately
liberal." This is not to suggest that critics of
planning and of Keynesianism did not penetrate this
neutral facade and realize the social responsibilities
government could eventually assume under the guise of
counter-cyclical techniques designed for a growth
economy. [10] Nevertheless, scientific techniques and
the promise of a booming economy could still the
naysayers and offer opportunities for social programs
that might promote the general welfare and might not
infringe on free competitive enterprise.
Fourth, the ambiguity of the langauge in the
Employment Act provided political shelters for both the
CEA and the Congress. To empower the CEA to "promote
free competitive enterprise" and to "promote maximum
employment, production, and purchasing power" in accord
with the general welfare was to promote executive
discretion and administrative discretion. Congress
attempted to pass on particularly troublesome and
dangerous economic issues to the Executive branch by
delegating authority on a grand basis. Accountability
for CEA proposals and policies was to result from the
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CEA's inclusion within the Executive branch and from the
faculty of economic science to limit discretion by
limiting the number of rational choices to one. By
stressing the economic expertise necessary for qualified
CEA members, the Congress intended a CEA that would be
above politics and, thus, above discret ion
.
[ 11 ] The
ambiguity of the language in the Employment Act did give
the CEA room to manuever. it was possible to place
emphasis on either the mandate to promote free
competitive enterprise or on the mandate to promote
maximum full employment. However, discretion to slight
the former mandate was more limited than the discretion
to slight the latter mandate. Federal policies that
subvert free competitive enterprise (or, at least, the
ideal of free competitive enterprise) are always easier
to identify than policies that undermine maximum
employment. Indeed, since the Employment Act there has
been a continuing debate over what level of employment
can be considered maximum (or full) employment .[ 1 2
]
Consequently, the CEA's discretion is bounded on the one
side by the vision of a market economy that has existed
in no mass society. Explorations by the CEA past this
boundary are sure to bring indignant comments from
Congressmen accusing the CEA of transgressing its
author i ty.
Ill
These four strategies - scientific economics,
rapid and continuous economic growth, hidden social
benefits, ambiguity of the mandates — were employed by
the federal government after World War II to bypass the
dilemma posed by the responsibility of government for
both steering the private economy and maintaining the
basic needs of the citizenry. The institutionalization
of these strategies within the Executive branch in the
CEA marked the beginning of an approach to public policy
by the federal government that was grounded in
scientific planning. This scientific planning, though,
was to be denied access to the information about the
decisions, costs and plans of private enterprise which
might have allowed the federal government to plan
successfully for economic growth and maximum employment.
Scientific planning might give the government a fair
chance to manipulate the proper fiscal and monetary
levers, and thus a fair chance to abet prosperous times
and to curtail recessions. Nevertheless, the macro-
economic tools available to the federal government would
not be able to address all the responsibilities
government had accepted for the general welfare of the
populace nor for the specific groups within society
whose economic situations did not improve even during
the most prosperous periods. This scientific planning
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era in public policy in the United States — marked by
the scientization of economics and, thus, the
depoliticization of economic issues[13] — was slowly,
unevenly, but progressively, to bring about the
rationalization of the federal government's
administrative structure, budgeting procedures and
evaluation processes. In not one of these areas would
rationalization for scientific planning come close to
completion, but each area would realize enough
rationalization to make apparent by the 1960s that
planning on the periphery was not going to be a complete
success
.
The acknowledgement that scientific planning on the
perimeter of the private sphere would not be a final
answer to the dilemma created by the Employment Act of
1946 was made only after scientific planning had been
tried for almost two decades and its own partial success
had exposed its deficiencies. We turn now to an
exploration of those decades focusing on the
responsibilities accepted by the federal government and
on the rationalization of structures and procedures that
were to make possible the performance of those
responsibi 1 it ies.
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Scientific Planning in the Truman Administrati on
Harry S. Truman made clear, soon after his
elevation to the presidency, that the federal government
would not disregard the responsibilities it had assumed
before World War II. m messages to Congress in
September and November of 1945, President Truman asked
for legislation on employment and health. [14] The First
message called for both unemployment compensation and
for full-employment legislation. Truman's emphasis on
the role of government in assisting in the maintenance
of a "full production peace time economy" to create full
employment parallels the thinking behind the Employment
Act. Truman's November message to Congress asked for a
comprehensive health program founded on the Fair Deal's
"Economic Bill of Rights." Truman stated:
Our new Economic Bill of Rights
should mean health security for all
regardless of residence, station, or
race — everywhere in the United
States.
We should resolve now that the
health of this Nation is a national
concern; that financial barriers in
the way of attaining health shall be
removed; that the health of all its
citizens deserves the help of the
nat ion ... [ 15
]
While Truman was committed to the role of
government as the underwriter of an economic bill of
rights, he was wary of budget deficits and of Keynesian
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explanations of the acceptability of deficits. Truman's
fear of deficits and unease with Keynesians was
reflected in his appointment of the first Chairman of
the CEA, Edwin G. Nourse. Nourse, an advocate of
orthodox economics, was far more conservative than the
other two members Truman selected for the CEA, Leon H.
Keyserling and John D. Clark. [16] Nourse not only
disagreed with the policy views of the other members, he
felt that they abused their positions within the CEA by
making political statements and judgements. [ 17 ] Nourse
took seriously the claim that the CEA was to be a
repository for non-partisan experts, and his belief that
the CEA was to refrain from political debates made him
appear to the other members to be naive. The lack of
harmony in the CEA, Nourse' s view of a passive CEA and
an increasingly poor relationship with Truman led to
Nourse's resignation in October 1949. Prior to Nourse's
resignation, Truman had begun to rely on the advice of
Leon H. Keyserling. Keyserling offered an economic view
and a political stance that afforded Truman the
opportunity to mitigate his fear of deficits, to support
the provision of essential social services and, yet, to
retain his apprehension about that element in
Keynesianism which seemed to question the importance of
private enterprise and to inflate the government's role
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in the production of goods and services. Influenced by
Keyserling's thought, Truman could claim in his July
1949 midyear Economic Report that a balanced budget
during a recession was not a top priority:
We cannot expect to achieve a budget
surplus in a declining economy.
There are economic and social
deficits that would be far more
serious than a temporary deficit in
the Federal Budget. [18]
Keyserling's ability to influence Truman's economic
views (and to garner the position of Chairman of the CEA
after Nourse's resignation) [ 19] rested on Keyserling's
ability to combine an abiding faith in the virtue of
capitalism and in the Tightness of big government.
Keyserling's critique of the New Deal did not find fault
with the government's use of fiscal and regulatory
policies. [20] Rather, Keyserling argued that the
greatest fault of the New Deal was that it had lost
faith in capitalism. The New Deal had forgotten that
the private sector was the sector responsible for
economic growth and that the government's social
responsibilities could be afforded (and expanded) only
because of economic growth. [21] The New Deal had relied
too extensively on a coercive relationship with private
enterprise and had taken a dogmatic view on anti-trust
policy, weakening businessmen's faith in government and
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dampening their willingness to invest in a "hampered"
private sector. The government should trust private
enterprise to establish wage-price-profit policies that
will enhance the chances for maximum production and
(thus) maximum employment. Private enterprise should
have faith in the government's ability to enforce
regulatory policies and to employ fiscal policies that
will also enhance the chances for maximum production and
employment. [22] This mutual trust can only be instilled
if there is a clearer separation of the responsibilities
of each sphere than occurred during the New Deal.
Keyserling's criticisms of the New Deal are, of
course, open to contention. in Chapter IV we saw how
FDR's anti-business rhetoric was only rarely coupled
with legislation which could be deemed anti-business.
Indeed, the relief policies of the New Deal (a) paid
heed to the opinions of business leaders, (b) helped
diminish anti-capitalist sentiment among workers and the
unemployed and (c) supported a labor pool for private
enterprise. [23] Nevertheless, Keyserling's critique of
the New Deal remained compelling for two reasons.
First, maximum production and employment were dependent
upon a booming private economy. [24] Second, a booming
private economy was possible only if private
entrepeneurs retained faith in the prospects for a
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healthy investment environment in the future; for
entrepeneurs such an environment entailed limited
government intervention in the private sector.
Keyserling saw the government's role in enhancing
investment prospects as dependent upon the curtailment
of Executive branch criticisms of big business and upon
an increase in Executive branch reliance on the goodwill
and farsightedness of big business.
Keyserling's reliance on voluntarism in dealings
with the private economy was essential to the framework
of government planning at the perimeter of the private
sphere. Government policies designed to combat
recessions in the business cycle must not weaken
entrepeneurs' confidence in the economy and, thus,
exacerbate the recession. By avoiding direct controls
over wages-prices-profits and direct coordination of
private production, Keyserling sought the confidence of
businessmen. The voluntary cooperation of business and
labor would be possible because the goal of government
planning (at a distance) was what Keyserling termed
"expansion economics." Expansion economics would render
voluntary cooperation from all members of society
because economic growth would provide economic largess
for all without posing threats to "merited wealth. "[25]
The productive potential of the economy would be
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harnessed (or unleashed) by reliance upon "... (i) the
indirect controls of taxation, credit restraints, and
allocations and (2) voluntary adjustments by business,
labor and consumer . "[ 26]
Keyserling's views on expansion economics and on
voluntarism were important because his views shaped
Executive branch policy under Truman and established a
boundary between the government and the private sector
that future administrations did not violate (without
overwhelmingly compelling reasons). Keyserling was
instrumental in postponing wage and price controls in
1950 and 1951. During this period of recession and
United States' involvement in Korea, the Office of Price
Stabilization (OPS) argued for wage and price controls
to reduce inflationary pressures. Keyserling's approach
to the problem of inflation was to impose a price
freeze. OPS wanted to go beyond a price freeze and
enact a system of price roll-backs to prevent unfair
profits from being taken by companies that had raised
their prices in expectation of a freeze and a system of
roll-forwards to reward companies that had refrained
from opportunistic price-gouging and that were now
making unsatisfactory profits. [27] Keyserling opposed
price roll-backs because they would be difficult for the
government to administer effectively and he opposed
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roll-forwards because they would increase prices. [28]
Keyserling's view, of course, rested on his concept of
government planning at a distance, a distance that would
be threatened by government attempts to intervene more
directly in the private economy to secure an equitable
price freeze. OPS action to set price roll-backs and
roll-forwards would place the government in the wage-
price-profit domain which was to be Keyserling's
sanctuary for private (enterprise) decisions. By late
April 1951, though, OPS had won its battle with
Keyserling and a price roll-forward policy was
enacted. [29] OPS's moment of success was short-lived,
however, as Keyserling managed a long-term, but rather
strange, victory.
OPS calculation of price roll-backs and roll-
forwards was made on the basis of industry's own
calculation of cost-price data (yet another example of
planning at the perimeter of the private sphere).
Industry calculations were presented in formats designed
to retard equitable decisions and to maximize short-term
profits. [30] The failure of OPS to provide equitable
price-cost adjustments undermined the use of wage and
price controls as a technique for government control of
the economy for almost thirty years. [31] Keyserling
could point to the failure of coercive action by the
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federal government in its relationship with private
enterprise. Keyserling's claim was strange both because
price controls were a response to the failure of
voluntary profit restraint by private enterprises and
because the failure of OPS price-cost policy was, in
part, a failure of private enterprise to live up to the
integrity they were supposed to illustrate in a
voluntaristic framework. Keyserling lost a battle with
OPS only to prove the final victor in establishing a
separation of roles for the federal government and the
private economy which would keep scientific planning at
a distance from the private sphere.
Keyserling's ability to maitain government planning
at the perimeter of the private sphere as prescribed in
the last two years of the New Deal was also evident in
the Truman Administration's role in the steel ordeal of
1951 and 1952. In November 1951, Keyserling's CEA
presented two confidential reports to the President on
the course government action should follow if collective
bargaining between the steel industry and the unions did
not produce a contract before the 31 December strike
deadline. Grant McConnell, in his excellent monograph,
The Steel Seizure of 1952
, summarizes the CEA's advice:
The Council argued that "any remotely
reasonable wage increase" would be
absorbable without any price
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increase. Hence, although some wageincreases should probably be allowedthe government should stand against
'
any policy of simultaneous wage andprice increases. To do anything else
would be to encourage irresistable
collusion between labor and industry
And as a part of such a stand, the
government should avoid being drawninto bargaining itself. Finally, thegovernment should not await the
outcome of bargaining between the two
parties to make its own position
known. The CEA's reports constituted
a fairly forceful argument both for
separating price and wage controls
and for the active participation of
government (in the role of neutral)
in dispute settlements. [ 32
]
Three important facets of Keyserling's domestic
policy approach shine through this summary. First, the
government's responsibility to make its own general wage
and price position known to the public reflects
Keyserling's belief that expert knowledge can serve as a
tool for consensus politics. [33] If both parties to a
dispute (and the general public) are aware of the
"facts," and the consequences that will emerge from
those facts, then reasonable people will reason to
consensus. Keyserling's faith in voluntarism is at root
a faith in experts' knowledge and in the general
rationality of citizens. [ 34 ] The federal government can
maintain its distance from the private economy because
rational proposals by the government will command the
attention and consensus due to the authority of
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rationality.
Second, the separation of the federal government's
wage control decisions and price control decisions
reveals a problem inherent in planning in the United
States. Wage controls and price controls were the
domain of two distinct administrative units, because if
wage and price controls were decided upon by one agency,
then wage and price controls for any one industry would
have to be adjusted simultaneously
.[ 35] Simultaneous
adjustment of wages and prices was to be avoided to
prevent management/labor collusion for wage and price
increases at the expense of consumers. Separation of
wage and price decisions, though, is not without its own
problems. This separation of decisions assumes that the
proper wage levels and satisfactory profit levels can be
determined empirically. The issue of redistribution of
corporate earnings can be silenced under such a schema
because a proper wage-to-profit ratio can be
"empirically" established, but the data from which the
empirical ratio is derived is always skewed in favor of
management and, thus, in favor of rising prices. This
result is not due to pro-business government
administrators, rather it is the result of relying on
data provided to government by private enterprises. The
steel companies refused to provide their operating
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figures to the OPS and the OPS staff had to rely on
published industry figures in deciding upon a price
increase. [36] One can imagine the public outcry if wage
controls were to be determined on the basis of a union's
estimate of workers' wages. Even if an empirical wage-
to-profit ratio could be determined for government
economic planning, it could not be determined with the
management data available to OPS. Government planning
on the perimeter must prevent management/labor
collusion, but it must also impede its own planning
abilities (however limited) to prevent its penetration
into the sphere of private enterprise.
Third, the federal government can be an active
participant in the private sphere, but it must be a
neutral participant. Neutral participation results not
so much from the neutral ethical sphere established by
the Pendleton Act, but rather from the neutrality
secured through scientific and economic expert ise .[ 37
]
Federal administration, in response to the post-New Deal
role in society, justified its decisions and actions as
the proper scientific decisions and actions. Prior to
the New Deal, administrative discretion was to be
limited by specific statutory authorization of
administrative duties. After the New Deal, the federal
government's responsibilities were more difficult for
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the Congress to specify precisely (e.g., the language of
the Employment Act) and administrative discretion was to
be limited by expertise. Scientific neutrality could
side-step potentially disruptive political issues by
emphasizing the "reasonable" results of rational action.
Even Truman's decision to seize the steel industry
on 8 April 1952, after the failure of collective
bargaining and the rejection of the Wage Board's
recommendation by steel management, cannot be seen as a
gross violation of the private sphere by the federal
government. The steel seizure by Truman actually
amounted to little more than the refusal to allow
managers and workers to leave their jobs during the
Korean War. The government did not fire, hire, take
profits or even examine the operating figures of the
steel industry. When the Supreme Court declared on 2
June 1952 that the seizure was unconstitutional, Truman
immediately revoked the seizure. The steel workers went
on strike and they did not return to work until
collective bargaining had produced (with White House
guarantees to the industry of price increases) a
settlement on 24 July 1952. Thus, although the strike
took place during wartime in a key industry, the federal
government remained at a distance from the private
sector fray — a distance that had been endorsed by the
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Keyserling CEA.
The Keyserling Chairmanship established the CEA as
a vital actor in domestic politics. The Keyserling CEA
set a precedent for an active CEA, whose activity would
be justified by expert knowledge. Furthermore, the
Keyserling CEA established boundaries for government
activity in the private sector. These boundaries had
been suggested during the last two years of the New
Deal, but the Keyserling CEA was able to congeal these
boundaries. Even the critiques of the Keyserling CEA
made by commentators on the left did not admonish the
CEA for failure to take a more active role within the
private sector. Rather, the criticism was that the
Keyserling CEA had placed "... insufficient emphasis on
the monetary, tax and expenditure policies of the
federal government as stabilizing devices ."[ 38 ] The
Keyserling CEA was criticized for insufficient use of
the economic tools available to a government at the
perimeter of the private sector, not for the limited
options available at the perimeter.
The Keyserling CEA was also responsible for adding
expansion economics — a philosophy of rapid and
continuous growth with the federal government as the
controller of the stabilizing devices — to the list of
acceptable options for public policy. Expansion
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economics was never fully embraced by the Truman
Administration, nor was it to be the guiding economic
theory of the Eisenhower Administration. Nevertheless,
the theory of expansion economics was accepted by the
moderate-to-left wing of the Democratic Party and was to
regain access to the Executive branch in 1961. Even
those opposed to the government activity inherent in
expansion economics were forced to (a) rely on and
deploy the macro-economic tools prescribed by expansion
economics and (b) to measure the success of other
economic approaches by the indices developed by
advocates of expansion economics (e.g., growth). As we
shall see, expansion economics would exert influence
even during an Administration that viewed expansion
economics with disfavor.
The recourse to federal government planning after
World War II required a further rationalization of the
Executive branch. During the Truman Administration,
attempts were made to increase Executive control over
the federal administration, to develop budgeting
techniques which could evaluate the new programs
government would now undertake and to create planning
staffs within domestic agencies
Increased Executive control over the federal
administration was a goal of the First Hoover Commission
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(1949). [39] Following the tradition of the President's
Commission on Administrative Management (1937), the
First Hoover Commission recommended that: (a) the three
member Civil Service Commission be headed by one
Chairman who would also be a staff adviser to the
President; (b) the number of staff units be expanded
under the hierarchical control of the Executive Office;
and (c) administrative assistant secretaries to the
Commerce, Justice, Labor and Treasury Departments be
selected from the career civil service. The latter two
recommendations reflected the pervasive view that
planning was now essential to good government and that
planning was an Executive, not legislative,
responsibility. Scientific planning could be held in
check by the technical application of knowledge and by
the unity of command under the President. While the
first recommendation did not prove satisfactory when it
was pursued during the Eisenhower Administration, the
latter two recommendations were enacted without major
disruptions. The increase in the number of staff units
provided more hierarchical control over the expanded
administrative state and made possible a distinction
among staff units. As Hugh Heclo has argued: "Over
time, even the staff concept became differentiated
between pure staff (such as planners and personal
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advisers) and auxiliary staff services (organizational
maintenance functions such as supplies, personnel, and
so on). «[40] The First Hoover Commission Report was a
proposal for the rationalization of the planning
approach to public policy in the United States.
Executive control over the federal budget and
Executive Office evaluation of domestic programs were
extended during the Truman Administration with the
sophistication of "performance" budgeting. Allen
Schick, in a 1966 article outlining the three stages of
budget reform in the twentieth century, characterizes
performance budgeting by its emphasis on management
control
:
In the first stage, dating roughly
from 1920 to 1935, the dominant
emphasis was on developing an
adequate system of expenditure
control. Although planning and
management considerations were not
altogether absent (and indeed
occupied a prominent role in the
debates leading to the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921), they were
pushed to the side by what was
regarded as the first priority, a
reliable system of expenditure
accounts. The second stage came into
the open during the New Deal and
reached its zenith more than a decade
later in the movement for performance
budgeting. The management
orientation, paramount during this
period, made its mark in the reform
of the appropriation structure,
development of management improvement
and work measurement programs, and
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of which must await the
institutionalization of PPB
(Planning-Programming-Budgeting)
, canbe traced to earlier efforts to linkplanning and budgeting as well as tothe analytic criteria of welfare
economics, but its recent developmentis a product of modern informational
and decisional technologies such asthose pioneered in the Department ofDefense. [41] (emphasis added)
Performance budgeting was a response to the same proble
addressed by the First Hoover Commission Report:
inadequate Executive control over an expanded federal
administration. Performance budgeting provided for
greater agency accountability to the Executive Office
and installed performance evaluation techniques which
would produce data for future planning proposals.
Performance budgeting aided in establishing a system of
rational evaluation of government programs which would
make possible a greater emphasis on long-term planning.
Long-term planning by domestic agencies was
accentuated during the heyday of performance budgeting
by the creation of planning staffs within the agencies.
In the Department of Interior, a Program Staff with
committees in the field was created in 1947. The
Program Staff was to design a system for the
clarification of the Department's short-term and long-
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term goals and to improve the means for departmental
coordination of activities. [42] The Program Staff
proved particularly adept at defining and clarifying
short-term goals. Which is not surprising given the
emphasis and techniques of performance budgeting. Long-
term planning, though, posed greater problems for the
Program Staff.
The Program Staff did produce a five year plan
(1955-1960) in 1953, but the planning reports suffered
from those three banes of domestic long-term planning:
imprecise statement of program goals, inadequate
quantitative techniques and insufficient research.
Precise articulation of program goals is never easy in
domestic policy and Congress has manifested little
willingness to hone the goals of domestic legislation.
As was suggested earlier, oblique social legislation is
part of the political fare in a society where government
plans at the periphery of the private sphere. The
problem of inadequate quantitative techniques for
domestic long-term planning is inherent in any society
which permits open debate over the value of human
products and human activities, and holds values that
cannot be quantified by the market. This does not mean
that the quantification of agency activities and goals
is useless or that techniques cannot be improved. The
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introduction of systems analysis in the 1960s offered an
analytical framework that did provide planners with more
success in long-term predictions and that produced a
plethora of information for decision-makers. More
sophisticated analytical techniques would not solve the
problems endemic to government planning at a distance.
However, the planners within the Truman Administration
had faith in the ability of scientific techniques to
solve the problems of government planning and they
experimented with the integration of planning structures
into domestic federal agencies. Their experiments came
to a temporary conclusion with Eisenhower's election,
but their contributions would not be lost to the
Democratic administrations of the 1960s.
Scientific Planning in the Eisenhower Administration
The Eisenhower Administration did not follow the
same path toward the rationalization of the federal
administration for improved government planning that the
Truman Administration had begun clearing. The
Eisenhower Administration took a slower, but still
parallel path. The slower pace was due to a greater
belief in (a) the self-sustaining power of free
enterprise, (b) the dangers of big government and (c)
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the role of Congress in making public policy. The
inability to stake out a different direction from the
one chosen by the Fair Deal was the result of a basic
acceptance by Eisenhower of the federal government's
responsibility for private sector growth and for social
welfare. The Eisenhower Administration would underscore
the Employment Act's mandate for the promotion of free
enterprise, but the mandate for maximum employment and
for securing the general welfare (with its implications
for social welfare programs) would not be rejected.
Eisenhower's economic philosophy and the role of
government in his philosophy has been summarized well by
Elmo Richardson in his The Presidency of Dwiqht D.
Eisenhower ;
Eisenhower's yardstick in measuring
the public good was economy — what
he liked to refer to as "fiscal
responsibility." A sound economy was
the shortest distance to the solution
of any domestic problem, he asserted,
and it was the nation's best defense.
The federal government's role in
every subject before the Congress
should be based, Eisenhower said, on
"the plain workings of economic law,"
that is on the common sense
philosophy of production capitalism.
He did not wholly embrace the
laissez-faire economics of the
nineteenth century, but he did
believe that the nation's commerce
and industry needed encouragement to
venture ever further. Business
mergers, in that context, were deemed
necessary and proper. [43]
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Eisenhower praised the virtue of a permanently balanced
budget and forsook Keynesian economics because it
advocated government deficits during economic downturns
and it placed government too close to the activities of
the private sector.
The federal government could reduce its size and
could remove itself farther from the machinations of the
private economy, Eisenhower assumed, because state and
local governments would be able to control the worst
effects arising from free(d) enterprise. The federal
government would stimulate the economy by exhibiting
fiscal responsibility and by promoting a stable economy
conducive to private investment. The states and local
governments would be responsible for regulating private
enterprise in a manner conducive to regional and local
interests. [44] This separation of responsibilities
between the federal government and state/local
governments seems to be a reasonable modern rendition of
the division of powers envisioned by the Founding
Fathers. However, the Eisenhower Administration never
examined the possiblity that private capital might prove
too powerful for state and local governments nor did it
ever develop clear guidelines for the separation of
responsibilities. The federal government removed itself
farther from the private sector, justifying this move by
134
a "new federalism" that was never produced.
The relative inactivity of the Eisenhower
Administration was also a product of Eisenhower's belief
that the constitutional separation of powers between the
Executive and the Congress was not to be ignored.
Eisenhower wished to redress what he perceived as
excessive aggrandizement of Executive power. A greater
reliance on Congress for public policy initiation and
legislation would also, of course, relieve the Executive
of long-term domestic planning responsibilities and
distribute the accountability for the results of
remaining social programs. [ 45 ] It is unfair to claim
that Eisenhower's belief in a more equal distribution of
power between the Executive and the Congress did not
rest upon his appreciation of the constitution, but it
would also be an underestimation of his intellect to
assert that Eisenhower did not gauge the political
leanings of the dominant Congressional bloc of the late
1940s and the 1950s. [46] The conservative bloc --
composed of Republicans and southern Democrats — which
controlled the legislative locks during Eisenhower's two
terms shared Eisenhower's convictions that the federal
government should prune its size and its
responsibilities. Congress placed little pressure on
the Eisenhower Administration to extend its role in
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domestic long-term planning.
Despite the restraint of Executive branch activity
these three components of Eisenhower's political thought
implied, the Eisenhower Administration could not divorce
itself from the techniques employed by its predecessor.
When the Eisenhower Administration did eschew the fiscal
techniques advocated by the Keyserling CEA, the economic
growth necessary to diminish the political tempest
between rich and poor did not occur. The Eisenhower
Administration finally faltered in its balancing act
between the mandates of the Employment Act (a tough
enough act, in itself) and the goals of orthodox
economics. The problems encountered can be exposed by
an examination of the Burns CEA.
Arthur Burns, a professional economist who shared
Eisenhower's view of government/private economy
relations, was Eisenhower's selection for the Chairman
of the CEA. Burns combined a belief in orthodox
economics with a conviction that the science of
economics could transcend partisan debates. Burns saw
himself as a professional economist who could,
therefore, fill the role prescribed for the CEA by the
Employment Act. Burns stated that the Employment Act
"... expresses the plain intent of Congress that members
of the Council should function as professional
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economists, giving their views on economic problems and
policies in an objective, non-partisan manner.
-[47]
Unintentionally, perhaps, Burns helped maintain the
illusion conjured by Keyserling: economics was a science
(beyond the din of politics) which could guarantee the
promises of the Employment Act without resorting to the
dangerous politics of redistribution.
To promote the idea of a science of economics,
Burns insisted on a distinction between framing policy
and justifying policy. [48] The Burns CEA would frame
policy, but it would not offer political justifications
for its policy. A science needed no political
justification. The illusion of one right scientific
answer to each economic problem was also to be
maintained by a change in the CEA's organizational
structure. On 1 June 1953, the Eisenhower
Administration proposed to Congress "Reorganization Plan
No. 9. n [49] This plan brought about a centralization of
power in the CEA conferring new powers to the Chairman
of the CEA: (a) operating head of the CEA; (b) sole
reporter to the President of CEA findings; and (c)
responsibility for staff appointments. The disharmony
that thwarted the Nourse CEA and, thus, revealed the
lack of scientific agreement on economic issues was to
be avoided by ensuring harmony through the firm
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leadership of the Chairman of the CEA.
Government planning by the Burns CEA was based on
the belief that long-term planning was unnecessary,
because short-term plans to stimulate the economy would
be sufficient to accelerate economic growth. Keynesian
fiscal tools would be used sparingly and only to provide
economic stability, rather than to generate the
expansive economic growth Keyserling advocated. [ 50
]
Nevertheless, the Burns CEA retained the services of a
Keynesian economist to analyze economnic indicators and
during the recession of 1954 to draw up plans for a
large public works program. [51] The public works
program was never enacted, but its consideration by the
Eisenhower Administration is testimony to the influence
of the Employment Act and of Keynesian economics on even
the most diligent subscribers of orthodox economics.
The Eisenhower Administration's reliance on a
balanced federal budget to promote a stable, favorable
economic environment did not entail an abandonment of
established social programs to secure a balanced federal
budget. In 1956 and 1957, the only two years of
Eisenhower's presidency in which the federal budget was
balanced, federal domestic spending increased slightly
each year. The "fiscal responsiblity" demonstrated by
the Eisenhower Administration in 1956 and 1957 did
son
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little to prevent a recession in 1957 and 1958. This
experience, combined with a growing commitment by the
Burns CEA to ride out economic upturns and downturn
with minimal government activity, was not to be lost
the policy advisers in the Kennedy Administration.
Increased funding for social programs would be possible
only if government would more directly control the
macro-economic tools at its disposal and create rapid
and sustained economic growth. The Eisenhower
Administration, though, had no commitment to an
expansion of social programs and was unwilling to employ
fiscal policy to manufacture rapid economic growth. The
result was a holding pattern on social programs, a
sluggish economy and a federal government seeking
greater distance from the private sphere.
Two indices of the Eisenhower Administration's
strides for a greater distance from the private sphere
were the Second Hoover Commission Report of 1955 and
Eisenhower's call for a Goals Commission in January
1959. Analysis of the Second Hoover Commission Report
has usually emphasized the Report's contribution to a
clearer understanding of the distinction between
political positions and administrative positions in the
Executive branch. [52] The increase in the number of
political appointees recommended by the Report was, in
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part, a recognition of the problems the first Republican
administration in twenty years might face in controlling
administrators brought to the upper echelons of
government during the New and Fair Deals. The Report's
recommendation for the creation of a Senior Civil
Service composed of three thousand high ranking career
administrators was based, however, on a notion that such
experts could remain politically neutral. [53] The best
that can be said of the Report's clarification of the
politics/administration distinction is that it
recognized the need for political control over the
Executive branch (which its predecessors had also
recognized) and that it opened no Pandora's box by
claiming the intrinsic neutrality of career
administrators. The more important contribution of the
Second Hoover Commission Report (at least, to the
Eisenhower Administration) was the Report's attempt to
fulfill the mandate outlined by the Eisenhower
Administration in 1953: "... eliminating nonessential
services, functions, and activities which are
competitive with private enterprise. "[ 54 ] The Report
was, in fact, an attack on the social policies of the
New Deal and a justification of the economic philosophy
of the Eisenhower Administration. The Report was a
series of guidelines for removing the federal government
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even farther from the private sphere.
The final contribution of the Eisenhower
Administration to federal planning was the establishment
of a Goals Commission in 1959. The Goals Commission was
to prepare a report outlining national goals for health,
education, welfare and living standards
.[ 55 ] To ensure
that the setting of such goals would not be based on an
active federal government, Eisenhower stipulated that
the Goals Commission was to be (a) composed only of
members drawn from the private sector and (b) funded
entirely by the private sector. [56] Eisenhower's
version of planning placed the federal government at a
distance from the private sphere where it could still be
beckoned in times of domestic crisis, but where the
expansion of government's responsibilities could not be
the result of government's advocating more government.
The extension of federal government programs into the
private sector would be solely a reactive extension
premised on the neutrality (and "objective" distance) of
the federal government.
With the exception of the Second Hoover Commission
Report, the Eisenhower Administration made no lasting
contributions to scientific planning by the federal
government. Further rationalization of the budgeting
procedures and of evaluation techniques, and the
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institutionalization of planning staffs within domestic
agencies would await the New Frontier and the Great
Society.
Scientific Planning in the Kenned y and Johnson
Administrations
The election of John F. Kennedy marked the return
of Keynesians to the federal government and the return
of the federal government to the prescribed Keynesian
location at the perimeter of the private sphere. The
Kennedy Administration's reliance on and endorsement of
the Keynesian brand of scientific planning produced two
important results during the 1960s. First, the Kennedy
Administration successfully deployed Keynesian tools to
bring about expansion economics. The 1964 tax cut,
during a business upturn, placed the federal government
directly behind the wheel that was to steer the economy.
The success of the 1964 tax cut invigorated the
Keynesians in the federal government and made possible
the extension of the social services always promised by
expansion economics. The celebration of the science of
economics following the 1964 tax cut increased both the
government's confidence in its ability to address and
redress social problems in a scientific, efficient and
neutral manner, and thus, the government's willingness
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to accept more and more social responsibilities, m the
remainder of this chapter we will examine the
relationship between the private sphere and the public
sphere which was articulated during this heyday of
scientific planning. The second important result, which
we shall give closer scrutiny to in the next chapter,
was the realization that expansion economics based on
the scientific tools employed at the perimeter of the
private sphere was not adequate to the task of
fulfilling completely the social promises of the
Employment Act. Expansion economics would have little
effect on those citizens suffering from structural
unemployment or from the newly discovered "cycle of
poverty" (the Kennedy Administration's code word for
institutionalized racism). Consequently, expansion
economics would come to be supplemented with a
"scientific" approach to community participation.
Kennedy's interest in Keynesian economics prior to
his election in 1960 was, at most, slight. Kennedy's
appointments for his two top economic advisers, Walter
Heller for Chairman of the CEA and Douglas Dillon for
Secretary of the Treasury, reflected the ambiguity of
Kennedy's view of Keynesianism, as well as the dilemma
facing all post-New Deal Democratic presidents. Walter
Heller was a respected economist of the Keynesian
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variety and Douglas Dillon was a Republican who
advocated orthodox economics. Both men, though, did
share a common characteristic of vital importance to
effective service in Kennedy's Executive Office: and
ability to shed (or, at least, alter the hue of) their
ideological trappings with changes in the politicial
surroundings. Kennedy was to find Heller the more
persuasive adviser, but Dillon was important for calming
the anxieties businessmen always evince at the election
of a post-New Deal Democratic president.
Kennedy's reliance on orthodox economics when he
became President was evident in the Kennedy
Administration's tax policy in 1961. The tax package
provided no cuts for individuals and for small
reductions in corporate taxes. [57] Private enterprises,
through the enactment of an investment incentive credit,
were to trigger a period of faster economic growth. The
reliance on investment, rather than consumption, was an
indication that the Kennedy Administration was not yet
prepared to break away from the assumptions that guided
the Eisenhower Administration. Not that Kennedy's
Keynesian advisers pushed hard for a change in policy.
In January 1961, President Kennedy's Task Force on the
Economy, a choice selection of Keynesian economists
including Paul Samuelson, Seymour Harris, James Tobin
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and Walter Heller, reported to Kennedy that their advice
was to go slowly on public expenditures, to postpone any
tax cuts unless the economy remained sluggish and to
minimize reliance on monetary policy. [58] Their advice
was not difficult for Kennedy to accept.
Kennedy's conversion to expansion economics was the
result of (a) an interest in increasing public
expenditures for the military and (b) a battle among
three competing economic views advocated by Kennedy's
advisers. The argument for expansion economics during
the Truman Administration was strengthened by the
infamous NSC-68 document and the Korean War. [59]
Expansion economics in the 1960s was appealing because
of the renewed heat of the Cold War (especially the
Berlin Crisis) and Kennedy's promise to close the (non-
existent) missle gap. Since 1946, the promise of more
butter has always been accompanied by the acquisition of
more guns. In the 1960s protests and riots by welfare
recipients were not disconnected from the similar
activities of the anti-war movement. Given Kennedy's
commitment to a military build-up, it was not difficult
to disarm the arguments of Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Martin that deficits were unacceptable. Nor
were the arguments of John Kenneth Galbraith, in favor
of public spending for domestic goods and services to
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spur a consumption-based recovery, convincing to the
President. The Heller CEA after 1961, though, offered a
recovery package that promised more military
expenditures and provided a rationale for a tax cut
without a cut in government expenditures.
The Heller CEA was able to propose such "voodoo
economics" because they believed that a reduction in
taxes during a business upturn would maintian or
increase the upturn and create the economic growth
necessary to decrease unemployment and to increase tax
revenues despite the tax reduct ion. [ 60 ] Government
deficits during the downturns in the economy would be
acceptable because government spending would shorten the
downturn and deficits would be recouped during the
prolonged economic booms. The appeal, then, of the
Heller CEA version of expansion economics is not
difficult to deduce: there was something for almost
everyone in the recovery package. The military could
continue to build-up. Existing social programs could be
maintained. Big business and small business supported
the tax cut and the populace did not object to
reductions in personal income tax rates. [61] The tax
cut of 1964 was a proposal that generated a vast array
of political support for the President's fiscal
pol icies
.
ire
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The domestic economics of the Heller CEA we
acceptable to Kennedy for many of the same reason:
Keyserling's views were acceptable to Truman. First,
Kennedy could placate private sector fears of big
government by stimulating the economy without large
public expenditures on domestic programs. Fiscal policy
would be deployed, but the emphasis would be on tax
policy rather than on public spending. Second, Kennedy
could still make the standard Democratic claim that a
balanced economy was more important than a balanced
budget. This, of course, is a claim that pays homage to
the Employment Act's mandate for maximum employment and
the Democratic party's commitment to decent living
standards for all citizens. Third, a balanced economy
with due regard for the economic conditions of citizens
was possible if economic growth was rapid and sustained.
Kennedy's conversion to the economics of the Heller CEA
(the first signs of the conversion are usually traced to
Kennedy's speech at Yale on 11 June 1962), [62] was, in
part, based on Kennedy's belief that economic growth
would depoliticize the issues of redistribution. Class
conflict would be mitigated by overwhelming
abundance. [63]
All this was possible because Kennedy believed that
a science of public finance was possible. Kennedy, more
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than any other modern president, was convinced that
rational and reasonable policy was the result of
objective facts, neutral management techniques and
technological sophistication. Just as Robert McNamara
was able to become the top adviser to Kennedy on Viet
Nam because of McNamara's ability to overwhelm with
statistics and "objective" accounts, the Heller CEA was
to gain predominance in domestic economic policy because
they were able to provide a steady stream of
quantitative, and therefore "true," mater ial
.[ 64 ] This
faith in the object if iable was not, as some commentators
have argued, a sign of Kennedy's pragmatism. Rather
Kennedy combined a fairly conservative view of domestic
politics with a scientific approach to policy
formulation. The business of the United States was
business, and the federal government would act in a
manner calculated to foster economic growth first and
social goods later.
The Revenue Act of 1964 was deemed a success by
almost every observer. The tax cut was partially
responsible for an increase in revenues and a decrease
in unemployment. The fiscal policies of the Heller CEA
had apparently fueled faster economic growth. There
were several morals that were drawn from this success
story. First, the federal government had been too timid
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in the use of fiscal policy during the 1950s and the
early 1960s. [65] The federal government's distance fr
the private sphere and reluctance to deploy the fiscal
arsenal had become too great to insure the goal of
economic growth.
Second, government management of a growth economy
could be (a) based on economic tools that were neutral
tools, (b) sustained permanently if the political
structure of the United States would provide the
Executive branch with enough flexibility and (c) lifted
from the partisan and moral quagmires into the lofty
realm of pure science. In 1966 Robert Lekachman
concluded that:
The effects of the victory will be
felt for a long time, but the
continued expansion of the economy
during 1964 and 1965, the steady
downward drift of unemployment, and
the gratifying increase of sales and
profits gave immediate support to the
claims of the new public finance and
justified the slash in excise taxes
in June 1965. It is as certain as
such things can be that never again
will an American government profess
helplessness in the face of
unemployment, recession, and lagging
economic growth. Rational fiscal
policy expressed in the use of taxes
as stabilizing agents and the
acceptance of deficits without guilt
may be a belated achievement but not
the less treasurable because it comes
a generation after the birth of the
doctrine which justifies the public
action. [66]
om
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Even the usually restrained prose of James L. Sundquist
flowered before the scientific achievements made evident
in the 1964 tax cut:
I^PU^ ?Lj n °ther terms ' the RevenueAct of 1964 may have marked the point
at which the discussion of fiscalpolicy in the nation crossed the
threshhold from the realm of morals
to the realm of economics. Fiscal
policy may have come at last to be
molded primarily by a cool assessment
of its impact upon the various
indices that reflect the economic
well-being of the people — the rate
of national growth, levels of
employment and unemployment, the
stability of prices — rather than by
the force of moral absolutes. But
assuming that "the Puritan ethic," as
Heller once termed it, has faded, and
assuming further that economic
science has advanced to the point
that the economists, at any moment in
time, can devise the right
antirecession measures, what then?
Will the institutional structure of
the government permit the effective
execution of well-designed
antirecession measures? [ 67
]
The science of economics had arrived. The solutions
were at hand; the sole question remaining was whether
the constitutional separation of powers would allow the
hand to played.
The third moral of the tax cut was that government
management of the economy was dependent on government's
long-range planning abilities. Effective economic
management precluded reliance on only short-term
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reactive planning:
In fact, the jump from relatively
specific, emergency, and short-term
programming to more comprehensive
planning of governmental programs
received perhaps its biggest boost in
the acceptance, during the Kennedy
administration, of the basic policy
objective of accelerated economic
growth. By Administration
interpretation, growth involved
projections into the future in terms
of potential, the anticipatory nature
of which required forward
planning. [68]
The federal government must return to the location on
the perimeter of the private sphere which was prescribed
by Keyserling in the 1940s. The "perfection" of macro-
economic tools made possible government planning that
would not have to interfere directly with the price,
wage and profit decisions of the private sector. This
was not a type of planning that pushed government into
the private sector in the pursuit of specific policy
goals, but rather it was plannning at a distance that
permitted the government to anticipate the needs that
could be addressed through macro-economic leverage.
Fourth, social programs would not be the result of
firm ideological commitments; they would be the logical
extension of a neutral fiscal policy. Education and job
training programs would offer "equality of opportunity"
and still serve the interests of the private sector.
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Increased funding for these programs would not be so
much a political choice; rather, funding would be a
scientific response to anticipated needs in the private
sector.
The federal government had accepted the role of
steering mechanism for the private economy and
legitimator of the social order in the 1930s. in the
1960s the federal government had "perfected" the
techniques which would make it possible to fulfill both
roles without substantial penetration of the private
sphere. Scientific planning by the government would
produce abundance, would still political debate over
economics and would make rational the policies of the
federal government. At least, these were the claims
made. A failure to obtain these results would no longer
generate an attack aimed directly at the private
economy. The target for discontent, if it somehow
emerged, would be the federal government. An economic
crisis would now be understood as a rationality crisis
-- a crisis in the scientific planning functions of the
federal government. The distance from which the federal
government was to plan would be inadequate to secure the
results promised, but the distance was not so far as to
blur the target of citizens' disenchantment.
The promise of scientific and rational planning by
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the federal government continued to precede the
institutionalization of planning processes and
structures during both the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations. However, rationalization of the
Executive branch did continue during the 1960s.
Centralized coordination of domestic programs under the
guidance of the Executive branch became a major concern
of the Johnson Administration in 1966 and 1967. The
proliferation of domestic programs at the beginning of
the Great Society had created a dispersal of control
over the programs. In October 1966, Charles L.
Schultze, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, sent a
memo to Johnson on the dilemma facing Great Society
programs:
Their success or failure hinges upon
establishing new and effective
mechanisms for coordinating planning,
evaluation and execution quite
different from any currently
available. [69]
In response to Schultze' s concerns, Johnson established
the Heineman Task Force on Government Organization. By
September 1967, the Heineman Task Force had prepared two
major recommendations for enhanced Executive control of
domestic programs. The first recommendation was for
increased planning staff within the Executive Office and
within domestic agencies:
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Jw afJ ia i S^ary ' lt can be seenthat the task force envisaged a needtor strengthening presidential
program development and coordination,
to be achieved primarily by the
expansion of institutionalized staff
aid at the presidential level —
reducing somewhat the need for
personal staff aid, but supported by
stronger planning and direction at
the departmental level. There was nodiscussion in the report of whether
Great Society programs could be
successfully administered without
policy change — such as grant
consolidation or transfer of some
programs to financially aided state
governments. Instead, there was an
assumption that institutionalized
staff aid to the president and the
departments -- aided by field
decentralization — could provide
coordinated program and policy
development. [70]
This recommendation hardly represented a departure from
the established mechanisms for coordinating planning,
evaluation and execution. The Heineman Task Force was
simply calling for an extension of the Executive
coordinating mechanisms proposed by those two earlier
reports that also based government planning (on the
perimeter) on a belief in Executive Office control and
accountability: the PCAM report and the First Hoover
Commission Report. The Heineman Task Force accepted the
relationship between the public sphere and the private
sphere which had been articulated during the last years
of the New Deal.
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The second recommendation of the Heineman Task
Force was for the consolidation of the Departments of
Commerce and Labor into a new Department of the Economy.
The Task Force stated that:
We continue to feel that the major
organizational problem in the area of
economic affairs is the existence of
several special interest executive
departments
, each holding a stake in
only part of the national economy,
and none now capable of serving as a
neutral, Presidential instrument of
program or policy on broad-gauged
economic issues on problems that
affect "their" interest or clientele.
... As President Johnson has
recognized, the President and the
public interest would be served
better by a Department of the
Economy
,
especially including
activities of the departments of
Commerce and Labor. [71] (original
emphasis)
This recommendation illuminates the path upon which the
advocates of scientific planning wished to trod. The
neutrality of economic policy, with its consequent
neutralization of political issues, was being thwarted
by the institutionalization of two clientele departments
which were created to press specific economic interests
and which regarded the other as a rival. The
consolidation of the Departments of Commerce and Labor
did not occur, but the proposal reveals the degree to
which intelligent citizens subscribed to a view of
neutral economic policy.
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Government planning at the periphery of the privat
sphere was also further rationalized in the introducti
of a new budgeting approach in the 1960s. Performance
budgeting, with its emphasis on management control, was
replaced with "Planning, Programming, Budgeting System"
(PPBS). PPBS was an approach designed to address the
three basic functions of budgeting: (a) operational
control — the efficient use of money to carry out
assigned tasks, (b) management control -- the efficient
and accountable use of resources, and (c) strategic
planning -- the designation of plans and objectives to
be funded. [72] PPBS would force all departments to
engage in a clearer articulation of program objectives
and to make planning part of the departmental routine.
PPBS's contribution to comprehensive planning in
the federal government was limited by a number of
factors. First, PPBS assumed a comprehensive review of
funding beyond the capabilities of administrative
agencies. Lindblom has testified to the incremental
nature of bureaucracies and the incremental nature of
the human mind. [73] Nevertheless, long-term planning
need not be completely comprehensive to be effective.
The crucial point in Lindblom's defense of
incremental ism against comprehensive planning is that
e
on
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comprehensive planning places too great a political
burden on policy makers. Comprehensive planning assumes
decisions are made free from the pressures of political
groups and free of past political commitments. It
assumes a rationality untainted by political
considerations. More importantly, PPBS is based on the
proposition that goals can be stated with clarity and
specificity, and that indices can be developed that will
provide a sound determination of progress toward stated
goals. In social programs, the development of
quantifiable goals and indices is notoriously difficult.
In the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW), analysts, during the 1960s, had an abundance of
statistics but a dearth of useful indices for evaluation
and planning. [ 74 ] Evaluation of agencies engaged in
public activities is intrinsically difficult because
public agencies must not only be efficient in delivering
goods and services, they must also be fair, open and
honest. Planning by such agencies is made more arduous
by their lack of control over their political
environment
.
When indicators of social progress are developed by
public agencies, the results may be even more
troublesome. In March 1966, Johnson requested a report
from HEW on the nation's social progress during the last
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decade. [75] This "social progress report" was to
supplement the economic report prepared by the CEA for
the President. The document prepared by the HEW was a
voluminous indictment of American society which
concluded that little, if any, progress had been made in
ensuring the social welfare of large groups of citizens.
The result was an Executive Office condemnation and
suppression of the report. In response, HEW prepared a
very short paper entitled "Toward a Social Report" which
omitted all sections on racial issues and which
suggested how future indices might be developed.
Comprehensive planning could not function without social
indices and, yet, it could not prepare indices without
illustrating that many social programs were beyond the
grasp of "comprehensive" planning at the perimeter of
the private sphere.
The scientific approach to government's economic
and social responsibilities reached its culmination in
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Despite some
successes, this approach to public policy was finally a
failure. The federal government had assumed
responsibilities that it did not have the power to
fulfill. Keynesian fiscal policy could accelerate
economic growth under certain conditions, but it could
not guarantee that growth because the federal government
did not control the price, wage and profit decisions
private enterprises.
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CHAPTER VI
THE PARTICIPATION MOVEMENT: 1963-1969
The Importance of the Participation Movgmpnf
Even as the scientific planning approach to public
policy was reaching its culmination in the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations, a new approach to public policy
was being unleashed: the participation approach. The
participation approach, realized most fully in the
Community Action Programs (CAPs) administered by the
Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0) , is of crucial
importance in the history of public policy in the United
States for three reasons. First, the participation
movement was established because the scientific planners
realized, as early as 1963, that the rapid and sustained
economic growth promised by scientific planning would
not lift all citizens out of poverty. Citizens
unfortunate enough to suffer from the consequences of
stuctural unemployment and citizens mired in the cycle
of poverty (the Kennedy Administration's code word for
institutionalized racism) would not be able to partake
of the promised abundance. [ 1 ] The attempt to
depoliticize society by the technical provision of
abundance would have to await specific policies which
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weighed political and economic gains and losses, and
which addressed questions of equity that were beyond the
domain of science and technique.
Second, the dominant evaluation of the
participation movement concludes that the participation
movement was a failure and that the failure can be
attributed to an inconsistent conception of the movement
and to the accidental construction of the movement. [2]
The dominant evaluation stresses the dangers of e
participation movement and, therefore, discourages
further exploration of, and experimentation, with
structures for democratic participation in the United
States. I will illustrate in this chapter that (a) the
CAPs were not accidental, (b) the CAPs were far from an
unmitigated failure, especially given the goals set for
the CAPs, and (c) the CAPs embodied a concept of
participation that was not structured democratic
participation, but instead participation in interest
group politics. The history of CAPs may be an
indictment of interest group politics, but it is not an
indictment of structured and responsible democratic
part icipat ion
.
Third, the participation movement politicized
citizens and, thus, hastened the demise of the
scientific planning approach to public policy. [3] The
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participation movement gave voice to the urban poor,
especially the urban black poor, and also politicized
those citizens who responded to, and reacted to, this
new voice. The CAPs did more than politicize the urban
poor; they politicized the bureaucrats who administered
the programs for the poor and they politicized the
populace by forcing issues of equity and ethics into the
public domain. The result was the rejection not only of
the participation movement, but also of the scientific
planning approach and the very premises which had guided
the scientific planning approach. Indeed, the
estrangement from government declared by both the left
and the right in the late 1960s, and the discord
experienced by all citizens during this time, caused
some commentators to suggest that the United States was
experiencing a legitimation crisis. [4] Hostility toward
the government and toward the society for which the
government was responsible did not, though, produce a
new government. Rather, the crisis of the 1960s,
precipitated by the CAPs and the polit icizat ion of
scientific planning, brought about a search for a policy
approach that would pay lip-service to citizen
participation and that would remove the government from
the perimeter of the private sphere as the government
discarded the social responsibilities it had assumed
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during the New Deal.
The history of CAPs, then, is the history of the
demise of the idea of government planning at the
periphery of the private sphere and of the ideals which
motivated this approach. The inability of scientific
planning (even with the supplement of CAPs) to attain
the objectives framed in the Employment Act of 1946
engendered a crisis in citizenship and a crisis in
scientific rationality. The response by some policy
scholars would be a redefinition of citizenship and a
restructuring of the relationship between the public
sphere and the private sphere that would redefine the
concept of the public good. To trace the political
reasons for this new public policy model — a welfare
economics/public choice approach — we must first
examine the history of the participation movement and
dismiss the present myths which surround it.
The Political Appeal of the Community Action Programs
The war on poverty did not begin with the creation
of the 0E0 and the CAPs in 1964. By 1963 three distinct
approaches to urban poverty had developed:
One, exemplified by the Ford
Projects, sought to work through
existing institutions — the local
government, the school system, the
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private social agencies — with thehope that they would be influenced bycoordinated planning. 1
Another, of which Mobilizationfor Youth was the prototype, wentbehind the "power structure" to
organize the poor themselves to
assert and defend their own interests
• • •
The third strategy, adopted by
the President's Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime, put itsfaith in the application of
knowledge, through comprehensive
planning, with the risk that planning
might never lead to action. [5]
Mobilization for Youth and the President's
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime were
two of the Kennedy Administration's early attempts to
deal with the problems caused by urban poverty. Both
programs were premised on the recognition that urban
poverty (and the problems associated with it) would not
be cured by the economic abundance promised by Kennedy's
Keynesian economists. The meager results these programs
achieved, combined with data from the Council of
Economic Advisers showing that between 1956 and 1961 the
absolute number of families living in poverty had
increased, convinced Kennedy in the spring of 1963 that
the problem of poverty in the United States must be
addressed in a new and comprehensive fashion. [6]
Kennedy was assassinated before the new design for
this new and comprehensive anti-poverty program was
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completed. The responsiblity for supporting and
executing the war on poverty fell into the hands of
Lyndon Baines Johnson. Johnson's support for this new
program, which would create the OEO and establish the
CAPs, was strong because it appealed to his vision of
the presidency and because it was politically appealing.
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was politically
appealing because it appeared that everyone was to gain
and that no one was to lose. The Act did not create a
massive program based on the transfer of income. An
income transfer program raises equity considerations
which scientific planning was supposed to obviate. The
OEO anti-poverty program would not be caught in the
political turmoil and ethical quagmire an income
transfer program would produce.
A second virtue of the CAPs was that this anti-
poverty program would not be foisted on local
communities, but would await community demand before the
services were offered. Furthermore, responsibility for
the success of the community programs would not rest on
the federal government, but on the local communities.
A third benefit of the CAPs was that its design
satisfied the planning agencies within the Executive
Office: the Council of Economic Advisers and the Bureau
of the Budget. The programs would provide flexibility
171
at the local level, coordination of service delivery
within the communities and a variety of data bases from
which planners could evaluate the success of programs.
Social experimentation could now be practiced by the
planners within the Kennedy Administrat ion. [ 7 ] The 0E0
programs could serve as a ready data base because,
unlike Mobilization for Youth which was mired in
intricate planning details, the CAPs would be launched
with minimal centralized planning by allowing
communities to plan as they developed. This "building
block" conception of planning made possible the rapid
extension of CAPs to a variety of localities in a manner
consistent with Johnson's claim that his Administration
was now ready to fight an "unconditional war" on
poverty. [8]
A fourth virtue of the CAPs was that the
legislation creating the 0E0 did not specify the nature
of participation in the CAPs. Legislators could, and
did, embrace an anti-poverty program which depended on
local initiative, and they did ignore the possibility
that CAPs might provide an organizational structure for
new and powerful minority interest groups.
One can search the hearings and
debates in their entirety and find no
reference to the language — which
became so controversial later —
regarding the participation of the
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poor in community action. The wholenovel concept of community action --the definition of the community, thenature of the community action
^
n3' £ he K c°ntent of its program,all of which were to have a profoundimpact on federal-state-local
relations and on the social andgovernmental structures of
participating communities — was leftto the Office of Economic Opportunityin an exceptionally broad grant ofdiscretion. [ 9]
That legislators did not understand the nature of
participation to be employed by CAPs, though, does not
mean that planners within the Executive Office deployed
CAPs casually, unref lect ively or accidentally. Daniel
Patrick Moynihan's claim in Maximum Feasible
Misunderstanding that the CAPs were not designed to
create participation by the poor in organized political
pressure groups simply does not wash.
In Moynihan's retrospective apology for his
involvement in a program which he later considered to
pose dangers to the legitimacy of the welfare state,
Moynihan avers that:
The community action title, which
established the one portion of the
program that would not be directly
monitored from Washington, should
provide for the "maximum feasible
participation of the residents of the
areas and the members of the groups"
involved in the local programs.
Subsequently this phrase was taken to
sanction a specific theory of social
change, and there were those present
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in Washington at the time who wouldhave drafted just such language withprecisely that object. But the
record, such as can be had, and
recollection indicate that it wasintended to do no more than ensure
that persons excluded from the
political process in the South and
elsewhere would nonetheless
participate in the benefits of the
community action programs of the newlegislation. it was taken as a
matter beneath notice that such
programs would be dominated by the
local political structure
.[ 10
]
(original emphasis)
There are several problems with this argument.
First, as was noted earlier, the Kennedy
Administration had already created poverty programs
based on the theory that poverty engendered political
powerlessness which, in turn, promoted the continuance
of poverty. Mobilization for Youth was based on this
explanation of the "cycle of poverty." Participation
only in the benefits of poverty programs would not solve
the core of the problem: powerlessness. Maximum
feasible participation by "the residents of the areas
and the members of the groups involved in the local
programs" was absolutely essential in creating community
power structures which could address the problem of
powerlessness. To assume that participation in the
OEO's anti-poverty programs was to be simply
participation in the benefits of the programs, Moynihan
has to ignore the setting in which the term
-maximum
feasible participation" came into use.
Second, even the distribution of benefits to the
poor depended in many cases on the creation of local
community organizations which would not be dominated by
the local political structure. This point was
recognized by federal planners and is documented in
Moyni nan's work.
On Febuary 3, 1964, the CAP advocates
once more put forth their proposal.
Charles Schultze explained that
projects would be initiated at the
local level, with a measure of
federal prodding, and approved at the
federal level. William Capron
touched on the problem of local
leadership in the South, especially,
and noted that CAP's could be used to
bypass the local "power structure"
with the use of Federal funds. [11]
Domination of CAPs by local governments would not only
fail to alleviate the powerlessness of the poor,
domination would perpetuate the problem of local
governments' misdirecting federal funds targeted for the
urban poor. The CAPs were to provide an alternate route
for federal funds that previously had been waylaid by
existing local racist political structures. These local
political structures could hardly be bypassed if they
were to dominate CAPs and if CAPs were to be staffed,
not by the poor, but by members of these local political
am
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structures.
Third, CAPS were designed to do more than provide
an alternate route for federal grants to the poor: CAPs
were to create organizations capable of forcing local
agencies to provide funds for the poor which had been
authorized for the poor by the federal government. I
not suggesting that the federal planners in the Kennedy
Administration knew that CAPs would create warfare
between federally sponsored programs and local
governments. The confrontational tactics deployed by
some community action groups — sit-in protests, mass
demonstrations and riots[12] — surely exceeded the
expectations of the federal planners, including Jack
Conway the Director of the 0E0.[13] However,
confrontational tactics of a more moderate nature were
certainly expected and even encouraged. The attempt to
bypass local governments and create a competition
between political organizations for federal funds was
sure to create confrontation among these organizations.
The provision of legal talent to the CAPs and to
citizens in poverty with the creation of the Legal
Services Organization was a clear indication that the
prevailing power structures would be challenged. [ 14
]
The refusal of some participants in CAPs to pursue only
legally and socially acceptable tactics in confronting
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local governments may have surprised federal planners,
but confrontational tactics by community programs
populated by residents of the area was the not-so-
accidental goal of the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations.
Community Action Programs and the Politicizat ion of
Ci t lzens
CAPs did develop in ways not always anticipated
precisely by federal planners. The broad grant of
discretion given to 0E0 officials by the Congress was
followed by broad grants of discretion by 0E0 to federal
field administrators and to local community action
programs. The variety of program structures and the
differences in program priorities among the CAPs,
though, was a stated goal of the federal planners .[ 15
]
The "building block" planning approach to the CAPs
proved compelling in two ways. The variety of designs
and program priorities provided federal planners with
the opportunity to discover the most successful
structures, procedures and agendas for future community
programs. Social experimentation could be practiced
with a large number of available cases -- a highly
desirable result for those imbued with, and engaged in,
scientific planning.
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The "building block" approach also allowed 0E0 to
institute community action programs quickly and the
immediate participation of disgruntled citizens. This
flexibility made CAPs the perfect instrument for
anticipatory federal programming. Potential urban "hot
spots" could be identified and then funding and federal
officials could be poured in to douse potential
violence. In their case study of Oakland,
Implementation
, Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B.
Wildavsky castigate federal officials for poor planning
and poor politics. [16] The latter accusation is made
because federal officials, on their arrival in Oakland,
met first with local black leaders rather than with the
Mayor and his staff. Pressman and Wildavsky fail to
mention that it was not the Mayor and his white
constituents who posed an immediate threat to urban
tranquility. Federal officials knew whom they could
afford to bypass more conveniently in a no-win
situation. Members of city government may have felt
slighted, but they could be expected to illustrate their
displeasure through legal and socially acceptable
forums. The lack of action based on sophisticated
planning was far less important than the lack of (some
kind of) action.
The CAPs did provide action and they did provide
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participation by the poor and by representatives of the
poor. By 1965, the poor constituted, on average, 27
percent of the community action boards. [17] By 1966,
participation by the poor on community action boards had
risen to 30 percent, and the 1966 amendments to the OEO
legislation mandated that a base of 33 percent be
reached by all community action boards by 1967.
Congress may not have considered the nature of
participation in CAPs in 1964, but by 1966 Congress had
endorsed the direction taken by federal administrators
in the OEO programs. That this direction was successful
is evident from two results. First, CAPs, and the
welfare organizations they helped develop, did increase
the flow of funds to urban poverty areas. The threat of
litigation and the acts of demonstration by CAPs and by
welfare rights organizations forced local relief
agencies to make available funds to the poor which the
poor were entitled to under federal legislation. [ 18 ] No
longer were local agencies able to hold down allocations
to the poor because the poor were no longer ignorant of
their rights or powerless in the political structures of
urban America. The increase in welfare benefits to the
poor during the middle and late 1960s was not so much
the result of increased benefit levels, but rather the
result of two other developments: (a) an increased
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knowledge by the poor of their rights and privileges in
the welfare state and (b) the destigmat ization of
welfare which encouraged more of the poor to apply for
funds for which they had always been qualified. [ 19]
The success of CAPs in confronting local
governments and in establishing interest group
representation for the urban poor was also evident in
the 1967 Green Amendment to the 0E0 legislation. By
1967, CAPs had placed local governments under such
pressure that mayors began to lobby for control of the
programs. The confrontations between CAPs and local
governments forced mayors to push their claims for
control over community power structures to the federal
level. Congress responded with the Green Amendment
which, for the first time, placed CAPs under the control
of city governments. [20] This backlash against the
developing power structures of the urban poor did little
to slow the momentum of welfare rights organizations or
to diminish the growing political astuteness and
awareness of the urban poor, especially the black urban
poor. It did, however, signal the decline of CAPs as an
effective agent for social change. Even Moynihan admits
that prior to 1967 the CAPs which had fallen under the
control of local governments were inef f ect ive
.
[ 21 ] The
purpose of the Green Amendment was to render all
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community action programs ineffective and, thus, to slow
the changes being rendered in urban areas. it is
curious that Moynihan reveals that if CAPs had been
enacted in a manner designed only to secure benefits,
and not to develop participation outside the prevailing
power structures, they would not have been able to
secure those benefits.
A reevaluation of the success of the CAPs, then, is
certainly in order. A fair evaluation has not been, and
cannot be, made as long as the illusion that the CAPs
were designed accidentally and enacted arbitrarily is
accepted. Federal control of the CAPs did, at times,
elude OEO administrators, but the general direction
taken by the CAPs was plotted by the federal government.
If we judge CAPs by the goals established by OEO
planners, the experiment with CAPs is far from an
unmitigated failure. CAPs did bypass local governments
and establish direct links between the urban poor and
the federal government. CAPs did confront local
governments and they did increase the delivery of goods
and services by local governments to the poor. CAPs did
increase opportunities for blacks to participate in
mainstream local and state politics, and, over time,
CAPs helped legitimate black interest groups in urban
politics. It can be argued that CAPs did, by
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politicizing blacks and by encouraging confrontation
with local governments, increase urban violence during
the late 1960s. However, such a view underestimates the
ability of CAPs to coopt black leaders who might have
chosen more violent tactics if CAPs had not been
deployed by the federal government, in retrospect, the
legitimation of black political structures and the
integration, albeit limited, of black political issues
into the political agenda of the United States were
extremely smooth given the racism and the inflexibility
of white political structures prior to the 1960s.
While the successes enumerated above — and these
were not unintended consequences -- were largely ignored
by social commentators, both the left and right in the
United States railed against the participation movement
as it was embodied in the CAPs. [22] The right
criticized the participation movement for placing an
overload on the administrative systems of local, state
and federal government
.
[23] The increased demands of
the poor placed an extra burden on already overextended
and overloaded governments. The left, in a seemingly
contradictory criticism, railed against the
participation movement as a government perpetrated
hoax. [24] The left claimed that citizen participation
never occurred in the formulation, execution or
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evaluation of federal programs. I deem both of these
criticisms correct. Such an interpretation is possible
if one examines the administrative structure of
governments at the three levels of this nation's federal
system. The administrative structure of local, state
and federal government in the United States is
characterized by centralized control within each level
and by the construction of agencies which formulate and
enact policy within limited and specific avenues for
constituency input. Interest group participation is
usually limited to formulation and evaluation within
congressional (or council) committees or subcommittees.
Constituency participation in agency decisions and
actions is most pronounced only when the constituents
have a monopoly on the information necessary for the
agency to fulfill its legislative mandate. Thus,
constituency participation in administrative activities
is a characteristic of regulatory agencies. While it is
certainly true that welfare policy in the United States
has been designed to regulate the poor, the poor have
not been viewed as legitimate partners in welfare
policy. [25] The attempt by CAPs to create interest
groups for the urban poor resulted in an overload on a
system not designed to engage in intercourse with the
poor. An overload on the system emerged even at the
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same time as participation by the poor was rejected by
those in the administrative systems. Institutions
designed to mitigate and structure interest group
representation in welfare policy did not exist, and the
CAPs were not designed to provide them. Such
unstructured conflict promoted unfair and unjust
understandings by participants of their adversaries.
Poor persons engaged in conflict with local relief
administrators viewed the administrators as heartless
and mal intent ioned guardians of relief funds. [26] Local
administrators viewed their adversaries as persons who,
because of their poverty, were obviously unable to
engage in effective participation and planning
.[ 27 ] Not
all local activists or local administrators succumbed to
these misinterpretations, but the very structure (or,
precisely, the lack of a structure) of the conflict made
such misinterpretations convenient and compelling.
The CAPs, then, generated an overload on
administrations not designed or accustomed to
participation (even interest group participation), and
also failed to provide participation by the poor in the
planning, execution and evaluation of welfare policy.
One can conclude from the history of CAPs that they did
fail to institute CAPs as a meaningful and permanent
interest group structure for the urban poor. [28] One
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cannot conclude from their history, though, that citizen
participation failed, because responsible democratic
participation by citizens in the decisions by
governments that affect their communities was never
tried. The CAPs were not an experiment in democratic
participation, but rather an experiment in creating
interest groups for the poor and the black poor which
could engage in the everyday scramble for goods and
services in an interest group-dominated political
economy. Why then, did the CAPs provoke so much
criticism from social commentators, even those who
usually defended interest group politics?
Almost all criticisms of CAPs center on the failure
of CAPs to subdue the issue of equity. The CAPs,
through their organizational and informational
functions, "hyper-politicized" the urban poor in the
United States. The CAPs helped legitimate a critique
aimed at the systemic failure of a political economy
dependent upon the scientific planning approach to
public policy. The claims made in the Employment Act of
1946 were stripped of the scientific facade which had
protected the federal government as it struggled in a
structural bind. The assault by hyper-politicized
citizens was aimed not at the private economy, but at
the federal government and its scientific planning
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approach. The failure of the political economy to
secure equity, or even a decent standard of living for
all citizens, was a failure of the federal government.
Compounding this systemic critique, and this new
political awareness by poor citizens living in a land of
economic abundance, was the creation by CAPs of urban
black interest groups which were gaining political
clout. In the past, the urban poor, and especially the
black urban poor, had been the disorganized losers in
economic zero-sum transact ions
.[ 29 ] The abundant
society which scientific planners had promised was
supposed to prevent such zero-sum transactions with the
provision of plentitude. Nevertheless, economic choices
were made which benfited the middle and upper income
groups in the United States at the expense of the
poor. [30] Once the urban poor had developed their own
interest groups to play interest group politics in the
United States, they could force governments to live up
to the obligations accepted by these governments.
The urban black poor, though, were not the only
citizens politicized by the participation movement.
Once the issue of equity was unleashed in a political
economy dominated by interest group politics, the
protection and extension on everyone's fair share was
possible only by the creation and action of a multitude
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of citizen interest groups, a pluralist society which
had served the general interests of the wealthy and of
large corporations, and had claimed responsiblity for
the general populace now was faced with organized
interests representing a large number of diverse and
conflicting interests. Hispanics, women,
environmentalists, the elderly and a host of other
interest groups emerged to make claims on the
administrative state. Pluralist politics, which was
supposed to defuse class consciousness, was successful
in creating cleavages among groups which had been
consistent losers in economic transactions, but
pluralist politics could not forestall a multi-pronged
attack on the upper class groups which had been the
consistent winners in economic transactions. The claims
made on the federal government by these previous losers
undermined the possibility of the federal government's,
which was dominated by a scientific planning approach,
remaining on the periphery of the private sphere.
The proliferation of citizen interest groups
threatened scientific planning on the periphery of the
private sphere for two reasons. First, many of the
claims pressed on federal government could not be
addressed simply by rapid and sustained economic growth.
The claims made by minorities and women extended beyond
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economic fair shares. Equal treatment in the private
economy and equal access to government funds required
changes in social patterns and mores. Equal treatment
entailed federal laws both to mandate fair treatment
and, in the name of equity, to redress past injustices.
To provide these, the federal government would have to
penetrate the private sphere and intervene in the wage
and hiring policies of private sector actors. Equity
would not be achieved by economic abundance alone.
Economic abundance would also fail to satisfy the
claims of interest groups concerned with consumer safety
and with the environmental degradation perpetrated by
the private economy. These concerns could only be
satisfied with the extension of government interference
in the decisions and actions of private sector actors.
The federal government found itself in a situation where
the periphery would not hold.
Second, although the CAPs did not institute
democratic participation, the rhetoric of participation
provided a focus for interest groups' pressing claims on
the federal government. These new interest groups
claimed the right to install representatives within the
decision making structure of government agencies which
affected their interests .[ 31 ] This, of course, posed
the threat that scientific planning structures would be
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penetrated by "non-expert- citizens who would not be
"objective." This penetration also threatened the
standard defense of scientific planning that decisions
were based on scientific neutrality.
"Non-expert
-
citizens would still have the acumen to realize that
"scientific decisions" were not neutral, and that those
who made the decisions were not objective. Furthermore,
participation in agency decisions by citizen advocates
would foul the gears of administrative machines designed
for efficiency. [32]
The assault on the federal government by citizen
interest groups and the hyper-politicizat ion of citizens
was a result that seems inevitable given the
contradictions embodied in the promises made and in the
position held by scientific planning at the periphery of
the private sphere. The legitimacy of such a public
policy approach and of the federal government which
embraced that approach were called into question. The
left, the right and, even, the liberals who had endorsed
the federal government's role in American society,
perceived that the federal government was, in the late
1960s, in a crisis of legitimacy. [33] The left called
for a socialist cure, while the right prescribed its
standard medication of a return to orthodox economics
combined with a massive reduction in the federal
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government's size and responsibilities. The liberals
either endorsed a continuation of present policies or a
search for a new policy approach which could end the
crisis and provide permanent stability by reducing the
responsibilities of the federal government and yet
appease (and anasthetize) the "hyper-politicized"
citizenry. The new public policy approach finally
endorsed by many of the distraught liberals was a
welfare economics/public choice approach to public
policy. This approach has now become the mainstream
ideology of policy scientists in the United States. It
is an approach designed to redefine the role of
government and the role of citizens in the United
States. It is a pernicious approach to a "dangerous,"
but soon to be defused, situation.
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CHAPTER VII
THE WHY OF A WELFARE ECONOMICS/PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH TO
The Search for Political Stability
The 1970s witnessed the emergence of a new
"paradigm- in public policy models in the United
States. [1] The new approach to policy was a welfare
economics/public choice model. This model was not born
in the 1970s; in the 1950s welfare economics had
articulated its presuppositions and the 1960s public
choice theory had been developed in the economic
framework established by, among others, Buchanan and
Tullock.[2] The quantitative rigor and theoretical
elegance of this approach, though, were not sufficient
to displace the theoretical premises and the
institutionalization of either the regulatory approach
or the scientific planning approach. Only with the
crisis of legitimacy that occurred during the late 1960s
and the consequent pan- ideolog ical barrage against the
federal government's role in society did the space open
up for the welfare economics/public choice model to be
embraced by a wide variety of influential policy
scholars and policy analysts.
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The reasons for the embrace of this policy approach
were, and are, primarily political, a welfare
economics/public choice approach to public policy can,
its advocates hope, depoliticize citizens and, thus,
render both citizens and the crisis of legitimacy
quiescent. in addition, this approach may reduce the
fiscal commitments the federal government assumed during
the scientific planning approach, especially the Great
Society, and thus may solve the fiscal crisis of federal
government. The political appeal of a welfare economics
approach is grounded, then, in the goal of political and
social stability. Political and social stability,
though, is to be purchased at an extremely high price.
The price includes (a) a rejection of democratic
politics, (b) a redefinition of good citizenship and (c)
a denial of the public good as a goal of, and a
criterion for, good public policy.
In the next chapter we will examine the high
political and social costs of a welfare economics/public
choice approach. First, though we need to lay out
specifically the allure of this new approach and to
reveal its moments of insight in its critique of and
"solutions" to the past policy approaches we have
examined in previous chapters. A welfare
economics/public choice framework does more than offer
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political stability; it provides coherent answers to the
deficiencies of all of the public policy approaches
which characterize the modern welfare state in the
United States.
Solving the Problems Created by the Regulator Approach
Governmental regulation of private enterprises in
the twentieth century has been prone to five basic
faults. First, regulatory agencies have often been
co°Pted bv the Private enterprises which regulatory
agencies were designed to regulate. Second, the lack of
clear and specific statutory guidelines by Congress has
allowed excessive discretion to fall into the hands of
regulatory administrators. Excessive discretion,
combined with cooptation, provides regulated enterprises
with a regulatory atmosphere in which the public good is
often defined in terms of the private interests of
regulated enterprises. Third, regulatory agencies must
make decisions which are equitable to each firm in their
domain of authority, and this creates both excessive
information demands for regulatory agencies and creates
ever-increasing regulatory staffs. Fourth, statutory
and administrative guidelines in regulatory policy are
subject to long delays by challenges from regulated
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enterprises in administrative hearings and in court
trials. Fifth, regulated enterprises are protected from
market-place competition and thus neither competitive
pricing nor technological innovation are promoted.
A welfare economics approach to the goals of
regulatory policy appears to solve each of these
problems. To illustrate the solutions proffered to
regulatory policy, we turn to a regulatory area where a
welfare economics approach has developed its most
detailed scenario: water pollution. [3] From a welfare
economics perspective, industrial pollution of water
resources is a case where the economic benefits to the
polluting enterprise, and the social costs resulting
from the pollution, escape the pricing mechanisms of the
market-place. Each polluting company on a lake, for
example, receives the benefits of disposing of their
wastes with minimal cost (the unpleasantness of polluted
water near their facility), and each user of the lake
bears some of the costs associated with polluted water
even if they do not pollute the water themselves. As
long as the pollution can be absorbed by the body of
water without damaging the water quality, then the
absence of pricing mechanisms is not important.
However, if water pollution does alter the quality for
users, then we encounter, because of the absence of
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pricing mechanisms, Hardin's scenario in "The Tragedy of
the Commons. "[4]
The correct governmental response to water
pollution, according to welfare economists, is the
creation of effluent fee systems. Water quality
standards for the water resource would be established
and then all polluters would have their discharges of
pollution, their effluents, monitored at the discharge
point. Effluent fee scales would be established for
each type of pollutant discharged, and fees would be
based on the costs required to maintain the desired
water quality. This procedure would force polluters to
pay the price of their polluting and, thus, to pass on
the costs of pollution in the manufacturing process to
consumers. Prices would reflect the true costs of
production. Obviously, some toxic wastes would still be
regulated — no discharge of these wastes would be
allowed. Also, obviously, the effluent fee approach
would still present difficult technical problems for
those administrators in charge of developing effluent
fee scales. [5] Nevertheless, an effluent fee approach
does appear to avoid the pitfalls of the regulatory
approach.
An effluent fee system would curtail cooptation of
regulators by the enterprises regulated and would limit
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the discretion of regulatory administrators. Water
quality standards would be established by Congress and
administrators would be bound, by technical expertise,
to arrive at the correct effluent fee scales.
Administrators, under the regulatory approach to
pollution control, were open to cooptation because:
(a) regulation demanded intimate knowledge of the
manufacturing processes of each regulated firm;
(b) intimate knowledge of the manufacturing processes
depended, in large part, on the willingness of the
regulated firms to share openly with administrators
their manufacturing secrets and their profit margins,
and, thus, depended on goodwill between administrators
and regulated firms; and (c) regulatory agencies were
expected to insure the commercial success of all
regulated firms. [6] An effluent fee approach reduces
the chances for the cooptation by keeping at a minimum
the interaction between effluent fee experts and
regulated copmpanies. Administrative discretion at the
federal level would be constrained by the one-right-
effluent-fee-schedule which would produce
Congressionally mandated results. At the local level,
administrative discretion would be removed entirely.
Administrators would maintain effluent monitors, report
the discharge of new and uncovered discharges, read the
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effluent meters, and enforce strictly the payment of
effluent fees by polluting companies. it, of course,
would still be possible for local administrators to
engage in misfeasance or malfeasance, but these are also
possible under a regulatory approach and should not be
confused with administrative discretion - choice within
legal bounds.
An effluent fee system might also reduce the
excessive information demands encountered under a
regulatory approach. A regulatory approach to pollution
control demands that administrators know the production
processes of each company regulated, the profit margins
of each company regulated and the current best pollution
abatement technology compatible with each company's
manufacturing processes. As new pollution abatement
technology becomes available, administrators must
recalculate regulatory guidelines for each company.
Administrators are thus faced with an incredible
information burden. Under an effluent fee approach,
administrators will still be faced with vast information
demands in calculating effluent fee schedules,
particularly as new effluents are produced, but
administrators will not have to concern themselves with
either the various manufacturing processes employed by
each company or the latest technological developments in
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pollution abatement equipment
.[ 7 ] The reduction in
information demands, combined with the reduction in
demands placed on state and federal inspectors, may make
it possible to reduce the size of state and federal
agencies involved in pollution control, and thus reduce
government expenditures on regulatory policy.
An effluent fee system would not guarantee a
reduction in legal challenges by regulated companies
dissatisfied with statutory guidelines or administrative
fee schedules. However, an effluent fee system would
allow charges to be levied during litigation and would
(a) encourage technical innovation during litigation and
(b) discourage protracted legal battles in which the
plaintiff saw little chance for victory. Under the
regulatory approach, regulated firms seek protracted
legal suits in order to postpone the purchase and the
use of new technology. An effluent fee system would
encourage self-maximizing private firms to seek new
methods for pollution abatement even as the private
firms sought legal redress.
An effluent fee approach would also encourage,
rather than discourage, competitive pricing among
private firms which are now regulated. The regulatory
approach to pollution control must protect all
established enterprises which adhere to regulatory
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guidelines, and which purchase and use the suggested
best available pollution abatement technology. if
regulated companies fail in the "market-place," then the
blame must fall on regulatory policy and on regulatory
agencies. Rather than pursue new pollution abatement
technologies, private firms now have incentives to
maintain old standards and old technologies in the quest
to reduce production costs. New firms must be able to
meet, immediately, pollution guidelines which older
companies have had years in which to adapt, and new
firms must have the capital to purchase, immediately,
the adopted best available technology used by the
regulated industry. The results of regulatory policies
are minimal price competition and minimal technological
innovation in pollution abatement by regulated firms.
An effluent fee system mandates neither the success of
each enterprise monitored nor the type of technology
used to reduce pollution. [8] The onus for success of
regulated enterprises moves from the government
regulatory agencies to the amorphous regime of the
market-place (and to the economic shrewdness of company
managers). If a private firm decides to forego
pollution abatement technology, then their costs of
production will be much higher than those of firms
devising inexpensive methods to reduce their effluents
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and their effluent charges. Assuming, of course, that a
market is operating for these goods, companies able to
reduce their effluent fees/pollution abatement
technology costs will drive companies with prolific
pollution production costs out of business. New
companies entering the industry will be encouraged to
find innovative new techniques to reduce polllution
costs and will not be saddled with requirements to
purchase specific, and usually expensive, pollution
abatement technology. Competitive pricing and
technological innovation will be the products of an
effluent fee system, because an effluent fee system
reinstitutes market conditions.
The solutions offered to the faults of the
regulatory approach to water pollution are impressive
and can be applied equally as well to air pollution
control and, some even argue, to workplace safety
control. [9] In the area of car passenger safety, an
incentive/disincentive approach could be used to prevent
auto makers from further delay of airbag installation.
Each car without an airbag system (or a restraint system
capable of equalling the safety capabilities of an
airbag system) would be taxed at such a high level that
comparable cars with airbag systems would be much less
expensive. Consumers would be given a "choice," auto
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makers would be given a "choice," and the technological
development of alternative restraint systems with safety
capabilities equal to or better than the airbag systems
would be encouraged. Of course, most welfare economists
would give short shrift to this example, because
personal safety is not a collective good. Rather,
safety information on cars should be provided by the
federal government, and persons who value safety highly
would be willing to pay the costs of expensive and
effective systems. Persons who did not value safety
systems (trusting in their own driving abilities or in
fate, or having a death wish) would forego safety
systems and the price of such systems. This would leave
the buyer "free to choose" in an area deemed by welfare
economists not to be a "commons" situation.
Solving the Problems Created by Government's Assumption
of Responsibilities During the New Deal
A welfare economics/public choice approach to
regulatory policy provides remedies for the maladies of
the traditional regulatory approach. The treatment does
not end here. A welfare economics/public choice
approach also provides cures for the ills caused by two
related policy approaches which emerged after the
formulation of the regulatory approach: the New Deal
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provision of goods and services, and the scientif
planning approach. The scientific planning approach
guided, as we saw in Chapters IV and V, by the
assumption of social and economic responsibi It ies by the
federal government during the New Deal. The provision
of goods and services by the government during and after
the New Deal, though, did not necessitate the particular
characteristics we have associated with scientific
planning. Planning at the perimeter of the private
sphere — the hallmark of the scientific planning
approach -- was not the only method which might have
been pursued in the provision of goods and services. A
syndicalist approach, or even, government planning which
penetrated the private sphere and decided and
coordinated the production, the prices and the wages of
private enterprises were possible, if unlikely, methods
for delivering on the social and economic promises of
the New Deal. A welfare economics/public choice
approach to public policy supplies both (a) methods for
retaining the ambience of "the responsible New Deal
government" without having to assume the social,
economic and political burdens of that responsibility,
and (b) answers to the social, economic and political
problems encountered by a scientific planning approach
to New Deal promises.
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Thus, while it is not always easy to distinguish
clearly between the problems associated with the New
Deal assumption of social and economic responsibilities
and the problems associated with the scientific planning
approach to those responsibilities, the best case for a
welfare economics/public choice approach to public
policy in the United States can be made if we do
distinguish between the two sets of problems.
Two major problems, obviously related, of the New
Deal assumption of social and economic responsibilities
are (a) the increasing demands placed on government in a
society that fosters constantly rising economic
expectations of what constitutes "minimal decent living
standards" and (b) the fiscal bind created for
government as it attempts to meet rising needs. In
neither case is the scientific planning approach
directly responsible for these problems. Rising
expectations over what constitutes minimal guarantees of
decent living standards are not simply a case of giving
the poor (and the middle class) an inch and their
subsequent request for a mile. Rather, rising
expectations are a realistic response in a political
economy which generates ever increasing needs, even, to
maintain one's economic standing. Michael H. Best and
William E. Connolly have pointed out this predicament
209
vividly in an insightful discussion of the burdens of
inequality in the political economy of the United
States.
The shift from the icebox to the
refrigerator merely symbolizes, of
course, the changed social and
economic context in which today's
consumers must make choices If
cheap cuts of meat are no longer
available in the supermarket (perhapsthey are not profitable enough), I
must buy the more expensive cuts. Ifthe "consumer durables" of today,
such as television sets, washing'
machines, hot water heaters,
refrigerators, automobiles, and evenhouses, wear out faster than in a
previous period, I must simply
replace them more often at the going
prices. If public transportation is
unavailable, I must purchase a car todrive to work and to shop. If the
risks and costs of automobile
accidents are growing, I must
purchase more expensive automobile
insurance. If cars are more
complicated than in the past, I must
pay to have them repaired rather than
fixing them myself. If building
codes, plumbing regulations, and the
electrical specifications required by
law are too complicated for the
handyman of yesterday to understand,
I must hire specialists to install
and repair these household systems.
If the breakdown of extended kinship
ties threatens to leave my offspring
unprotected in the event of death or
injury, I must buy life and
disability insurance to provide for
their security. If home heating
costs are going up, I must buy home
insulation. If crime is increasing,
I must buy locks and police dogs and
alarm systems to protect my family.
If my children today must go to
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^
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Y regulation or necessity of
The ever increasing demands by citizens on government
for more goods and services are irrational only in the
sense that they are rational and reasonable responses to
an irrational political economy.
Escalating demands by citizens do not have to be
met with escalation in the provision of goods and
services by government. However, in the United States,
the representative assemblies have been unable to avert
a fiscal crisis and to fend off the demands of business,
citizens or the defense establishment. At the federal
level, Congresspersons' quests for reelection and for
personal power within the assemblies have created both:
(a) a decentralization of power which gives each
Congressperson power within one or two issue areas and,
thus, contributes to porkbarrel legislation, and (b) a
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break between appropriation, authorization and revenue
functions within the House of Representatives which
encourages expenditures to exceed revenues and which
makes coherent budget planning in the House of
Representatives impossible. [ 11 ] At all levels of the
federal system, representative assemblies produce social
programs which cater to the interests of specific
minorities and which, many times, create services which
are neither cost-effective nor consistent with the user
preferences of the individuals within the service
population.
These problems - rising expectations by citizens
of government provision of goods and services, and the
fiscal crisis these expectations create — can be
countered with a welfare economics/public choice
approach. Four steps must be followed to arrive at the
solution. First, the provision of goods and services
must be decentralized, with local and state governments
taking more fiscal responsibility for goods and
services. State and local governments can assume this
burden because the second step is to make the provision
of goods and services dependent upon the market success
of delivery agencies. Charles L. Schultze, in his The
Public Use of Private Interest
, describes how these
first two steps can be taken in the area of health care:
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First removing financial barriers tomedical care for the poor can beSS ^.S a system of'edLalinsurance, either as a reform of the
nVIT M*dicaid P^gram or as a partof a broader national healthinsurance system. Second, afterproviding the seed money to help newinstitutions like neighborhood healthcenters get started, the federalgovernment could gradually withdrawthe operating funds and require theinstitutions to charge fees covering
costs. This would be no hardship forthe poor, since their medical bills
would be covered by federally
supported insurance. But the
neighborhood health centers would
then have to stand the test of the
marketplace, since potential clients
would have the means to choose
between them and other sources of
medical care. Moreover, it would notbe necessary to limit the centers'
services to the poor, since everyone
would be paying fees coverinq the
costs. [12]
The federal government will still bear some of the costs
of health care for the poor with the creation of a
national health insurance, but the federal government
can remove its commitments for operating costs — costs
which are substantial and persistent. The federal
government will simply provide the capital for the poor
to enter the same health care "market" as all other
citizens. State and local governments need only supply
the services which are cost-effective (i.e., do not take
more from local budgets than they return to local
coffers)
.
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The third step to be taken is the privatization of
many services now being provided by public agencies.
Local governments would reduce the number of public
employees (and the number of pensions to be paid later),
and would serve as contract agents between the public
and privately owned and managed businesses. Local
governments would learn which services to seek by
polling residents individually on their willingness to
pay for a particular service. Ideally, each resident
would be asked to state how much he/she would be willing
to pay for each year of service. Each resident must be
isolated from other citizens when stating his/her
personal use value for each service, or else, the
problem of "free-riding" will occur. [13] All of the
residents' preferences (willingness to pay $n for a
service) would be summed. If this figure could purchase
the service, then the local government would contract
with a private business. The fourth step, then, is the
provision of a method for aggregating individual
preferences
.
These four steps could reduce the rising costs of
governments and force citizens to see the direct
connection between the expansion of services and
increased taxation. If, for example, residents in a
local community expressed a desire for ambulance
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service, the role of the local government under a
welfare economics/public choice approach would be to
poll citizens to see if they were willing to finance the
service. If such a willingness was expressed, then the
local community would take bids from private businesses
willing to provide ambulance service. The local
government could decide whether it wished to pay a flat
rate to the company and avoid charging residents for
each trip, to subsidize part of each trip or to allow
the company to charge individual users the full cost of
the ride. The first two options would, of course,
redistribute tax money to the sick and the unlucky and
would force non-users to share the costs — not an ideal
scenario in a welfare economics/public choice framework.
If no private firm was willing to provide the service,
then the local government would operate the ambulance
service as a public enterprise. If the public
enterprise did not break even or make a profit, and
citizens were no longer willing to provide operating
funds, then the service would be discontinued. Of
course, ideally, several ambulance services would have
appeared in the community because of the consumer needs,
and the local government would not have to act at all —
competition between services would guarantee low prices
and adequate service. Indeed, the success of a public
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enterprise should encourage private firms to enter the
ambulance service market and, thus, allow the local
government to discontinue its service in favor of
competitive businesses in the private sector.
The privatization of public services, the cost-
effectiveness criterion for remaining public services
and the decentralization of the provision of goods and
services to local governments constituted primarily to
serve as contract agents can reduce federal, state and
local government expenditures. Rising expectations
about the provision of goods and services by government
will be thwarted as individuals are forced to see the
direct link between services and the costs of services.
Public agencies will be streamlined as they compete with
private firms for clientele. Another, less mentioned
but obvious, benefit of this policy approach is that
powerful public unions, which increase the costs of
services, can be busted. If public unions demand high
wages and generous benefit packages, then they can be
dropped by a local government which will now purchase
the service from a private company. If a powerful
private union then emerges in the new private company
providing the service, the local government can
recontract if the private union's demands cause future
price increases in service delivery. The appeal of
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public union busting extends, though, beyond price
advantages; public unions have always evoked, at best, a
mixed reaction both by the public and by Public
Administration scholars. The idea that unions, as
adversaries of management, should have a place in the
public sphere where the government is the manager,
remains troublesome. [14] The trouble would be settled
if public unions could be disarmed.
Solving the Problems Created by the Scientific Pl anning
Approach " " a
The scientific planning approach to public policy
exacerbated the problems associated with regulatory
policy and with the New Deal provision of goods and
services. In the attempt to meet the responsibilities
assumed by government, the scientific planning approach
overextended the reach of government, overburdened
government planners with information and placed the
government in the position of being responsible for
almost all social and economic maladies experienced by
citizens. According to the welfare economics/public
choice paradigm, the problems engendered by the
scientific planning approach revolve centrally around
the failure to grasp the miracle of the market. First,
government is overextended because scientific planners
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placed too little faith in the proficiency of
decentralized market structures and too much faith in
the planning abilities of both people and institutions.
The comprehensive planning required by government during
the 1960s was incompatible with individual abilities and
with the incremental nature of bureaucratic decision
structures. [15] As administrative intervention in the
private sector increased in the attempt to control more
and more of the consequences of the planning variables
and to relieve more and more of the consequences of past
actions, government took on too many responsibi 1 ites
which it could not handle. The proliferation of
administrative agencies, at all levels of the federal
system, was the product of a planning mentality guided
by an overemphasis on individual equity and on coercive
control of private sector actors. Charles L. Schultze
has described cogently his view of why the scientific
planning approach failed.
First, a satisfactory method of
sorting out the frivolous from the
important occasions for intervention
has not been developed, and thus much
social effort is spent to achieve
such goals as having all fire
extinguishers in industrial
workplaces painted red. Second, we
have a propensity to intervene in
resource-allocation decisions in
order to achieve equity and income-
distribution goals that might better
be handled by some form of tax or
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we usiailv^ Pr.h3pS m°St imPortant,ually tend to see only one way
se/olT6— 9 " namel y> removing^et of decisions from the
nr?v^I
aliZ
!
d and incentive-orientedp ivate market and transferring themto the command-and-control techniquesof government bureaucracy
.[ 16
]
Second, the scientific planning approach placed an
information overload on government planners. Too much
information is needed to make the elaborate decisions
necessary within a planning framework. The demand for
decisions based on equity exacerbates this information
overload because it forces administrators to decide each
case on its particular merits (e.g., is this person
eligible for welfare? Should we fine this polluting
company?). Even if administrators could handle the
information burden imposed by scientific planning, it is
unlikely that administrators would be able to plan
effectively. Scientific planning at the perimeter of
the private sphere does not allow access to, or control
of, important economic variables within the private
economy. Private firms still control production, price
and wage decisions, and cannot be relied upon for
accurate reporting of their decisions and results. [17]
The informational burden on administrators cannot be
resolved in the framework of a scientific planning
approach.
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Third, the scientific planning approach has made
evident the dangers of placing responsibility for
economic and social conditions on the limelighted
shoulders of government. This is, indeed, the condition
welfare economics/public choice advocates abhor most
strongly. The crisis in confidence and the strain on
the political and social fabric of the United States
caused by the scientific planning approach is a central
concern of welfare economics/public choice advocates.
Charles L. Schultze, in contrasting a scientific
planning approach (an output or iented-process ) and a
welfare economics approach (a process-oriented process),
claims
:
Regardless of the circumstances,
however, social intervention has
almost always been output-oriented,
giving short shrift to the process-
oriented alternative. And this has
proven a costly bias. It has, with
no off-setting gain, forfeited the
strategic advantages of market-like
arrangements. It has led to
ineffective and inefficient solutions
to important social problems. It has
taxed, well beyond its limit, the
ability of government to make complex
output decisions. And it has
stretched thin the delicate fabric of
political consensus by unnecessarily
widening the scope of activities that
it must cover
. [ 18 J (emphasis added)
In an even more alarmist fashion, Vincent Ostrom, in his
opening chapter of The Intellectual Crisis in American
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Public Administration, contrasts the bureaucratic
structure employed by a scientific planning approach
with the bureaucratic structure necessitated by a public
choice approach, and avers that:
As we approach the Bicentenary ofAmerican nationhood, we are losing
confidence that the twenty-first
century will be an American century.
Instead, we have been seized by a
maelstrom of crises. Some have evenbegun to wonder whether there will be
a twenty-first century in the
Christian era, and whether the UnitedStates of America will survive as a
nation. [19]
Among the crises we face in the United States, one of
the most serious, according to Ostrom, is an untenable
reliance on a centralized federal administration — a
reliance induced by the claims of scientific planning.
If we are concerned about human
poverty, community assistance
programs, rural development, the
public security of the neighborhood
streets, and the quality of the
environment, should we proceed on the
assumption that these are national
problems requiring national solutions
which can only be solved by
Presidential intervention? Or should
we proceed on the assumption that
these problems are but names for a
multitude of difficulties confronting
individual human beings as they
pursue their relative advantage in
dealing with one another?[20]
(original emphasis)
Resolutions to these three problems encountered by
scientific planning — an overextended federal
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government; a multitude of overloaded subnational
governments; and a legitimation crisis - are offered by
a welfare economics/public choice approach. The key to
these resolutions is a return to the harmony of market
forces. The discord caused by governmental intervention
into the private sphere can be alleviated if government
will reduce its responsibilities and replace coercive
regulations with the skillful use of market incentives.
The privatization of public services will allow
governments to reduce social commitments (and social
expenditures) without abandoning completely the promises
of social welfare which governments have made.
Centralized scientific planning can be replaced by the
decentralized management of market forces.
Decentralized management of market forces requires
neither cumbersome bureaucracy nor comprehensive
knowledge. [21] Adjustments in incentive/disincentive
packages — e.g., to control pollution, to reduce
industrial accidents and to provide health services —
can be made incrementally and over long periods of time.
Such adjustments do not require, necessarily,
confirmation of agency actions by legislative bodies
inclined to fluctuations in objectives and open to
constant assault by narrow-minded interest groups.
The size of governments can also be reduced,
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according to welfare economics/Public choice advocates,
by evaluating the effectiveness of public service
agencies with the same criteria used for evaluating
private enterprises upif a r0uses, welf e economics/public choice
advocates give short shrift to some standards employed
in the evaluation of public service agencies, especially
such standards as equity, openness and the symbolic
effects of public service agencies. Such standards are,
of course, far from being rigorously quantified and,
indeed, may never be. The solution is to ignore or
slight these troublesome standards and evaluate public
agencies with the same "benefit-cost efficiency model-
used in the private sector. This evaluation approach
cannot always be used completely -- e.g., the
Departments of Defense and Justice — but efficiency
evaluations should be the goal by which all evaluations
are measured. This evaluation approach can allow for
the "even-handed" retrenchment of government
departments
.
The reduction in the size of governments is closely
connected to a reduction in the amount of information
which must be mastered by governments. The scientific
planning approach did increase the size of federal
government as the federal government sought mastery over
more and more information about the private sphere. As
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we have just seen, informational requirements under a
welfare economics/public choice approach are reduced
because (a) social responsibilities are reduced, (b)
private actors assume many new functions, (c)
comprehensive information is not necessary in
structuring incentive/disincentive packages and (d)
evaluations of public agencies can ignore some
troublesome criteria no longer deemed important.
Furthermore, information burdens are reduced because, as
Schultze states, a welfare economics approach takes "...
a devil take the hindmost approach to questions of
individual equity. "[22] Administrators need not know
the specific conditions of each polluting firm or the
specific condition of each consumer of social
services. [23] What is important is to know how rational
self-maximizers will respond to different incentive
packages. [24] in addition, even the breadth of this
knowledge can be limited by returning government
functions to the private sphere — to the marketplace
where information is processed mysteriously and
miraculously, and where errors can be blamed on no one
person, agency or institution.
By reducing the responsibl i t ies of governments and
the demands made upon governments, advocates of a
welfare economics/public choice approach intend to
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alleviate the crisis of confidence in government and to
reweave a tattered social fabric. Governments will
still manage pollution control, but not in a coercive
regulatory framework. Rather, companies will be
controlled through the structuring of
incentive/disincentive packages which do not require
government intrusion into the specific economic choices
of private enterprises. The privatization of public
services will release governments from accountability to
the public and return "accountability" to the amorphous
entity of the market. The decentralization of remaining
public services will take the pressure off the federal
government and allow the federal, state and local
governments to compete for constituents. This
competition will offer citizens more choices while
dilating their narrow focus on the federal government.
Solving the Problems Created by the Participation
Movement
The defusing of the legitimation crisis in the
United States is possible, though, only if the
politicized citizens -- a product of the participation
movement — of the United States are depolit icized. [25]
Thus, a welfare economics/public choice approach must
also offer solutions to the problems engendered by the
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participation movement. Four basic problems emerged
during the participation movement, all a sign of the
dangers of a
"hyper-politicized" society: (a)
administrative advocacy (b) the demand by citizens for
participatory structures which would help shape and
control community and regional policy (c) the
proliferation of interest groups and (d) an acute
awareness by citizens of the zero-sum nature of many of
the economic and political decisions of governments. We
will explore briefly each of these problems and then
turn to the solutions offered by welfare
economics/public choice advocates.
The participation movement created situations where
administrative discretion was replaced with
administrative advocacy. Federal administrators in the
social service programs of the Great Society became
advocates for their clientele. [26] Administrators were
no longer neutral enactors of policy; they became both
proponents of the poor, especially of the black poor,
and instigators for new economic and social "privileges"
for citizens in poverty. It is difficult to fault
federal administrators for advocacy of citizens' rights
and privileges for certain groups when the situation of
these citizens in the 1960s was so obviously dire. [27]
Nevertheless, unrestrained administrative advocacy
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undermines administrators' accountability to elected
officials and, thus, the integrity of administrators.
Furthermore, administrative advocacy, even when limited,
is open to wide-ranging abuses. Do we want
administrative advocates for the middle class, the upper
class, polluters, etc.? Simply, no one has yet been
able to develop guidelines which will enable
administrators, elected representatives and citizens to
determine which groups should be served by
administrative advocates and when. Yet, one of the
goals of scientific planning and the participation
movement — a decent standard of living for all citizens
— forces administrators into social service agencies
where they, to procure individual equity, must become
representatives of their clientele.
The second problem -- the demand by citizens for
participatory structures -- is a result of the promises
made by the federal government during the participation
movement. Although responsible democratic structures
for citizen participation in administrative formulation,
enactment and evaluation of regional and community
policies were not developed during the participation
movement, government assurances of such structures
created a continuing demand by citizens for
participation. The problem with these demands is that
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the centralized structure of administration, at all
three levels of the federal system, and the requirements
of the scientific planning approach used by
administrators is not capable, at present, of working
with participatory structures. [28 ] When participatory
structures are slapped onto the present administrative
structures, the result is little effective participation
by citizens and a further information overload on
administrators. Both citizens and administrators feel
betrayed by the attempt at participatory structures, and
the response by citizens, who are now more aware of the
political system and the need to control policies
affecting their lives, is the creation of more interest
groups.
The third and fourth problems engendered by the
participation movement -- the proliferation of interest
groups and an enhanced awareness by citizens of the
winners and losers in the political economy of the
United States — increase the pressures on the modern
administrative state. Rational planning is undermined
by the abundance of politicized citizen groups on every
side of every major issue within the political economy.
No longer can economically weak groups be deemed
politically weak. The federal political structure, with
its large number of access points for interest group
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intervention, makes it possible for almost any interest
group to exercise veto power over new policy
initiatives. [29] Increasing economic demands by
interest groups, combined with their ability to stave
off assaults on gains already made, place an increasing
fiscal burden on governments, especially the federal
government. [30] (At the federal level, the fiscal
pressure is especially intense because of a continued
commitment to vast expenditures on armaments.) The
result has been a questioning of the scientific planning
approach to public policy, a ridiculing of participatory
structures and a choosing between two unacceptable
options for federal policy-makers: (a) a continued
muddling through or (b) a return to orthodox economics
in which the promises of the New Deal are ignored, the
federal government reduces social expenditures and the
economy once more prospers by impoverishing large
numbers of citizens. [31] Without the depolit icizat ion
of citizens, though, the latter approach may also find
itself in the quagmire of interest group liberalismf 32 ]
,
and without a coherent policy of social regulation
(e.g., pollution control) the latter approach may find
itself exposing the irrationalities of an orthodox
economics approach which had earlier generated the
demands for coercive regulatory policy. [33]
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A welfare economics/public choice approach can
provide solutions to the problems we have just examined.
In each case, the solution centers on the
depoliticization of actors within the political economy
of the United States.
First, administrative advocacy can be stilled by
removing administrators, especially federal
administrators, from the delivery of social services.
Equity considerations will not be important because of
national minimal guarantees for income (national
guaranteed income) or health care (national health
insurance) or education (a national voucher system). [34]
A majority of social services can be supplied by private
enterprises contracted by local governments. In
addition, federal administrators will never again have
to play the role of organizers for the poor in the
United States as they did in the 1960s — a role which
encouraged both identification with clientele and
administrative advocacy. Administrators will not have
to be organizers of disadvantaged groups, because the
nature of citizen participation will be redefined.
The second problem, the demand for participatory
structures, can be handled by a redefinition of citizen
participation which will eliminate the need, and thus
the demand for, participatory structures which encourage
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responsible democratic participation. Participation in
a welfare economics/public choice approach is
participation in the polling process used to determine
the isolated preferences of citizens. A good citizen
need not reflect on issues in a democratic forum or
participate in interest group liberalism. Rather, a
good citizen must know how much he/she is willing to
spend for each particular social service offered by
local governments. Each citizen is allowed to
participate — provide his/her economic opinion — on
each issue, thus alleviating the demand for
participation and providing a structure of participation
that does not threaten the remaining administrative
structures. Information about citizens' views can be
reduced to one number (the sum of individual
preferences) and structures of participation do not need
to be slapped onto existing administrative structures.
Third, in a welfare economics/public choice
approach, interest groups will still attempt to
determine policy goals, but the ability of interest
groups to redistribute tax monies to themselves, and to
veto policy changes, will be reduced. Federal
guarantees of income, health care and education will be
redistr ibut ive, but clients of social services will be
forced to see the direct link between social
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expenditures and taxes. User fees for social services
will discourage interest groups from applying political
pressure for social goods and services, because services
will rest on individual consumer's willingness to pay
for those services. Interest groups may still veto some
national insurance schemes through the political
process, but they will lose power over the
administrative formulation and execution of public
policies. Administrators will develop programs which
return service delivery to the private sector, and will
determine needs not by interest group pressures, but by
the summation of the preferences of isolated
individuals. Citizens will gain leverage not by
political pressure, but by the economic choices they
make in the new "market" atmosphere of social service
provision.
The fourth problem, an increased awareness by
citizens of the winners and losers in the political
economy of the United States, can be resolved under a
welfare economics/public choice approach by transferring
responsibility for winning and losing from governments
to the amorphous "black box" of the private market. [35]
The problem is not that there are winners and losers;
the problem is that governments, especially the federal
government, are now responsible for political and
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economic outcomes. By defusing the political in the
modern political economy, it may be possible to shift
responsibility for outcomes to the interplay of market
forces and to retrieve the notion that losses are the
result of bad choices by individuals or of the bad luck
of individuals. indeed, even the failure of governments
to provide adequate social services is not the result of
administrative shortcomings, but of the inability of the
individuals in a community to register their "true"
economic preferences. Accountability is either shifted
to the market or back to the individuals who voiced
their preferences. in neither case can the government
be held responsible or accountable for the losses
experienced by citizens.
A welfare economics/public choice approach to
public policy provides resolutions to the problems
engendered by a participation movement which was
designed to shore up the problems encountered with a
scientific planning approach. A welfare
economics/public choice approach can (a) squelch
administrative advocacy, (b) provide a certain type of
participation which will alleviate demands for
democratic participation, (c) diminish the worst moments
of interest group liberalism and (d) reduce governments'
responsibility for gains and losses in the political
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economy. Thus
, this approach can ^^
in confidence in the federal government. Furthermore,
it can solve the fiscal crisis facing the federal
government without resorting to the tactics of orthodox
economics; it can still pay homage to the social
promises of the New Deal while reducing social
expenditures and it can still provide a coherent
regulatory schema without resorting to the coercive
methods employed by the regulatory approach.
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such discrimination.
28. Participation by citizens in the decisions ofgovernment faces two problems: (a) the centralized
structure of modern bureaucracies, and (b) the very
nature of modern science. The latter problem is wellbeyond the scope of this work.
29. For a discussion of the various levels of
access to government decisions, see E. E.
Shattschneider
,
The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's
View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt. Rinehart
and Winston, 1960). For a discussion of the increase in
groups* using their veto power in policy making, see
Lester C. Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and
the Possibilities for Economic Change (New York: Penguin
Books, 1981).
30. This has been most obvious in the case of
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h C ief Executive who is, of course, also theCommander-in-Chief) is an appeal to the public good. Anappeal to the public good, though, is unlikely to be asuccessful approach by an administration which preachesand practices a "politics of greed."
33. The exposition of these irrationalities was
made all too obvious in the first two years of theReagan Administration's Environmental Protection Agency.
34. Vincent Ostrom might not agree with these
suggestions made by Charles Schultze: Schultze, The
Public Use of Privat e Interest
, pp. 61-63. Even~w7thin
the welfare economics/public choice circles there is
some "political" controversy. Schultze is on the left
of a very narrow spectrum.
35. Schultze approves of this mystical "black box"
description of the workings of the market. His approval
stems from his belief that it is hard to blame failure
in the market on the mysterious workings of the "black
box." Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest,
pp. 76-77.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE DEPOLITICIZATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
Bad Diseases and Worse Cures
We have seen in the last chapter the allure of a
welfare economics/public choice approach to public
policy in the United States. In this chapter, I will
argue that the cure is worse than the diseases. A
welfare economics/public choice approach offers, at
best, superficial cures for the maladies produced by the
previous public policy approaches we have examined.
Beyond the superficiality of a welfare economics/public
choice approach, though, lingers a philosophy of
public/private relations and a conceptualization of
human thought and action which threaten the very
possibility of good government; for a welfare
economics/public choice approach asserts the most anemic
view possible of the public good and denies the
possibility of good citizenship. This harsh judgement
of a welfare economics/public choice approach can be
best substantiated by (a) examining the effects of this
approach on the four policy approaches employed in the
United States in this century, (b) revealing the
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theoretical barrenness of this approach and (c)
unveiling the anti-political social conditions which
this approach engenders and, indeed, in which it would
operate most efficiently, we turn fi rst
, then, to an
examination of the welfare economics/public choice
solutions to the problems posed by previous public
policy approaches undermine the possiblity of good
public policy.
Essential Qualities in Regulatory Pojj cy
A welfare economics approach to regulatory policy
suffers from three fundamental flaws. The first flaw is
a result of a failure by welfare economists to pursue
fully their own assumptions about the nature of self-
maximizing private enterprises. Polluting enterprises
may respond to effluent fees with reductions in
discharges and with the creation of innovative pollution
abatement technology. However, an alternate response by
self-maximizing corporations is the creative
restructuring of chemical pollutants. Corporations may
alter the chemical composition of their effluents and
create new pollutants that are not covered by existing
governmental effluent fee schedules. As each new and
innovative discharge is produced, federal government
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experts will be forced to evaluate and then record
new fee schedules. [ 1 ] Once the new discharge is
"costed-in" to the production process by effluent fees,
the response will be the slight chemical alteration of
discharges and the creation of new and uncovered
effluents. Such behavior may well be both self-
maximizing and innovative. it is also guaranteed to
lead government effluent experts on a never-ending chase
after new effluents and a never-ending restructuring of
effluent fee schedules. The information burden posed by
this behavior is large, especially when effluent fee
experts must also adjust effluent fee schedules to
account for the synergistic effects of new
pollutants. [2]
It is, of course, true that not all polluting
enterprises will be able to take advantage of effluent
fees through creative discharges. In some industries,
for example the wood milling enterprises, the costs of
pursuing innovative pollutants may outweigh the costs of
new pollution abatement technology. However, within
those industries which produce a variety of chemical
discharges, the incentive to decrease costs without
reducing discharges may lead to a continuing scramble as
effluent fee experts chase after the elusive new
discharges produced by self-maximizing corporations.
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The chances that such a mad scramble will occur are
heightened by an even more fundamental flaw in the
welfare economics approach to public policy: the failure
to grasp the distinction between the letter of the law
and the spirit of the law. Despite the problems with
the traditional statutory approach to regulation of
private enterprises, the statutory approach acknowledged
the importance of the spirit of the law. Private
enterprises were expected to comply with both the
restrictions and the intent of the law. m a welfare
economics approach, there is no spirit of the law.
Reflection on the intent of the law is not necessary
because the intent of the law is to be realized through
unreflective profit maximization. As long as the
private sector actors remain within the letter of law,
anything goes.
Under the statutory approach, few companies abided
by the spirit of the law. This, however, is no reason
to give up on the importance of the spirit of the law in
civilized society. Corporate irresponsibility was not
the result of the statutory approach, but rather was the
result of a legal fiction which provided the corporation
with the legal status of an individual without the civic
responsiblit ies and the state of accountability demanded
of individual citizens. Indeed, the legal fiction of
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the corporation as individual raised the status of
corporations at the same time that it demeaned the idea
of citizenship. The corporation as an individual set an
example of irresponsibility, and left a trail of self-
maximizing behavior devoid of the spirit of the law, for
Veal" individuals to follow, a good society cannot be
based solely on the letter of the law conception of
individual thought and action. All laws, as all rules,
are open to interpretation and abuse. Faced with
creative self-maximizers as "citizens,- government is
forced to respond continually with ever more detailed
and rigid laws. Without an acceptance of the spirit of
the law, government is caught in an infinite regress of
writing laws to cover all possible circumstances and
interpretations. This is not only futile, it creates a
situation antithetical to the very foundation of good
government: the laws should be simple, straightforward
and few so that citizens can know and understand the
law, and, thus, act within both the letter and the
spirit of the law.
The proliferation of administrative rules and laws
in such agencies as the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) need not be the result of
bureaucratic intrigue, of bureaucratic idiocy or, even,
of the statutory approach to regulation of the
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workplace. [3] Rather, the proliferation of rules may be
the result of self-maximizing corporations which will
use any possible interpretation of the letter of law to
reduce production costs at the expense of worker safety.
Welfare economists confuse cause and effect: OSHA
nitpicks not because it is a nitpicker, but because many
corporations creatively construe general rules on
workplace safety to the detriment of workplace safety.
The effects of a welfare economics approach to
government regulation of the private sphere are to
diminish further the spirit of the law in the United
States, and to undermine the achievement of responsible
and reflective citizenship which has made social life,
without tyranny, possible. Rather than attempting to
reconstruct the legal fiction of the corporation as an
individual, welfare economists wish to reconstruct the
nature of citizenship in order that "real" individuals
will assume the unreflective and irresponsible character
of private corporations. Indeed, incentive/disincentive
packages are not proffered by welfare economists just
for the regulation of corporations, but also for the
control of citizen activity. Good citizens, in a
welfare economics approach, do not need to understand
the spirit of the laws, they simply need to (re)act to
the incentive/disincentive systems in society as
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unreflective self-maximizers
.
The third flaw of a welfare economics approach to
regulatory policy is the result of the failure of
welfare economists to understand and appreciate the
character of legitimate public action during previous
public policy approaches. Government actions depended
upon providing remedies to social and economic problems
which (a) were directly linked with the problems to be
addressed and (b) created both rights and obligations
for citizens and for private enterprises. The failure
of public choices was the result of the application of
inappropriate methods, or of the irresponsibility of
public or private actors. If the failure was the result
of irresponsiblity, then citizens could, and did, hold
reflective actors accountable for their actions. If
failure was the result of inappropriate methods, then
either new approaches should be tried or the project
should be scrapped. In any case, citizens were able to
determine the connection between means and ends in
public policy and were, thus, able to examine and
critique the use of public authority. Government
authority did, and must, rest on a transparency of means
and ends so that citizens can reflect on, and
distinguish between, legitimate and illegitimate
authority.
in a welfare economics schema, authority is masked
and citizens are not expected to distinguish between
either rights and obligations, or between legitimate and
illegitimate authority. The failure of an
incentive/disincentive approach will be construed as
either the failure of experts to build the correct
incentive packages or the failure of private actors to
act solely as unreflective profit self-maximizers. The
correct cure is not to question to deployment of
incentive systems, but rather to redesign the incentive
packages. Once one has accepted the assumptions of
welfare economics, the only rational response is to
amend and to extend incentive packages in an eternal
quest to control the behavior of innovative profit self-
maximizers, personal and corporate. Because incentive
packages are not designed to be transparent, their
extension into more and more areas of social life makes
the critique of illegitimate authority difficult, if not
impossible. The "nature-like" quality of incentive
systems (by "nature-like" welfare economists mean as
unaccountable as Nature) threatens the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate authority, and,
thus, undermines a foundational element in both
republican and democratic theories of legitimate
government
.
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Essential Conuiit^nts i n the New Deal Provision ofGoods and Serviced
A welfare economics/public choice approach to the
provision of goods and services will shrink government
expenditures and reduce citizen demand for more goods
and services by (a) privatizing many public services and
(b) operating remaining services on the criterion of
private enterprises, cost-effectiveness. Yet, since
before the turn of the century, government agencies have
developed selection and evaluation procedures, internal
norms, and structural constraints which, correctly,
reject the amoral standards and the amoral aims of
private enterprises. Merit exams, openness in
procedures and decisions, and tenure in office in return
for non-partisanship are all methods to ensure that
public agents in public bureaucracies remain committed
to procedures and goals which have eluded bureaucracies
in the private sphere. [4] Public agencies maintain a
commitment to equity, to equal opportunity and to the
public good, as well as a recognition of the symbolic
effects of their activities. These commitments and this
recognition are not acknowledged by private enterprises
and the result in the United States has been the
development of a moral public sphere and an amoral
private economic sphere . These commitments and this
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recognition cannot be infused in private agencies
providing formerly public goods by creating new
incentive packages. The concern for equity, the
enactment of equal opportunity, the pursuit of the
public good and the understanding of the symbolic power
granted by public authority are reflective achievements
of human thought and action, and can never be the result
of simple stimulus-response behavior induced by
incentive systems. The public sphere has always
questioned and demoted the criterion of cost-
effectiveness because cost-effectiveness is only one
constituent element of effectiveness in a sphere
maintained by reflection on morality and human values.
In the attempt to alleviate the burden of
responsibilities accepted by governments at all three
levels of the federal system, a welfare economics/public
choice approach is willing to destroy the distinction
between the values of the public sphere and the values
of the private economic sphere. The result is the
collapse of the public sphere into the private sphere
and a loss of the very values which helped establish
public action and which grounded the distinction between
citizen and consumer.
249
Essential Qualities in the Scientific Plann ing
Approach "
Although the scientific planning approach did try
to claim that accountability sometimes rested on
professional-scientific standards, the scientific
approach did accept the concepts of responsible action
and accountable public action which had been nurtured
during the New Deal. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter VI,
it was the failure of the scientific planning approach
to address responsibly the concerns of many citizens
(especially the black poor) which finally led scientific
planners to argue that their approach must be
supplemented by a participation movement. It was this
participation movement which politicized citizens, thus
creating increasing demands for responsibility and for
accountability which engendered a legitimation crisis
which welfare economics/public choice advocates claim
they can solve. As should be obvious, though, the
privatization of public agencies is not designed for
either greater public responsibility for the quality of
life of citizens or for greater public accountability to
citizens. It is also unlikely that incentive systems
will reduce the size of the federal bureaucracies which
grew during the scientific planning approach. We will
first examine the ability of a welfare economics/public
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choice approach to reduce the <H «fn size of government and
then examine the issuer: of n„Ki •ues public responsibility and
public accountability.
If we are correct in the assumptions that profit
self-maximizers are both innovative in their behavior
and ignorant of the spirit of the law, then arguments
that a welfare economics/public choice approach will
reduce the size of government are probably incorrect,
incentive systems will have to be adapted constantly to
meet the challenges of innovative behavior which
responds to all statutes and incentives not with
reflection on the proper action to take, but with an eye
toward the cheapest and easiest behavior to pursue.
Administrators responsible for incentive packages will
be involved in never-ending revisions of their packages
and the development of new packages to deal with the
behavior of private individuals and private enterprises.
As long as cost-effectiveness remains the chief
criterion of private enterprises providing formerly
public goods and services, public administrators will
have to develop incentive packages to ensure that
private enterprises live up to minimal standards of
decency and competence. It should be obvious that large
administrative organizations are necessary to control
individuals and to regulate some private enterprises,
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but why should it be necessary to develop administrative
organizations to create incentive packages for private
enterprises providing formerly public goods and
services? The answer is that without such incentive-
control administrative organizations, there will be no
incentives (in the market) for private enterprises to
supply quality public goods and services. An example
can illustrate this problem.
Public fire companies are expensive enterprises.
However, because public fire companies are staffed by
persons who are (a) guaranteed a career, (b) guaranteed
a pension and (c) infused with an "esprit de corps"
which causes firefighters to place public safety above
their own private safety, the quality of service offered
by public fire companies is excellent. Private
companies, because they would be under contract to local
governments, cannot guarantee a stable career or a
reasonable pension to their employees, or even guarantee
moderate heroics by their employees. Private companies
which did offer generous salaries, tenured positions,
reasonable pensions and quality service would be placed
in jeopardy every time the contract between the company
and the local government ended and new bids for a new
contract were accepted. We want more than cost-
effectiveness from a fire company and, thus, either
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incentive systems would have to be developed (e.g.,
'
bonuses awarded for fewer deaths per year and/or lower
total fire damage costs per year) or contracts would
have to be made more permanent. The first solution
would be difficult and the second solution would be a
return to fire service as usual. [5] it certainly can be
argued that this is an extreme case, but it applies in
varying degrees to a host of other services including
ambulance service and public education.
It can be argued, of course, that other factors
than cost-effectiveness can be added to the calculation
which will determine which companies will deliver the
goods or service. Such attempts, however, demand that
the "willingness-to-pay" criterion be adjusted in a
political debate which undermines the elegance of the
welfare economics/public choice approach and which
reintroduces the very values which welfare
economics/public choice advocates have explicitly
disavowed. The growth of administrative agencies may be
temporarily slowed by a welfare economics/public choice
approach to the provision of goods and services, but
large bureaucracies filled with scientific planners will
soon be replaced with large bureaucracies filled with
incentive design experts.
Public responsibility for the quality of life is
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weakened by the welfare economics/public choice approach
to the provision of goods and services. Responsibility
in republican government demands more than simply toting
up individual preferences for goods and services.
Public choice advocates are not incorrect in accusing
representative assemblies of providing goods and
services to their constituents which would not be
provided if provision depended upon the sum of
individuals' willingness-to-pay for the goods and
services. However, welfare economics/public choice
advocates are incorrect in supposing that representative
assemblies are simply conduits for popular opinion.
Responsible representatives are expected to reflect the
majority opinions of their constituents, but they are
also expected to inform, enhance and shape the opinions
of their constituents. [6] The goal in representative
assemblies is not the summation of all constituents'
opinions; representatives are not merely pollsters and
mathematicians. The goal in representative assemblies
is to transcend the summation of private self-interests
and to posit policies for the public good. Responsible
representation includes voting against the majority
opinions, on occasion, and voting for community
interests which are not always identical to the
interests of any specific constituency. Representation
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and government responsibility are concepts which elude
precise empirical definition and, thus, elude most
welfare economics/public choice advocates.
Nevertheless, they remain important concepts which guide
political life in human communities.
Accountability in republican government is also a
concept which eludes precise empirical definition.
Accountability to the public for public actions is not
simply the accounting of dollar costs and dollar
benefits. Welfare economics/public choice advocates
have been correct in arguing that post-New Deal politics
have generated responsibilities for governments beyond
the power given to governments to warrant such
responsibilities. Their solution, though, — the return
of responsibility and accountability to the market place
-- is not a solution to, but a rejection of, government
responsibility and accountability. The nature-like
market cannot be held accountable, because there is
focus for neither blame nor praise, nor is there finally
any concept of public action within the market place.
This last point is important because the welfare
economics/public choice advocates wish to reduce public
action, but not to eradicate it. [7] Thus, some form of
accountability is necessary even in a welfare
economics/public choice approach. However, as we shall
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see in the next section, the remains of accountability
which the welfare economics/public choice advocates
proffer are neither compelling to citizens nor
informative for citizens.
The
"hyper-politicization" of citizens caused by
the participation movement can be alleviated in a
welfare economics/public choice approach by a
redefinition of citizen participation. Citizen
participation will be based not on (a) participation in
interest group politics or (b) participation in
responsible democratic forums, but by participation in
"willingness-to-pay for services" polls. Isolated
individuals (without isolation, "free-riding" will occur
and ruin the poll) will be queried on their willingness
to pay for public goods and services. Public policy
choices will be made by aggregating individual
preferences. The definition of good citizenship will be
the ability of isolated self -maximizers to assess their
personal interests and to reveal their preferences in
accurate dollar totals. The mark of good policy will be
the ability to sum dollar preferences and to provide
goods and services within the constraints of the final
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Accountability for the public interests (there is
no longer a "public good") is shifted from public
representatives and public agents to the market place
and onto the shoulders of individuals who provided the
preferences which were aggregated. An insufficiency of
public goods and services is necessarily the fault (if
there is fault and not just the whims of the market
place) of individuals who revealed their preferences
incorrectly or inaccurately. Citizens, who are denied
the capacity to determine goals intersubject ively , are
the culprits of public policy failures.
In the pursuit of minimizing the responsibilites of
government and of defusing the "hyper-politicizat ion" of
citizens, a welfare economics/public choice model is
willing to deny the political capacities of citizens and
to deny the possibility of the public good.
Furthermore, by draining the concepts of "politics" and
of "citizen" of their meaning, a welfare
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economics/public choice approach is willing to blame
citizens for the failure of public policies created in a
political and moral vacuum.
The Tragedy of a Welfar e Economics/Publ i c Choice
Approacn to Public Policy "
The dangerous consequences which we have just
examined of a welfare economics/public choice approach
— the collapse of the public sphere into the private
sphere, the masking of government responsibility, and
the rejection of the value of intersubj ect ive
(democratic) communication, and, thus, the rejection of
the public good — are all the result of an attempt to
reconstruct two prime categories of political
understanding. These categories are humans and goods.
In the history of political thought, humans have been
understood as political beings within a community, a
group, a class or a species. Goods were understood as
having specific relations to the needs and wants of
political beings within the political economy of the
society. Public authority rested on the ability of
political beings to determine intersubj ect ively the
needs and wants of political beings within human
associat ions
.
[ 8 ] In a welfare economics/public choice
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approach, humans are not understood as political beings,
but rather as individual self-maximizers. Goods are not
understood as having specific relations to political
beings, but as having general izable relations to each
individual (i.e., more is better). m the
reconstruction of these two categories of political
understanding, a welfare economics/public choice
approach inverts the relationship between humans and
goods and, thus, removes the needs for political thought
and action by citizens and the need for forums of
political discourse.
We can now finally see the importance of Garret
Hardin's fable, "The Tragedy of the Commons," for a
welfare economics/public choice approach. Only by
positing a transcendent view of humans as individual
self-maximizers can welfare economics/public choice
advocates hope to overthrow a tradition of political
thought (and an everyday self
-understanding by humans)
which is grounded in the moral quality and the political
capacity of citizens. Citizens must be convinced that
they are, indeed, incapable of resolving problems
outside of a solely self-interested economic framework.
The only political awareness demanded of citizens is
that they realize that political solutions must be
abandoned and that reflection must be replaced by self-
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interested behavior. Hardin's fable is important in
convincing humans of their political inabilities because
it posits that humans never had such abilities in the
first place; crises were managed by scarcity which was
produced by the whims of nature or the whims of invading
barbarians. The lesson is that there is no political
tradition of thought and action in human affairs;
rather, there is just the timeless self-interested
individual finally unleashed by the marvels of the
natural sciences.
Hardin's lesson is compelling for two reasons.
First, modern corporations live down to this model of
the self-maximizing individual. - Second, humans are
self-interested beings; but, this is just one
constitutive element of a successful human. Humans are
also moral, altruistic, reflective and political. These
latter qualities, though, must be denied or, at least,
must be judged unimportant in the modern world by
welfare economics/public choice advocates. The denial
or denigration of these constitutive elements is
necessary in order to (a) convince the doubter of the
appropriateness of a welfare economics/public choice
approach and (b) compel the citizen to retard these
qualities and bask in the light of pure self-interest.
Both convincing and compelling the individual are
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necessary, because the success of a welfare
economics/public choice approach depends upon
individuals' acting on pure self-interest. The failure
of the individual to pursue his/her pure self-interest
clogs the gears of a welfare economics/public choice
approach, because altruistic citizens may not respond to
incentives or reveal their "true" self-interest when
allowed to "participate" in the selection of public
goods and services. indeed, the success of a welfare
economics/public choice approach rests upon the
realization of an array of social conditions all
dependent on the depolit icization of public policy and
on the depoliticization of society.
The ideal conditions for a welfare economics/public
choice approach depend upon four fundamental changes in
society in the United States. Each change undermines
the political achievements upon which previous public
policy approaches were based. Given the inadequacies of
previous approaches, this may not seem much of a loss.
However, all four previous approaches were built on and
around a concept of the public good, an appreciation of
the legitimate tasks of government and a belief in (and
commitment to) reflective, responsible citizenship. A
welfare economics/public choice approach disavows these
core concepts of responsible politics.
First, a welfare economics/public choice approach
demands the extreme depolit icizat ion of society.
Political truths are no longer the product of reflective
citizens earnestly pursuing the public good within
democratic forums. Rather, politcal "truths" are seen
simply as the aggregation of individual opinions which
must be voiced in isolation from other citizens.
Justice and equity become mathematically determinable
and no longer must rest on reflection and dialogue and
an understanding of particulars in the world. Political
rights are products of economic opinion and not the
product of reflection on the role of the individual
within the life of the community. Freedom becomes
simply the anemic freedom to voice one's economic
preferences. The need to ponder, much less engage in
reflective dialogue about, justice, ethics, rights and
freedom is undermined.
Second, a welfare economics/public choice approach
attempts to mask questions of legitimate authority.
Politics, though, can achieve both great good and great
evil. Thus, within a liberal state, citizens must be
able to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
authority. This involves more than an understanding by
citizens of the ends of political action; it involves an
understanding of the means of political action.
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Government has a responsibility to lay bare (to make
transparent) each step in the means to political ends.
A welfare economics/public choice approach obscures
authority and severs questions of responsibility and
accountability from a political framework in which
illegitimate authority may be critiqued.
Third, a welfare economics/public choice approach
portends the collapse of the public sphere into the
private economic sphere. The legitimacy of public
actions has, correctly, within the United States been
premised on the character and commitment of public
employees. As we have seen, the ethical character of
public employees has been formally acknowledged since
the Pendleton Act of 1883 and the commitment to the
public good by public employees has been legally
recognized since the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887.
This character and this commitment have produced a
Public administration which holds effectiveness above
efficiency. Effectiveness includes a dedication to
fairness, a quest for open procedures and an
understanding of the symbolic effects of public action
which transcend the mathematical accountability of
efficiency. A welfare economics/public choice approach
attempts to replace public sector values with the
criterion of private sector efficiency.
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Fourth, a welfare economics/public choice approach
demeans the reflective achievements of political beings
by arguing that politics can be seen as stimulus-
response behavior to economically derived incentives.
The vending machine society becomes the vending machine
"polity." Citizens become consumers and humans become
Skinnerian pigeons, albeit efficient pigeons. Thought
is not replaced by action, but instead is replaced by
behavior. This result is not unintended. The goal of a
welfare economics/public choice approach is prediction
and control in the name of social stability. The goal
of the good society is replaced with the goal of the
predictable, yet unaccountable, society.
These four ideals are necessary to purge society of
those who might be moved by politics to ask the
difficult questions which, necessarily, politicize human
lives. Just as eighteenth and nineteenth century
political-economists desired to convince individuals
that the decline of the commons was the inevitable
outcome of individual liberation from the moral
constraints on greed, the proponents of a welfare
economics/public choice approach desire to create
individuals who will fit their model of a placid, yet
"interested," individual.
A welfare economics/public choice model does, then,
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provide strategic answers to certain policy problems.
However, its method of answering and the answers
themselves provide no foundation for a public policy
approach that could responsibly deal with political
questions and values that must be reconciled and re-
reconciled within a political and democratic setting. A
welfare economics/public choice approach to public
policy marks not the beginning of a new and enlightened
approach to difficult political issues, but, instead, a
march into the sea of technique, efficiency without
responsibility, numbers without values, policy without
politics.
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